I.THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS In State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 871 P.2d 801, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 952, 115 S.Ct. 369, 130 L.Ed.2d 321, and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 955, 115 S.Ct. 377, 130 L.Ed.2d 327 (1994) ( Odiaga I), the Court overturned Odiaga's conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. Id. at 392, 871 P.2d at 809.
Both Estrada and the State have limited their analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel to the federal framework; this Court's analysis will be similarly restricted. See State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 387, 871 P.2d 801, 804 (1994). The United States Supreme Court established the standard for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, supra.
Defendant admits that we have on numerous occasions rejected claims that the abolition of the insanity defense violated the Federal Constitution. State v. Delling , 152 Idaho 122, 267 P.3d 709 (2011) ; State v. Moore , 126 Idaho 208, 880 P.2d 238 (1994) ; State v. Odiaga , 125 Idaho 384, 871 P.2d 801 (1994) ; State v. Gomez , 126 Idaho 83, 878 P.2d 782 (1994) ; State v. Winn , 121 Idaho 850, 828 P.2d 879 (1992) ; State v. Card , 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991) ; State v. Searcy , 118 Idaho 632, 798 P.2d 914 (1990). The most recent decision on the issue from the United States Supreme Court is Clark v. Arizona , 548 U.S. 735, 126 S.Ct. 2709, 165 L.Ed.2d 842 (2006), which this Court considered in Delling . "Having previously decided this question, and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, we are guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as expressed in our earlier opinions."
The Court has declined to grant a writ of certiorari for any Idaho case on this matter. See Stoddard v. Idaho, 546 U.S. 828, 126 S.Ct. 40, 163 L.Ed.2d 75 (2005), and denied his petition for rehearing, see 546 U.S. 1135, 126 S.Ct. 1127, 163 L.Ed.2d 943 (2006); See also State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081, cert. denied 506 U.S. 915, 113 S.Ct. 321, 121 L.Ed.2d 241 (1992); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 871 P.2d 801 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 952, 115 S.Ct. 369, 130 L.Ed.2d 321 (1994); and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 955, 115 S.Ct. 377, 130 L.Ed.2d 327 (1994). While this in itself is not dispositive of anything, it reinforces the language found in other U.S. Supreme Court opinions that these types of decisions are left to the states.
The Court has declined to grant a writ of certiorari for any Idaho case on this matter. See Stoddard v. Idaho, 546 U.S. 828 (2005), and denied his petition for rehearing, see 546 U.S. 1135 (2006); See also State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081, cert. denied 506 U.S. 915 (1992); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 871 P.2d 801 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 952, (1994); and cert. denied, 513 U.S. 955 (1994). While this in itself is not dispositive of anything, it reinforces the language found in other U.S. Supreme Court opinions that these types of decisions are left to the states.
However, although we vacate Payne's sentence and order a new sentencing trial, we "shall pass upon and determine all questions of law involved in the case presented upon such appeal, and necessary to the final determination of the case." State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994); see also I.C. § 1-205. We will address each of the issues Payne presents on appeal to provide guidance on remand.
This Court has repeatedly confirmed the constitutional validity of I.C. § 18-207, which eliminated mental condition as a defense in criminal proceedings. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994); State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 854, 828 P.2d 879, 883 (1992); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 429, 825 P.2d 1081, 1085, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 321, 121 L.Ed.2d 241 (1992); State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 637, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (1990). Moore simply asserts that this Court should overrule its prior decisions on this issue, an invitation this Court has previously declined.
The validity of I.C. § 18-207 has been established in Idaho case law. State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 871 P.2d 801 (1994) (citing State v. Winn, 121 Idaho 850, 854, 828 P.2d 879, 883 (1992)); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 429, 825 P.2d 1081, 1085, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 321, 121 L.Ed.2d 241 (1992); State v. Searcy, 118 Idaho 632, 637, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (1990). Gomez presents no new basis upon which to consider the constitutionality of I.C. § 18-207 but argues that the Court should reconsider its prior rulings on the subject.
In such cases the court may deny the party refusing to cooperate the right to present evidence in support of a mental status claim unless the interest of justice requires otherwise and shall instruct the jury that it may consider the party's lack of cooperation for its effect on the credibility of the party's mental status claim. Santistevan relies upon a single decision, State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384, 871 P.2d 801 (1994), in support of his proposition that the compelled examination violated his privilege against self-incrimination. In Odiaga, in response to the defendant's indication that he intended to present evidence of his mental illness, the State moved to compel a psychiatric evaluation, and the district court granted the motion.
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 154. In State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 384 (1994), the Idaho Supreme Court relied on Riggins in adopting a standard that more closely resembles strict scrutiny. The court stated as follows: