Rock requires that a defendant whose case is dismissed without prejudice immediately appeal that order rather than await refiling and challenge the dismissal post-conviction. We disagree with Rock's view of "finality" and believe that our reasoning in State v. Olander, 8 Wn. App. 563, 509 P.2d 60 (1973), is more persuasive. Although we decided Olander under the CAROAs, as those rules then governed, the standard for review was similar to the standard now in place under RAP 2.2(a)(1).
Upon careful review of the record and the briefs submitted by the parties, and having duly considered the arguments raised and the case and statutory law relevant to the issues on appeal, we hereby dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because an order of dismissal without prejudice is not a final appealable order. See State v. Johns[t]on, 63 Haw. 9, 619 P.2d 1076 (1980); State v. Olander, 8 Wn. App. 563, 509 P.2d 60 (1973). On March 9, 1998, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration; however, the ICA denied the motion on March 11, 1998.
The documents reflect "'the final determination of the rights of the parties to the action.'" State v. Olander, 8 Wn. App. 563, 566, 509 P.2d 60 (1973) (quoting State v. Siglea, 196 Wn. 283, 285, 82 P.2d 583 (1938) (adopting the civil rule definition of judgment for criminal cases)).
A defendant may move to dismiss under RCW 10.46.090. State v. Sonneland, 80 Wn.2d 343, 494 P.2d 469 (1972); State v. Olander, 8 Wn. App. 563, 509 P.2d 60 (1973). We find that LJuCR 7.14(b) does not supersede but instead complements RCW 10.46.090 by directing that justice is furthered by dismissing cases where there has been unreasonable delay in referring juvenile offenders to the court.