Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3389-10T1
04-05-2012
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. LUZ OSORIO, Defendant, and ALLEGHENY CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
Richard P. Blender, attorney for appellant Allegheny Casualty Co. James F. Ferguson, Atlantic County Counsel, attorney for respondent (Donna M. Taylor, Assistant County Counsel, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Sabatino and Ashrafi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Atlantic County, Indictment No. 09-00-5397.
Richard P. Blender, attorney for appellant Allegheny Casualty Co.
James F. Ferguson, Atlantic County Counsel, attorney for respondent (Donna M. Taylor, Assistant County Counsel, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Allegheny Casualty Company, which issued a bail bond to secure the release of defendant Luz Osorio from custody on State charges, appeals from a January 31, 2011 order of the Law Division denying its motion to vacate or remit forfeiture of the bail. Allegheny contends on appeal that the Law Division failed to consider and apply binding Supreme Court authority, State v. Ventura, 196 N.J. 203 (2008).
We agree that Ventura is controlling law in the factual circumstances of this case. However, the record in the Law Division contains no indication that Allegheny cited the case or brought it to the court's attention in support of its motion to vacate or remit bail forfeiture. Despite Allegheny's failure to make the argument it now raises for the first time on appeal, we are constrained to reverse the order denying remission and remand to the Law Division to reconsider Allegheny's application.
Defendant Osorio was arrested on November 9, 2009, and charged with State crimes involving false identification documents. On the same date, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security, placed a detainer against her release with the Atlantic County Sheriff's Department. On November 21, 2009, apparently unaware of the ICE detainer, Allegheny issued a bail bond for $15,000 to secure Osorio's release on the State charges.
Osorio was released on bail on November 24, 2009, but she was immediately taken into custody by ICE. The federal government deported her to Colombia on December 9, 2009. As a result, she failed to attend court on the Atlantic County charges on March 1, 2010. The court issued a warrant for her arrest and forfeited the bail.
Allegheny moved to vacate or remit the bail forfeiture, stating in a certification of the bail bondsman that Osorio had been deported. The court denied Allegheny's motion and, later, its motion for reconsideration. The court commented that it could not "legally help" Allegheny because Osorio was still a fugitive and had not been recaptured or returned to Atlantic County for proceedings on the State charges.
Bail forfeitures and remissions are governed by N.J.S.A. 2A:162-8 and Rule 3:26-6. The statute and the rule permit the court to set aside a forfeiture in whole or in part. State v. Ramirez, 378 N.J. Super. 355, 364 (App. Div. 2005); State v. de la Hoya, 359 N.J. Super. 194, 198 (App. Div. 2003). "The matter of remission lies essentially in judicial discretion." State v. Peace, 63 N.J. 127, 129 (1973).
In State v. Hyers, 122 N.J. Super. 177, 180 (App. Div. 1973), we listed factors relevant to the court's exercise of that discretion, and in Peace, supra, 63 N.J. at 129, the Supreme Court approved consideration of those factors. At a later time, and after development of additional precedents on the issue of bail remission, the Administrative Office of the Courts issued guidelines to assist trial courts in determining the amount of forfeited bail that should be remitted. See Supplement to Directive #13-04, (issued Nov. 12, 2008), available at www.judiciary.state.nj.us/directive/2008/dir_13-04_ Supplement_11_12_08.pdf.
Citing case law, the administrative directive outlines policy concerns, in particular, providing an incentive for a surety to recapture a fugitive and avoiding commercial sureties from being overly cautious in issuing bail bonds. Id. at 1. The directive lists the relevant factors a trial court should weigh when deciding a remission request and provides guidance in balancing those factors. Id. at 1-4. The directive includes three remission schedules that courts should use as "a starting point when determining whether to grant a remission . . . and . . . the amount to remit." Id. at 4-8. Remission Schedule 1 states: "Where the defendant remains a fugitive when the remission motion is made, the essential undertaking of the surety remains unsatisfied, and the denial of any remission is entirely appropriate." Id. at 6 (citing State v. Harmon, 361 N.J. Super. 250, 255 (App. Div. 2003)). The directive recognizes, however, that there may be exceptions to denial of remission even where a defendant is still a fugitive. Ibid.
The AOC guidelines list the following factors:
1. Whether the surety has made a reasonable effort under the circumstances to effect the recapture of the fugitive defendant.
2. Whether the applicant is a commercial bondsman.
3. The degree of surety's supervision of the defendant while he or she was released on bail.
4. The length of time the defendant is a fugitive.
5. The prejudice to the State, and the expense incurred by the State, as a result of the fugitive's non-appearance, recapture and enforcement of the forfeiture.
6. Whether the reimbursement of the State's expenses will adequately satisfy the interests of justice.
7. The defendant's commission of another crime while a fugitive.
8. The amount of the posted bail.
[Id. at 1-2 (citations and further explanatory text omitted).]
In Ventura, supra, 196 N.J. at 216, the Supreme Court established such an exception in factual circumstances where a defendant is deported after being released on bail. The Court stated:
In most cases, remission of bail will not be appropriate unless the defendant has been returned to the jurisdiction of the court. Nevertheless, when deportation is the sole reason a defendant is unable to attend court, a crucial factor that the trial court should consider is whether the defendant was a fugitive from New Jersey at the time of deportation. That is, whether the defendant while compliant with the terms of his or her release, voluntarily attended a deportation hearing or was brought there by the authorities and thereafter was deported; or, whether the defendant was a fugitive when captured and then subsequently deported. If the former, then some degree of remission should be considered; if the latter, then remission generally should be denied.This case presents the former circumstances described in the quoted language. When Osorio was taken into custody by ICE and deported, she was not a fugitive from New Jersey. Therefore, some degree of remission of the bail was legally appropriate and should have been considered.
[Id. at 218.]
In Ventura, supra, 196 N.J. at 216-17, the Court also cited with approval our prior decision in State v. Poon, 244 N.J. Super. 86, 101 (App. Div. 1990), in which we rejected a per se rule prohibiting remission of bail forfeiture where a defendant has failed to appear in court because of deportation. In Poon, we discussed factors relevant to remission, including: (1) whether the indictment was dismissed on grounds other than the defendant's non-appearance; (2) whether the State was seeking to extradite the defendant; (3) whether the State was prejudiced by the absence of the defendant in a co-defendant's trial; (4) whether the defendant intentionally chose deportation over prosecution on the State charges, and (5) whether the surety made any effort to return the defendant to this jurisdiction. Id. at 101-02.
Here, because the Law Division did not consider the applicable law as stated in Ventura and Poon, we reverse its order denying Allegheny's motion to remit the bail forfeiture and remand for reconsideration in accord with those cases. We intimate no views as to whether remission must be granted nor the amount of any appropriate remission.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
I hereby certify that the foregoing
is a true copy of the original on
file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION