Johnson, 69 Wash, at 616; Jackschitz, 76 Wash, at 254; O'Day, 36 Wn.2d at 159; Van Wagner, 16 Wn.2d at 62.Johnson, 69 Wash, at 616; Jackschitz, 76 Wash, at 254; Olson 127 Wash, at 301; O'Day, 36 Wn.2d at 159; Jimas, 166 Wash, at 358, 361; Heslin, 63 Wn.2d 957; State v. Ohm, 145 Wash. 197, 198, 259 P. 382 (1927).Johnson, 69 Wash, at 614; Olson, 127 Wash, at 302; Van Wagner, 16 Wn.2d at 55; O'Day, 36 Wn.2d at 150; Jackschitz, 76 Wash, at 255; Sullivan, 172 Wash, at 535.
¶10 "It is the policy of the law to encourage the giving of bail in bailable offenses, and for this reason the courts are lenient in relieving bondsmen from a forfeiture, where they have been diligent in returning the person ... to the processes of the courts."State v. Ohm, 145 Wash. 197, 198, 259 P. 382 (1927). The test, in determining the question whether the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond, "is not alone one of time whether prompt or otherwise; nor good faith, or the lack of it; nor compensation, or lack of it, to the bondsmen or surety; nor whether there are organized, undisclosed principals in procuring the business of furnishing bail" but "is the judicial discretion of the trial judge, who, in formulating and arriving at his judgment, may look to all such things, if in the case, and others, if there are any, with the understanding, ... that in ‘the absence of evidence of flagrant abuse the appellate court will not interfere."
Where the principal is returned after the expiration of the 60-day stay of execution period, the trial court's decision has been affirmed in every instance whether the motion to vacate the forfeiture was granted or denied. State v. Van Wagner, 16 Wn.2d 54, 132 P.2d 359 (1942); State v. Jimas, supra; State v. Ohm, 145 Wn. 197, 259 P. 382 (1927); State v. Jackschitz, supra; State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 507 P.2d 909 (1973). [4] The scope of review that can be exercised by this court was stated in State v. Van Wagner, at 62-63 (quoting State v. Jimas, supra):
However, where the defendant is taken into custody after expiration of the 60-day stay of execution period, the trial court exercising its inherent discretion has been affirmed in every instance whether or not the motion to vacate has been granted or denied. State v. Jackschitz, 76 Wn. 253, 136 P.2d 132 (1913) (affirmed return of bail); State v. Ohm, 145 Wn. 197, 259 P. 382 (1927) (affirmed refusal to vacate); State v. Jimas, 166 Wn. 356, 7 P.2d 15 (1932) (affirmed refusal to vacate); State v. Van Wagner, supra (affirmed refusal to vacate). Defendant was not taken into custody until after the 60-day stay of execution period.