State v. Offen

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Davies

    164 N.H. 71 (N.H. 2012)

    To mount a successful collateral challenge to a guilty plea, the defendant bears the initial burden and must describe the specific manner in which his waiver of rights was in fact involuntary or without understanding, and must at least go forward with evidence sufficient to indicate that his specific claim presents a genuine issue for adjudication. State v. Offen, 156 N.H. 435, 438, 938 A.2d 879 (2007). If the defendant meets his initial burden, and if the record indicates that the trial court affirmatively inquired into the knowledge and volition of the defendant's plea, then the burden remains with the defendant to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the trial court was wrong and that his plea was either involuntary or unknowing for the reason he specifically claims.

  2. State v. Ortiz

    163 N.H. 506 (N.H. 2012)   Cited 11 times
    Ruling that "Padilla does not speak to the due process obligations of a trial court accepting a guilty plea," and upholding the traditional view that immigration consequences are collateral for that purpose

    In a collateral attack of a guilty plea, the defendant bears the initial burden and must describe the specific manner in which the waiver was in fact involuntary or without understanding, and must at least go forward with evidence sufficient to indicate that his specific claim presents a genuine issue for adjudication. State v. Offen, 156 N.H. 435, 438, 938 A.2d 879 (2007). If the defendant meets his initial burden, and if the record indicates that the trial court affirmatively inquired into the knowledge and volition of the defendant's plea, then the defendant has the burden to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the trial court was wrong and that his plea was either involuntary or unknowing for the reason he specifically claims.

  3. State v. Kinne

    161 N.H. 41 (N.H. 2010)   Cited 6 times
    Noting that Avery does not bar collateral attacks asserting ineffective assistance of counsel or collateral attacks on purportedly illegal sentences

    Kinne also acknowledged at his sentencing hearing that his attorney had advised him of the charges against him, and his attorney stated that he had gone over the acknowledgment of rights form with Kinne and was satisfied that Kinne understood his rights and knowingly relinquished them. CompareThornton, 140 N.H. at 538, 669 A.2d 791 (finding plea to be voluntary and intelligent where both defendant and his counsel signed an acknowledgment of rights form), withArsenault, 153 N.H. at 417, 897 A.2d 988 (finding that defendant had met his initial burden to challenge a guilty plea where he was unrepresented by counsel, he received information regarding the plea only from the prosecutor, and no one described any elements of the offense to him), andState v. Offen, 156 N.H. 435, 438, 938 A.2d 879 (2007) (finding that defendant met his initial burden where he appeared pro se, had a limited education, and testified that he did not understand an element of the crime). Kinne has never claimed that his trial counsel did not explain the elements of class A felony robbery.

  4. State v. Thiel

    160 N.H. 462 (N.H. 2010)   Cited 13 times
    Looking to plain and ordinary meaning of word "premises" as "the place of business of an enterprise or institution" in addressing defendant's argument that her conduct did not meet requirements of shoplifting statute

    “We review questions of statutory interpretation and constitutional questions of law de novo.” State v. Offen, 156 N.H. 435, 437, 938 A.2d 879 (2007). “In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole.”

  5. State v. McMillan

    158 N.H. 753 (N.H. 2009)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding that "holding a legal interest in property, such as a leasehold, is not dispositive on the issue of license or privilege" to enter premises but, rather, "the fact finder must look beyond legal title and evaluate the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a defendant had license or privilege to enter"

    To the extent the defendant raises an issue of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. State v. Offen, 156 N.H. 435, 437, 938 A.2d 879 (2007). We are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute as a whole.

  6. State v. Dansereau

    157 N.H. 596 (N.H. 2008)   Cited 17 times
    Describing the rule of lenity as a rule of statutory construction "for interpreting criminal statutes where the legislature failed to articulate its intent unambiguously"

    “A guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to be valid.” State v. Offen, 156 N.H. 435, 437, 938 A.2d 879 (2007) (quotation omitted). Thus, a defendant must voluntarily waive his rights and “fully understand[] the elements of the offense to which he is pleading, the direct consequences of the plea, and the rights he is forfeiting.”