Summary
In O'Keefe, 286 So.3d at 1046, the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered the ''applicant" be given an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea because the district court conceded it did not advise him of the parole eligibility provisions of La. R.S. 15:574.4, which required he serve a greater portion of the sentence without the benefit of parole than did the sentence imposed by the district court.
Summary of this case from Golatt v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.Opinion
No. 2019-KH-0608
01-14-2020
STATE of Louisiana v. Derek O'KEEFE
PER CURIAM:
Granted in part. The district court conceded that it did not advise applicant of the parole eligibility provisions found in R.S. 15:574.4, which require service of a greater portion of the sentence without the benefit of parole than does the sentence imposed under the plea agreement. Thus, applicant is entitled to withdraw his plea. See State ex rel. LaFleur v. Donnelly , 416 So.2d. 82 (La. 1982). The matter is remanded for a further hearing where applicant shall be represented by counsel and informed of the consequences that might lie if he withdraws his present plea. If applicant still wishes to withdraw his plea after receiving this information, the district court shall allow him to do so. The application is otherwise denied.
CRICHTON, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Crain.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., dissenting with reasons: Pursuant to an agreement with the state, applicant pled guilty to violating La. R.S. 14:42.1, forcible rape. The district court sentenced him to 25 years imprisonment at hard labor, with two years served without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The Department of Corrections then informed applicant he was parole ineligible until he served at least 85 percent of his sentence, pursuant to La. R.S. 15:574.4. The per curiam allows applicant to withdraw his plea due to the district court failing to advise him of the more prohibitive parole eligibility provisions found in La. R.S. 15:574.4.
I respectfully dissent. The more specific provisions of La. R.S. 14:42.1 prevail over the general provisions of La. R.S. 15:574.4. The former statute is specific for forcible rape, and instructs the judiciary, who is responsible for imposing sentences. La. R.S. 15:574.4 pertains generally to juvenile parole eligibility for crimes-of-violence and applies post-sentencing to the Department of Corrections, who is responsible for executing sentences. This Court has held "[i]t is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that when two statutes deal with the same subject matter, if there is a conflict, the statute specifically directed to the matter at issue must prevail as an exception to the statute more general in character." State v. Campbell, 03-3035, p. 8 (La. 7/6/04), 877 So.2d 112, 118.
Accordingly, I dissent and find the guilty plea should stand as agreed to, as it contemplated a legal sentence imposed by the district court. By legislative dictate and the district court's exercise of lawful sentencing discretion, applicant should be parole "eligible" after two years.