Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4636-11T4
10-28-2013
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. REGINA OKAFOR, Defendant-Appellant.
Chinemerem N. Njoku, attorney for appellant. Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jo-Ann Teng, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Reisner and Carroll.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Municipal Appeal No. 2011-047.
Chinemerem N. Njoku, attorney for appellant.
Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jo-Ann Teng, Special Deputy Attorney General/ Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Following a municipal court trial and a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Regina Okafor was found guilty of disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-2a(2). After reviewing the record in light of the contentions advanced on appeal, we affirm.
We discern the following facts from the record. The incident occurred when defendant entered the Essex County economic development building. Signs posted on doors leading into the building advised that audio/video recording equipment was not permitted. Beyond the doors was a security area. After passing through the magnetometer, defendant stopped, held up her cell phone, and began waving it back and forth. An image on the cell phone indicated that defendant was using it as a recording device. Defendant was asked to turn it off, and to clear the entry way so that persons behind her could pass through security. When she refused, thus preventing the line of some 250 people behind her from passing through, she was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.
On July 19, 2011, the municipal court judge found defendant guilty of the disorderly conduct charge. Defendant appealed to the Law Division which found, based on the record developed before the municipal court, that there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant of the charge. In a thorough written opinion, Judge Ramona A. Santiago found that defendant disrupted the security line at the county economic development building, by video recording on her cell phone, in violation of a posted sign, and then refusing to leave the premises when directed to do so. Instead, defendant stood blocking the security line, inconveniencing about 250 people who were waiting to enter the building. Defendant now appeals from this April 17, 2012, Law Division judgment, raising the following arguments:
POINT I: Hon. Ramona A. Santiago erred in ruling that the contents of the civil sign that was not produced in Court as evidence was not hearsay.
POINT II: [Judge] Santiago erred in finding that Appellant was guilty of disorderly persons conduct because the ruling is not supported by the evidence on record.
a. [Judge Santiago's] finding that there were prior statements between Appellant and Officer Megna is incorrect and without any factual basis.
b. [Judge] Santiago's finding that Appellant is guilty of a disorderly person's conduct because she stopped in front of the magnetometer and ignored the orders of the security officers is not supported by evidence.
c. The credibility of the witness regarding his testimony was very questionable and doubtful.
POINT III: The judgment must be reversed because the State despite having months to provide discovery, refused to provide the evidence of the civil sign, thereby prejudicing the right of Appellant to defend herself.
We affirm substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Santiago in her written opinion. We add the following comments.
We start with well-established principles. We review the Law Division's decision employing the "substantial evidence rule." State v. Heine, 424 N.J. Super. 48, 58 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 211 N.J. 608 (2012). We ask whether the Law Division's findings "could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964); see also State v. Avena, 281 N.J. Super. 327, 333 (App. Div. 1995). Once satisfied that the findings and conclusions of the Law Division meet that criterion, our "task is complete[,]" and we "should not disturb the result" even if we "might have reached a different conclusion" or if the result was a "close one." Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 162. Notwithstanding the foregoing, our review of the legal conclusions that flow from established facts is plenary. See State v. Handy, 412 N.J. Super. 492, 498 (App. Div. 2010), aff'd, 206 N.J. 39 (2011) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
Here, the Law Division judge applied the correct standard by making her own findings of fact based on the municipal court record, giving due, though not controlling, regard to the municipal judge's findings. See State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 473-74 (1999); Johnson, supra, 42 N.J. at 157. Judge Santiago specifically found "no merit" in defendant's argument that the testimony given by the sheriff's officer, who was stationed near the magnetometer, was unreliable. The officer's testimony about the posting of signs prohibiting recording devices established notice that defendant's conduct was prohibited. Additionally, there was testimony that the security officers informed defendant about the policy, and that she was violating it. Thus, there was clearly sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the judge's determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant's conduct served no legitimate purpose, that it caused inconvenience to some 250 people waiting to gain access to the building, and created a potentially volatile situation and a security breach. We perceive no basis for disturbing the judge's determination.
Defendant also argues that the officer's testimony regarding the content of the signs, which were not produced at trial, should have been excluded as inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.
"Hearsay" is an out-of-court statement used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, N.J.R.E. 801(c), and, as a general rule, is inadmissible, N.J.R.E. 802. As Judge Santiago cogently observed, testimony relating to the signs was admitted to show that defendant had knowledge of the fact that recording devices were prohibited, rather than to prove the truth of the matter. Testimony about the signs explained the officers' reason for telling defendant to leave, and was only offered to establish that the signs existed, that they were visible to patrons entering the building, and that they put patrons on notice of the building's requirements to gain entry. Further, defendant was not arrested for violating the direction contained on the signs, but rather for refusing to leave and then blocking the security line, thus preventing other patrons from entering. Given the State's non-assertive use of the testimony about the signs, the general rule for excluding hearsay does not apply. See Carmona v. Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc., 189 N.J. 354, 375-77 (2007) (finding no hearsay violation where a statement was considered, not for the truthfulness of its contents, but to demonstrate that the recipient had a reasonable and good faith basis to engage in certain conduct after receiving that statement); State v. Long, 173 N.J. 138, 152 (2002).
Defendant's remaining arguments are clearly without merit and do not warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION