Opinion
No. 5-442 / 04-1223
Filed July 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buena Vista County, Donavon D. Schaefer, District Associate Judge.
Rockne O'Hara appeals following his convictions for operating while intoxicated, second offense, and interference with official acts. AFFIRMED.
David Jennett, Storm Lake, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, Phil Havens, County Attorney, and David Patton, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J. and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
Rockne O'Hara appeals from the judgment and sentence entered following his convictions for operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2003), and interference with official acts, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.1(1). He claims the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police illegally entered his home to arrest him. We affirm the district court.
O'Hara asserts his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Iowa Constitution were violated. Our supreme court has generally interpreted Article I, Section 8 to have the same scope and purpose as the Fourth Amendment. State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 765 (Iowa 2001). Since O'Hara has offered no reason to distinguish the state constitutional guarantee from the federal provision as it has been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court with respect to the issue before us, our discussion of the Fourth Amendment applies equally to the state constitutional claim.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On October 31, 2003, Buena Vista County Reserve Deputy Sheriff Scott Mack was running radar on Highway 71 in Sioux Rapids, Iowa. At approximately 9:40 p.m., Deputy Mack observed a pickup truck turn onto the highway from a nearby bowling alley and accelerate to a high rate of speed. Deputy Mack's radar indicated the truck was going forty-six miles per hour in a thirty-five mile per hour zone. Deputy Mack decided to follow the truck.
The truck turned from the highway onto a gravel road. Deputy Mack observed the truck hit the curb while turning. At that point, Deputy Mack decided he was going to initiate a traffic stop, but before he did the truck turned into a driveway. Deputy Mack pulled into the driveway behind the truck and exited his patrol car. The driver of the truck exited his vehicle at the same time. As the driver walked towards the patrol car, Deputy Mack noticed that the driver was swaying. The driver bumped into the truck with his shoulder and appeared to be unsteady. Deputy Mack believed that the driver might be intoxicated.
Deputy Mack asked to see the individual's driver's license. The driver responded by attempting to give Deputy Mack two different credit cards. During this time, Deputy Mack could see the individual's driver's license in his wallet. Additionally, Deputy Mack detected the odor of alcohol and noticed that the driver's speech was slurred. Deputy Mack asked the driver if he had been drinking. The driver said that he had one beer at the bowling alley. The driver was subsequently identified as Rockne O'Hara.
Deputy Mack told O'Hara to either sit in his truck or stand where he was while he checked his license. Deputy Mack expressly directed O'Hara not to go into his home. O'Hara said that would be fine because he had no place to go. Deputy Mack then returned to his patrol car and requested that another deputy come to his location because he had a possible intoxicated driver. He also ran a check on O'Hara's license. While Deputy Mack was in his patrol car, he observed O'Hara walk into his house through an attached garage.
Since Deputy Mack was a reserve officer, he needed another deputy to do the implied consent advisory and administer field sobriety tests.
Deputy Mack exited his patrol car, walked into O'Hara's garage and knocked on his door. Deputy Mack could see O'Hara through a window in the door. O'Hara invited Deputy Mack into his home. Once inside, Deputy Mack asked O'Hara what he was doing. O'Hara told him that he needed to eat his supper and have a drink. O'Hara then took a drink of a clear substance from a glass. After he put the glass down, O'Hara ordered Deputy Mack out of his house. Deputy Mack asked O'Hara to step back outside. O'Hara refused, saying he did not have to leave. Deputy Mack decided not to arrest O'Hara at this point, because he thought there "could possibly be a struggle" and he did not want to fight with O'Hara in a kitchen area for officer safety concerns. Deputy Mack then exited O'Hara's residence and immediately called for more deputies to come to the scene.
Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, Deputy Marty DeMuth, Deputy Rob Danielson, Reserve Deputy Mike White, and Trooper Bryan Beckman arrived at O'Hara's residence. After Deputy Mack explained the situation to the other officers, he and Deputy DeMuth approached the front door of O'Hara's house while Deputy White and Trooper Beckman went to the back of the house to prevent O'Hara from fleeing from the scene. As Deputy Mack and Deputy DeMuth were walking to the front door, they observed O'Hara through a picture window. He was sitting on a couch with a bottle of Bud Light in his hand. Deputy DeMuth knocked on the door. O'Hara got up and opened the door. He was still holding the bottle of beer in his hand. The deputies stepped inside and arrested O'Hara. O'Hara was informed that he was under arrest for interference with official acts because he failed to obey Deputy Mack's orders.
While Deputy DeMuth was escorting O'Hara from his house to a patrol car, he noticed that O'Hara's balance was poor. Deputy Danielson also noticed that O'Hara smelled of alcohol, was swaying, and was not steady on his feet. O'Hara was asked if he would perform field sobriety tests. He said that he would not. At that point, O'Hara was told that he was also under arrest for operating while intoxicated.
On December 15, 2003, the State charged O'Hara with operating while intoxicated, second offense. O'Hara was also charged with interference with official acts. O'Hara moved to suppress evidence obtained based on the officers' warrantless entry into his home to arrest him. The district court denied his motion. Following a jury trial, O'Hara was found guilty as charged. O'Hara appeals.
The record is not clear on when O'Hara was officially charged with this crime.
II. Scope of Review
O'Hara challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, which implicates his constitutional rights; as a result our review is de novo. State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 510 (Iowa 1997). We make an independent evaluation of the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).
III. Discussion
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. In interpreting this provision of the Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "the Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions . . . but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner." Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 918 (1966).
Our supreme court has stated the following regarding the Fourth Amendment:
The essential purpose of the proscriptions of the Fourth Amendment "is to impose a standard of `reasonableness' upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law enforcement agents[,] in order `to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasion. . . .
