Opinion
2012 KA 1166
03-26-2013
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CORNEIL OBY
Ricky L. Babin District Attorney Donaldsonville, Louisiana and Donald D. Candell Assistant District Attorney Gonzales, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee State of Louisiana Prentice L. White Louisiana Appellate Project Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Corneil Oby Corneil Oby Homer, Louisiana Pro Se
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEALED FROM THE TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF ASCENSION
STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 25208, DIVISION "D"
THE HONORABLE JESSE LEBLANC, JUDGE
Ricky L. Babin
District Attorney
Donaldsonville, Louisiana
and
Donald D. Candell
Assistant District Attorney
Gonzales, Louisiana
Attorneys for Appellee
State of Louisiana
Prentice L. White
Louisiana Appellate Project
Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Corneil Oby
Corneil Oby
Homer, Louisiana
Pro Se McDONALD , J.
The defendant, Corneil Oby, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged. The defendant filed a motion to suppress, which the district court denied. He was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without parole. The defendant now appeals, alleging counseled and pro se assignments of error. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant's conviction and sentence.
FACTS
On April 14, 2009, Deputy Patrick Reames with the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office responded to a report of a shooting at a residence on Beau Jon Drive in Prairieville, Louisiana. While he was driving towards the residence, he located a black male standing in the street, waving his arms. The man stated that he had been shot in the back, and the deputy saw a large area of blood soaking through the back of the man's white T-shirt. The man advised Deputy Reames that the person who shot him left the area in a white vehicle. While he was walking toward the residence, the deputy made contact with a white male who advised him that he had also been shot. When the deputy entered the residence, he saw that seventeen-year-old Kolby Lambert, the victim, had been shot in the head.
Deputy Eric Giroir was advised through dispatch that there had been a shooting in the Southwood Village area, which was near Beau Jon Drive, and that a white vehicle was seen leaving the area. He pulled over a white vehicle driving away from that area and ordered the passenger and driver to get out. He observed loose shotgun shells, a box of Winchester cartridges, and .22 ammunition in the back seat of the vehicle. He identified the defendant as the passenger of the vehicle. The defendant and the driver of the vehicle were taken into custody.
Dennis Seay testified that he was at the residence and was exiting through the front door when he was shot in his neck. He stated that the same person who shot him also shot the victim. According to Seay, the shooter entered the residence alone and shot the victim, who was lying on the couch, within five or ten seconds of shooting Seay. The victim began to get up from the couch when the shooter entered the residence, and when he saw the gun pointed at him, threw his hands up to block. Seay saw the victim's hair blow when the gunshot went off. Seay stated that the shooter said, "[i]f you can't put up, don't get up."
The victim's mother, Misti Lambert, testified at trial that she and her son had been living in the residence, which was a known location for drug-related activities, because they had no other place to live. The house belonged to brothers Antonio and Eddie Coco. She and her friend, Brenda Johnson, were in the residence on the night of the shooting. According to Johnson, the two were sitting on the washing machine and dryer when they heard loud noises. After about the second or third gunshot, she heard the defendant say, "[w]here's the money and where's the drugs?" Johnson then saw Antonio Coco reaching for the handle of a door near where she was sitting just before a bullet was shot into his back. The next thing she saw was the defendant coming around the corner. He put his gun in her face. She recognized the defendant and asked him what he was doing there. He was surprised to see her at that residence and lowered his gun. He turned to point the gun toward Lambert, and she pushed it and screamed. The defendant then went after Antonio out the back door.
Johnson and Lambert went to the front room in the residence where they found the victim. Lambert heard someone kicking the back door in, so she and Johnson ran down the hall. Lambert went into Antonio's room. She heard a big bang and some wrestling. She then called 911. Johnson went to the back bedroom of the residence, which was Eddie Coco's bedroom. She told him not to open the bedroom door because she heard someone in the residence holler, "[w]here's it at? I know it's in here. Where's the money? Where's -- where's the dope? I know it's in this house." The defendant then hit or kicked the bedroom door open and began to wrestle with Eddie. After Eddie knocked the gun out of the defendant's hand and broke the gun, the defendant got up and ran outside.
Lambert testified that she recognized the defendant because he had been to the residence a week prior to the night of the shooting with Andre Smith. Earlier on the day of the shooting, Smith had been to the residence to buy some cocaine. According to Lambert, Smith became upset because Antonio would not "front him any more dope." She testified that when Smith left, he stated, "[alright], Tony. I'm going to f*** with you. Kobe [sic], I'm going to f*** with you. Misti, I'm going to holler at you[.]" Lambert opined that the shooting occurred as a direct result of Smith being upset about Antonio's refusal to front him drugs and that Smith was attempting to steal money and drugs from Antonio.
In a recorded statement, the defendant told detectives that he told Smith that he was having financial issues, and Smith told him he knew two men, the Coco brothers, that he could set up to rob. Smith told the defendant that there would be approximately $5,000.00 and some "dope" at their residence. On the night of the shooting, the defendant and Keitheon Carter met Smith, and Smith indicated it was a good time for them to go and rob the Coco brothers because only four or five people were in the residence. The defendant stated that when he arrived at the house and got out of his car, a man came outside. He and Carter pulled a gun on him and told him to be still. When the defendant went inside the house, he saw there were actually eight or nine people inside. Carter never entered the house. The defendant stated that he did not know what to do, he did not "even have control" to pull the trigger, but his "body tightened up and it happened" although he "never wanted [anyone] to get hurt." He further stated that the victim was an innocent bystander, and he wanted to apologize to the victim's family.
Dr. Alfredo Suarez performed an autopsy on the victim and testified that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his first counseled assignment of error and three of his pro se assignments of error, the defendant argues that the district court erred in failing to suppress his statements. Specifically, the defendant contends that the detectives conducting his interview purposefully refused to honor his request for the presence of his attorney. According to the defendant, he continued talking to the detectives after requesting the presence of his attorney out of fear that he would "miss out on an opportunity to secure a 'good' deal."
On the trial of a motion to suppress, the state has the burden of proving the admissibility of a purported confession or statement by the defendant. La. C.Cr.P. art. 703(D). In addition to showing that the Miranda requirements were met, the state must affirmatively show that the statement or confession was free and voluntary, and not made under the influence of fear, duress, intimidation, menaces, threats, inducements, or promises in order to introduce into evidence a defendant's statement or confession. See La. R.S. 15:451. The state must specifically rebut a defendant's specific allegations of police misconduct in eliciting a confession. State v. Thomas, 461 So.2d 1253, 1256 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984), writ denied, 464 So.2d 1375 (La. 1985). In determining whether the ruling on the defendant's motion to suppress was correct, we are not limited to the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion. We may consider all pertinent evidence given at the trial of the case. State v. Chopin, 372 So.2d 1222, 1223-24 n.2 (La. 1979).
The defendant contends that he was coerced into making the statements he sought to be suppressed because the officers told him that his attorney's presence would disrupt any deal that they could secure for him. He also contends that the denial of the motion to suppress was based on false evidence. The defendant testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. He stated that he waived his right to the presence of his attorney after requesting it because Sergeant Wayne Webb told him that talking to his attorney would not be in his best interest if he wanted to make a statement. The defendant also stated that at one point, he requested the presence of his attorney before the tape recorder was turned on, but the detectives questioning him told him that it would not be in his best interest to have his attorney present, so he waived his right to an attorney and spoke to them.
The detectives involved in interviewing the defendant also testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. The testimony of each detective directly contradicts the defendant's testimony that he was coerced into talking to the detectives without the presence of his attorney.
Detective Daniel Foulds with the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office testified that he first spoke with the defendant on April 14, 2009. After Detective Foulds discussed the defendant's Miranda rights with him, the defendant agreed to waive his right to an attorney and signed a waiver of rights form. The defendant agreed to give the detective a verbal statement, and the two spoke for about fifteen minutes. About an hour after Detective Foulds spoke with the defendant, Detective Glenn Luna, also with the Ascension Parish Sheriff's Office, conducted a second interview with the defendant. The defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and signed a waiver of rights form. Detective Luna testified that once the defendant requested to speak with an attorney, he stopped the interview.
Detective Foulds spoke with the defendant again on May 27, 2009, pursuant to the defendant's first written request. Detective Samuel Caston also sat in on this interview. The defendant signed a Miranda rights waiver form and gave a recorded statement. During the interview, he stated that the reason he did not want to talk to the detectives in his previous interviews was because he was worried about Keitheon Carter and was doing him a favor. He then proceeded to explain the events that took place on the night of the shooting and told the detectives that Carter was the person who entered the Coco residence and shot the victim. The detectives explained to the defendant that multiple witnesses identified him as the shooter. The defendant then requested that the detectives stop recording his statement. While the tape recorder was off, he asked the detectives what would happen to him if he told them that he shot the victim. When the tape recorder was turned back on, the defendant admitted his full involvement. According to Detective Foulds, the defendant was not coerced or promised anything in return for implicating himself. He also never asked to speak with his lawyer. Detective Caston testified that when the defendant was asked why he changed his story, he stated that he thought he had a better chance of "beating the charges" than Keitheon Carter did.
The defendant submitted a second written request to speak with detectives on July 21, 2009. He met with detectives on July 23, 2009, and was read his Miranda rights and signed a waiver. During this interview, the defendant explained that although he already confessed, he wanted to meet with the detectives again to be "completely honest" about who was involved. According to the defendant, contrary to the information he provided in his previous statements, Andre Smith was also involved.
According to Detective Foulds, the defendant never requested a lawyer when he spoke to him in April, May, and July. Detective Foulds also testified that the defendant waived his rights on all three occasions.
The district court gave reasons for denying the motion to suppress. In its reasons, the court stated that when the defendant invoked his right to counsel during the April interview, the questioning clearly stopped. It also pointed out that whether the questioning that occurred during the May and July interviews was constitutional came down to a credibility determination. Sergeant Wayne Webb testified that he never gave the defendant any advice or told him to speak to the detectives without the presence of his attorney. Sergeant Webb also testified that the defendant was not offered any promises or favors or coerced in any way to speak to the detectives in the May and July interviews. The court found Webb's testimony to be credible and found that the defendant requested the opportunity to speak with detectives and waived his right to counsel in both the May and July interviews.
The admissibility of a confession is, in the first instance, a question for the district court; its conclusions on the credibility and weight of the testimony relating to the voluntary nature of the confession will not be overturned unless they are not supported by the evidence. State v. Sanford, 569 So.2d 147, 150 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 623 So.2d 1299 (La. 1993). The district court must consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether a confession is admissible. Testimony of the interviewing officer alone may be sufficient to prove a defendant's statements were freely and voluntarily given. State v. Maten, 2004-1718 (La. App. 1st Cir. 3/24/05), 899 So.2d 711, 721, writ denied, 2005-1570 (La. 1/27/06), 922 So.2d 544. Further, when a district court denies a motion to suppress, factual and credibility determinations should not be reversed in the absence of a clear abuse of the district court's discretion, i.e., unless such ruling is not supported by the evidence. See State v. Green, 94-0887 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 280-81.
After a careful review of the record, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress. The testimony, the transcripts of the recorded statements, and the waiver forms, clearly establish that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and that he executed a waiver of those rights. Further, the evidence indicates that the defendant knowingly and intentionally waived his rights. The detectives' testimony at the hearing, which the district court found credible, showed that the defendant appeared to understand his rights and demonstrated a desire to speak to the police and explain his version of the events. The district court also found credible the detectives' testimony that they did not coerce the defendant into admitting to shooting the victim or changing his story. The test for voluntariness of a confession requires a review of the totality of the circumstances under which the statement was given. Maten, 899 So.2d at 721. We conclude, as did the district court, that under a totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statements were not involuntary.
This assignment of error is without merit.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In the last two assignments of error in his pro se brief, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, the defendant contends that he acted in self-defense in shooting the victim. He also contends that he did not go to the Coco residence to commit a robbery, such that he should not have been found guilty of second degree murder. According to the defendant, false testimony given by Lambert was material to the issue of whether he had specific intent to kill.
As indicated, the defendant confessed that he killed the victim. The remaining issues are whether he acted in self-defense and whether the jury should have convicted him of manslaughter rather than second degree murder. The constitutional standard for testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) requires that a conviction be based on proof sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See La. C.Cr.P. art. 821. In conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful of Louisiana's circumstantial evidence test, which states in part, assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. La. R.S. 15:438; State v. Wright, 98-0601 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 486, writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157, 2000-0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732.
The crime of second degree murder, in pertinent part, "is the killing of a human being: (1) [w]hen the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]" La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1). Specific criminal intent is that "state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14:10(1). Though intent is a question of fact, it need not be proven as a fact. It may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction. Specific intent may be proven by direct evidence, such as statements by a defendant, or by inference from circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's actions or facts depicting the circumstances. Specific intent is an ultimate legal conclusion to be resolved by the fact finder. State v. Buchanon, 95-0625 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/96), 673 So.2d 663, 665, writ denied, 96-1411 (La. 12/6/96), 684 So.2d 923.
