Statutory and decisional law provide that a postconviction relief proceeding is the proper vehicle for raising limited objections to parole board decisions. State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 363, 367 A.2d 704, 706 (1976). However, the legally protected "interests of one who merely has a hope of 'conditional liberty'" are sparse.

STANDARD OF REVIEW Our Supreme Court has held that objections to Parole Board proceedings are reviewable in Superior Court by way of a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 365-66, 367 A.2d 704, 707 (1977). This Court notes that the applicant for post-conviction relief bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that post-conviction relief is warranted in his case.

Section 10–9.1–1(a)(5); State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 363, 367 A.2d 704, 706 (1976); see also Estrada v. Walker, 743 A.2d 1026, 1027 (R.I.1999) (where applicant challenged denial of parole in a postconviction-relief proceeding). In our opinion, it was error for the hearing justice to conclude that postconviction relief was not the appropriate vehicle for reviewing a denial of parole.

Our Supreme Court has further expounded that the actions of the Rhode Island Parole Board are further reviewable by this Court pursuant to a petition for postconviction relief. See State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 365, 367 A.2d 704, 707 (1976). "It seems to us that [§] 10-9.1-1, the postconviction remedy statute, is the proper vehicle for bringing [parole challenges] before the court."

This Court has adopted a "hands-off" policy when dealing with Parole Board proceedings, and has consistently expressed our reluctance to interfere with this orderly, legislatively-created structure. State v. Ouimette , 117 R.I. 361, 363, 367 A.2d 704, 706 (1976). "This [C]ourt has previously acknowledged a historically hands-off policy with respect to board proceedings ‘and the overall reluctance to interfere with what must necessarily be highly discretionary decisions.’ "

He also pointed out that this court has stated that the board is not completely immune from judicial review. See State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 371, 367 A.2d 704, 710 (1976). Clark argues that no administrative appeal lies under that section for judicial review of a board decision in an individual case.

At that time G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 13-8-14 stated that a prisoner would not be paroled unless it appeared to the board that (1) the prisoner was deserving of such parole because of his good conduct while in prison and that such prisoner had shown a disposition to reform and (2) the prisoner would be able to secure employment upon parole and thus not become a public charge. These guidelines constituted little, if any, limitation upon the parole board's discretion, for as we observed in State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 367 A.2d 704 (1976) (after noting the provisions of § 13-8-14), "The Parole Board, because of its special expertise, has been granted an extraordinarily broad amount of discretion to make decisions regarding parole release.

Our Supreme Court has held that postconviction relief is an appropriate vehicle for inmates who challenge decisions of the Parole Board. State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 363, 367 A.2d 704, 706 (1976). However, the Superior Court's review of a Parole Board's decision is limited to whether or not the petitioner's due process rights were violated.

Standard of Review Our Supreme Court has held that objections to Parole Board proceedings are reviewable in Superior Court by way of a petition for post-conviction relief. State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 365-66, 367 A.2d 704, 707 (1976). This Court notes that the applicant for post-conviction relief bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that post-conviction relief is warranted in his case.

Instead, he argues that he is entitled to, and has failed to receive, "minimal due process" in the absence of a statutorily-created liberty interest. Nolan cites a pre- Greenholtz case from Rhode Island, State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 367 A.2d 704 (R.I. 1976), in support of his position. The Ouimette court did not specify the source of the due process rights that it recognized, though it purported to protect them through application of a Rhode Island postconviction statute.