State v. Legg, 633 N.W.2d 763, 766 (Iowa 2001). "To protect citizens against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fourth Amendment requires that the government must obtain a warrant before it may search or enter an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 767.
Our supreme court has adopted a two-part test for analyzing whether there has been a Fourth Amendment violation. State v. Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 2004). We first must decide whether the person challenging the search or seizure has shown a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area entered. Id. at 562-63. If so, we proceed to the second step which requires us to consider whether the State has unreasonably invaded that protected interest. Id. at 563. "Our evaluation of the reasonableness of a search [or seizure] is made using an objective standard." Legg, 633 N.W.2d at 767. "Consequently, the legality of a search and [or] seizure does not depend on the actual motivation of the individual officers involved." Id.
"The determination of whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy concerning a specific area is made on a case-by-case basis, considering the unique facts of each situation." Lovig, 675 N.W.2d at 563. "Notwithstanding a generally case-by-case approach, it is well established that persons have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their homes." Legg, 633 N.W.2d at 767.
O'Hara contends he was illegally seized in his home because the arresting officers did not have a warrant when they briefly entered his house to arrest him. The State suggests that when O'Hara opened his door in response to the deputies' knock he placed himself in a public place for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The State relies on United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42, 96 S. Ct. 2406, 2409, 49 L. Ed. 2d 300, 303 (1976) to support its argument.
In Santana, the police observed the defendant standing in the doorway of her home and they started shouting "police" and displaying their identification. As the officers approached, the defendant retreated into her home. The officers followed the defendant into her home and caught her in the vestibule. The United States Supreme Court determined that when a person is standing in the doorway of his or her home, the person is in a public place for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. The court reasoned that although the threshold of one's dwelling may be considered to be "private" under the common law of property, what a person exposes to the public even in his or her own house is not given Fourth Amendment protection.
We do not find Santana controlling here. Unlike in Santana, O'Hara did not retreat into his home after the officers identified themselves. Instead he merely opened the door after the deputies knocked. The deputies then walked into O'Hara's home and arrested him. Like the district court, we find that O'Hara had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his home, which included his doorway.
Having concluded that O'Hara had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his home, we must now determine whether the State unreasonably invaded O'Hara's home. The district court found that the deputies had probable cause to arrest O'Hara and that exigent circumstances existed which made it reasonable for the deputies to seize O'Hara in his home without a warrant. Upon our de novo review of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the district court's conclusions.
Our supreme court has defined probable cause to make an arrest in the following way:
Probable cause is not determined by observations of and reliance on any particular factor. Probable cause to make an arrest turns upon the circumstances of each case. The facts must give rise to something more than a mere suspicion, but they need not be so strong as to convince officers involved in the arrest of a suspect's guilt. Probable cause exists if the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it.
Lovig, 675 N.W.2d at 564.
O'Hara claims that the deputies did not have probable cause to arrest him. We disagree. We believe that when the deputies entered O'Hara's doorway they had probable cause to arrest him for at least three offenses.
Deputy Mack initiated a traffic stop with O'Hara by pulling in behind O'Hara in his driveway. Deputy Mack stopped O'Hara because his radar indicated that O'Hara was driving forty-six miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone. Deputy Mack subsequently became suspicious that O'Hara was operating while intoxicated because of his conduct. O'Hara was unsteady on his feet and was swaying, he gave Deputy Mack two different credit cards in response to Deputy Mack's request for his driver's license, he smelled of alcohol, his speech was slurred, and he told Deputy Mack that he had been drinking earlier that night. While Deputy Mack was checking O'Hara's driver's license, O'Hara walked into his house even though he was specifically instructed by Deputy Mack to stay by his truck and not to go inside his home. Each of the above facts viewed by a reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that the following three crimes had been committed by O'Hara: speeding, operating while intoxicated, and interference with official acts. Accordingly, we find the deputies had ample probable cause to arrest O'Hara.
We next turn to the issue of whether exigent circumstances existed in this case. The State claims that two exigent circumstances were present: the destruction of evidence and hot pursuit. The destruction of evidence and hot pursuit are acknowledged exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry. Legg, 633 N.W.2d at 770.
Our supreme court has previously recognized two ways by which the collection of evidence of an alcohol-related offense can be altered or destroyed by a delay in making an arrest. Id. at 772. First, a suspect could ingest more alcohol, skewing the alcohol content higher and corrupting any evidence of prior consumption. Id. Second, the blood alcohol level naturally dissipates during a delay. Id.
The State argues that Deputy Mack was in hot pursuit because he followed O'Hara before stopping him in his driveway and he was present when O'Hara walked into his home. The State further argues that O'Hara engaged in an effort to destroy evidence by drinking a clear substance in front of Deputy Mack and by having a beer in his living room. O'Hara consumed these beverages after being told by Deputy Mack to remain outside by his truck. The State contends that O'Hara's actions transformed a public traffic stop into a situation where hot pursuit was necessary and the destruction of evidence was a concern. The State maintains that the warrantless entry into O'Hara's home was justified by these exigent circumstances.
We agree that exigent circumstances existed in this case. It is undisputed that after being told to remain outside by his truck, O'Hara entered his home. He subsequently drank a clear substance in front of Deputy Mack and was seen by two deputies holding a beer in his living room. Any further delay by the deputies would have resulted in destruction of evidence.
We also note that the magnitude of infringement upon O'Hara's privacy interests were minimal. The two deputies walked a few steps into O'Hara's home to arrest him. The deputies were only in O'Hara's home for a few moments and the intrusion was peaceful. Furthermore, the deputies did not search the premises.
Having examined the competing interests in this case, we conclude that the deputies' conduct was reasonable. Although O'Hara clearly had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his home, there was probable cause and exigent circumstances that justified the deputies' minimal invasion of this privacy interest. Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.