Manslaughter is a homicide that would be a first or second degree murder, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. "Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed[.]" La. R.S. 14:31(A)(1). "Sudden passion" and "heat of blood" are not elements of the offense of manslaughter; rather, they are mitigatory factors in the nature of a defense that exhibits a degree of culpability less than that present when the homicide is committed without them. Because they are mitigatory factors, a defendant who establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in "sudden passion" or "heat of blood" is entitled to a verdict of manslaughter. State v. Rodriguez, 2001-2182 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/21/02), 822 So.2d 121, 134, writ denied, 2002-2049 (La. 2/14/03), 836 So.2d 131.
When the defendant in a homicide prosecution claims self-defense, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide was not committed in self-defense. State v. Williams, 2001-0944 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/28/01), 804 So.2d 932, 939, writ denied, 2002-0399 (La. 2/14/03), 836 So.2d 135. Louisiana Revised Statute 14:20(A)(1) provides that a homicide is justifiable when committed in self-defense by one who reasonably believes that he is in imminent danger of losing his life or receiving great bodily harm and that the killing is necessary to save himself from that danger. However, a person who is the aggressor or who brings on a difficulty cannot claim the right of self-defense unless he withdraws from the conflict in good faith and in such a manner that his adversary knows or should know that he desires to withdraw and discontinue the conflict. La. R.S. 14:21. On appeal, the relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Williams, 804 So.2d at 939.
The trier of fact is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness. Moreover, when there is conflicting testimony about factual matters, the resolution of which depends upon a determination of the credibility of the witnesses, the matter is one of the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. The trier of fact's determination of the weight to be given evidence is not subject to appellate review. Thus, an appellate court will not reweigh the evidence to overturn a fact finder's determination of guilt. State v. Taylor, 97-2261 (La. App. 1st Cir. 9/25/98), 721 So.2d 929, 932.
The record does not support the defendant's argument that he was not committing a robbery at the time of the shooting. He confessed that he went to the Coco residence to rob the Coco brothers. Witnesses testified that the defendant was hollering and asking where the money and drugs were. Moreover, even if the defendant was not engaged in the perpetration of an armed robbery at the time of the shooting, the fact that the defendant shot the victim in the head at a fairly short distance indicates specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. See La. R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1); State v. Ducre, 596 So.2d 1372, 1382 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 600 So.2d 637 (La. 1992). The portion of the disputed testimony of Lambert had no bearing on whether the defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim. Whether Lambert saw Seay or Andre Smith standing in the doorway when the defendant entered the house was only remotely relevant to the instant prosecution. Even if Lambert's testimony were false, there is no reasonable likelihood that it would have affected the ultimate result.
The guilty verdict in this case indicates that the jury rejected the defendant's claim that he shot the victim in self-defense. The testimony presented during the trial indicated that the defendant was the aggressor in the incident. The defendant did not indicate that the victim provoked or threatened him in any way before the weapon was fired. Rather, the testimony indicated that the victim was actually lying on the couch when the defendant came through the front door and shot him. In fact, the defendant referred to the victim as an innocent bystander.
Considering the testimony presented in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational juror could have found that the state established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense. Further, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational juror could have found that the defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in "sudden passion" or "heat of blood" immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. See State v. Maddox, 522 So.2d 579, 582 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988). Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence supports the jury's verdict. Due to the foregoing conclusions, these assignments of error lack merit.
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
In his second counseled assignment of error, the defendant argues that the district court gave incorrect jury instructions. Specifically, the defendant contends that the district court's rendition of the manslaughter statute was incomplete.
Erroneous jury instructions or failure to give jury instructions are not errors discoverable under La. C.Cr.P. art. 920(2), and absent an objection during the trial, a defendant may not complain on appeal of an allegedly erroneous jury charge or the failure to give a jury instruction. See La. C.Cr.P. arts. 801(C), 841(A), & 920(2); State v. Dilosa, 2001-0024 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 657, 671, writ denied, 2003-1601 (La. 12/12/03), 860 So.2d 1153. The record does not reflect that the defendant made a contemporaneous objection to the jury charges on the basis of the alleged failures now asserted in this assignment of error. Accordingly, the issue raised in this assignment of error is not properly preserved for appellate review.
Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE AFFIRMED.