Opinion
No. 4-679 / 04-0168
Filed February 24, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey A. Neary, Judge.
James Ouellette appeals his convictions for possession of methamphetamine and failure to affix a drug tax stamp. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Arthur Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Brigit Barnes, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Zimmer, JJ.
James Frederick Ouellette appeals his judgments and convictions for possession of methamphetamine in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1) (1999), possession of marijuana in violation of section 124.401(5), and failure to affix a drug tax stamp in violation of section 453B.12. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
From the evidence introduced at trial, a reasonable juror could have found the following. At 4:16 a.m. on May 29, 2000, Deputy Sheriff Armstrong arrived at a Pronto gas station in Lawton to investigate a suspicious recreational vehicle (RV) parked next to the pumps. When he arrived, Armstrong observed only someone sitting in the driver's seat. That person appeared to be acting suspiciously and speaking to another unseen person in the vehicle. Upon approaching the RV, Armstrong instructed the driver, later identified as Scott Ristau, to exit. Ristau explained the battery was dead and requested a jump from the patrol car.
Armstrong asked if anyone else was in the RV. Ristau informed Armstrong a man named Jim was in the vehicle. On Amstrong's request, the appellant, James Ouellette, exited the RV, appearing nervous to the officer. Investigation revealed that the RV was not registered to either Ristau or Ouellette. Ouellette stated that he was in possession and control of the vehicle and claimed that he had recently purchased it from some individual named "Bob," but that he could not remember Bob's last name. He further claimed he was giving Ristau a test-drive in hopes of reselling it to him. Ouellette told Armstrong that his brother would have better information about Bob; however, after being contacted by other officers, Ouellette's brother responded that he had no idea what Ouellette was talking about.
Ouellette then consented to a search of the RV. Another sheriff's deputy and a Moville police officer conducted the search. During the search, the officer opened a compartment underneath the RV's stove and observed a bag with a Harley Davidson design. Upon inspection, the officer saw that the bag contained several syringes, a large cellophane-wrapped ball, and another bag. The bag also smelled strongly of chemicals. Officers also found a small bag containing a leafy substance and a marijuana pipe. Subsequent testing revealed that the ball was, in fact, methamphetamine and that the leafy substance was marijuana. After the deputy informed Ouellette he was being arrested for the possession of drugs, Ouellette responded by advising him that Ristau had brought a black bag with him into the RV, even though the deputy had not mentioned a black bag or informed him where the drugs were found.
Based on these discoveries, the State charged Ouellette with possession of methamphetamine and marijuana and failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Following a trial, the jury found Ouellette guilty on all counts and the court sentenced him to serve sixty days on the two possession charges, which were discharged based on credit for time served, and an indeterminate term not to exceed five years on the drug tax stamp violation. Ouellette appeals, contending the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed the controlled substances and that the court should have granted his motion for new trial.
Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is for errors at law. State v. Spies, 672 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 2003).
The district court's finding of guilt is binding upon us unless we find there was not substantial evidence in the record to support such a finding. In determining whether there was substantial evidence, we review the record evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Substantial evidence means such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
State v. Sutton, 636 N.W.2d 107, 110 (Iowa 2001) (quoting State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993)). In reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, "we must consider all the record evidence, not just the evidence supporting guilt." Id.
The primary thrust of Ouellette's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim is that the State failed to establish that he possessed the drugs. In order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, it must be shown that Ouellette (1) exercised dominion and control over the contraband, (2) had knowledge of its presence, and (3) had knowledge that the material was a controlled substance. State v. Bash, 670 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 2003) (citing State v. Reeves, 209 N.W.2d 18, 21 (Iowa 1973)). Possession can be either actual or constructive. Id. at 138. "Actual possession occurs when the controlled substance is found on the defendant's person. Constructive possession occurs when the defendant has knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance and has the authority or right to maintain control over it." Id. (citations omitted). Because no drugs were found on Ouellette himself, this matter concerns constructive possession.
Several factors are considered for determining whether a defendant had constructive possession of contraband. These factors include (1) incriminating statements made by the defendant, (2) incriminating actions of the defendant upon the police's discovery of drugs among or near the defendant's personal belongings, (3) the defendant's fingerprints on the packages containing the drugs, and (4) any other circumstances linking the defendant to the drugs. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Iowa 2003). Additionally, in a motor-vehicle case, a court may also consider these factors: (1) was the contraband in plain view, (2) was it with the defendant's personal effects, (3) was it found on the same side of the car seat or next to the defendant, (4) was the defendant the owner of the vehicle, and (5) was there suspicious activity by the defendant. Atkinson, 620 N.W.2d at 4. All of these factors are only to be used as a guide in determining whether the State has established constructive possession. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d at 571.
We conclude the following facts constitute sufficient evidence to support that Ouellette constructively possessed the methamphetamine and marijuana. First, he admitted to possession and control of the RV when he claimed to have recently purchased it and stated he was attempting to sell it to Ristau. In fact, it appeared that Ouellette had made certain repairs to the RV, as the officers searching it observed glue and tubes of caulk and smelled paint, while noting that the windows had recently been repaired and that the floor had paint stains on the carpet. This evidence of Ouellette's control over the vehicle in which the drugs were hidden is probative of his dominion and control of those drugs. See Cashen, 666 N.W.2d at 571. It further supports that he had a proprietary interest therein. Bash, 670 N.W.2d at 139.
Ouellette's response when initially confronted by the officers and later when informed of the presence of drugs in the RV is significant. When Deputy Armstrong first arrived on the scene, he observed Ristau apparently talking to an individual in the rear of the RV, toward where the drugs were later located. This indicates his proximity to the drugs when Armstrong arrived. When Ouellette exited the RV, Armstrong characterized his demeanor as "very nervous." Moreover, as noted, when the deputy informed Ouellette he was being arrested for the possession of drugs, Ouellette responded by volunteering that Ristau had brought a black bag with him into the RV, even though the deputy had never informed him of a black bag or where the drugs were found. Ouellette's nervousness and his suspicious remark speak to his "knowledge of the presence of the controlled substances on the premises and the ability to maintain control over them." State v. Webb, 648 N.W.2d 72, 81 (Iowa 2002).
The location in which the drugs were found is also significant. The searching officer located them in a drawer, approximately twenty-four inches wide and six or seven inches deep, located under the RV's stove. Directly inside that drawer was a youth size flotation device and behind that flotation device was the black Harley Davidson bag which contained drugs. This bag was not located in a location which would have been readily accessible to a person, such as Ristau, who allegedly was merely in the RV for a test drive in anticipation of its purchase. Rather, the bag was located in a position which would more likely have been used by and accessible to one in possession and control of the vehicle.
Accordingly, based on these facts, we conclude the State introduced sufficient proof of Ouellette's "knowledge of the presence of the controlled substances on the premises and the ability to maintain control over them." Webb, 648 N.W.2d at 81.
New Trial.
Ouellette claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)( b)(6). This rule permits a court to grant a new trial "[w]hen the verdict is contrary to law or evidence." Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)( b)(6). A verdict is contrary to evidence when it is against the weight of the credible evidence. State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). Appellate review of a weight-of-the-evidence claim "is limited to a review of the exercise of discretion by the trial court, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence." State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Iowa 2003).
In particular, much as in his sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, Ouellette asserts an abuse of discretion based on his view that the weight of credible evidence showed he did not constructively possess the controlled substances. As we have already discussed, however, substantial evidence supports the jury's conclusion in this regard. Therefore, we do not conclude the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence or that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial to Ouellette.