{20} In the event that there is no formal arrest prior to questioning, "our appellate courts engage in a fact-specific analysis of the totality of the circumstances under which the questioning took place in order to decide whether the custody requirement is met." State v. Olivas , 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 10, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722. The following factors guide our inquiry: "the purpose, place, and length of interrogation[,] ... the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt, the physical surroundings of the interrogation, the duration of the detention, and the degree of pressure applied to the defendant."

It concluded that “it is clear that Article II, Section 15 [of the New Mexico Constitution] provides that physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda violation should be suppressed.” {21} In its motion to reconsider the suppression of evidence, the State argued that “Patane is valid law in New Mexico[,]” citing State v. Olivas, 2011–NMCA–030, ¶ 18, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722, and that several recent New Mexico cases state that Article II, Section 15 has not been interpreted to provide more protections than the Fifth Amendment, citing State v. Randy J., 2011–NMCA–105, ¶ 28, 150 N.M. 683, 265 P.3d 734, and State v. Quinones, 2011–NMCA–018, ¶¶ 16–18, 149 N.M. 294, 248 P.3d 336. Olivas, however, contains no mention of Article II, Section 15 and its discussion of Patane cites to Adame, in which this Court expressly stated that its analysis was based only on the United States Constitution.

Recently, we relied on Wilson in part to hold that the defendant was in custody for Fifth Amendment purposes, despite agreeing to meet with officers, when he was handcuffed, transported in a police vehicle, and interrogated at the district attorney's office without handcuffs but under other conditions indicating restraint. State v. Olivas, 2011–NMCA–030, ¶¶ 11–12, 15, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722. 4. Handcuffing Defendant did not Transform the Probationary Home Visit Into a Custodial Interrogation Situation

"It is well-settled law that in order to preserve a speedy trial argument for appellate review, the defendant must properly raise it in the lower court and invoke a ruling." State v. Olivas , 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 22, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). Though Defendant asserted his speedy trial right when his case began in 2003, he never filed a motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights, and he never sought to invoke a ruling from the district court on that issue.

{12} Appellate review of a motion to suppress under Miranda presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Olivas , 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722. We defer to the district court's findings of fact, if they are supported by substantial evidence, and apply de novo review to the application of the law to those facts.

{18} The United States Constitution does not require the suppression of physical evidence obtained by virtue of a defendant's voluntary statements, even if those statements were obtained without a valid waiver of the defendant's Miranda rights.See State v. Adame, 2006-NMCA-100, ¶¶ 9-14, 140 N.M. 258, 142 P.3d 26 (adopting the United States Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 633-34 (2004), "that the failure to give Miranda warnings [does] not require suppression of evidence that [is] the fruit of a suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements"); see also State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶¶ 18-20, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722 (admitting physical evidence obtained as a result of the defendant's voluntary statements even though officers failed to advise the defendant of his Miranda rights). Thus, the issue on appeal is whether Defendant's statements were voluntary. {19} Defendant made the statements during an interrogation at the police station, after Defendant was arrested near the scene of Lossiah's murder.

The expert testified that the impression on Taegan's abdomen was made by a shoe that was the same size and had the same outsole pattern as Defendant's right shoe. {41} As our Court of Appeals has observed, "the failure to give Miranda warnings did not require suppression of evidence that [is] the fruit of a [defendant's] unwarned but voluntary statements." State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 18, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722 (quoting United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004)). We affirm the district court's determination that Defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation when the statements were given—Defendant's statements were voluntary. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress the evidence of Defendant's shoes based on the statements given during his interviews.

Whether a defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation and whether a defendant's statement was voluntarily given are legal determinations that we review de novo on appeal." State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).

Whether a defendant was subject to a custodial interrogation and whether a defendant's statement was voluntarily given are legal determinations that we review de novo on appeal." State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 8, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722 (alterations, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted).

{¶3} "It is well-settled law that in order to preserve a speedy trial argument for appellate review, the defendant must properly raise it in the lower court and invoke a ruling." State v. Olivas, 2011-NMCA-030, ¶ 22, 149 N.M. 498, 252 P.3d 722 (text only) (citation omitted). Defendant concedes that he did not preserve the speedy trial argument and requests that this Court exercise its discretion to review for fundamental error.