Opinion
I.D. No. 0607020144.
Submitted: February 21, 2007.
Decided: April 2, 2007.
Upon Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
DENIEDThis 2nd day of April, 2007, upon consideration of Thomas A. Norris' ("Norris") motion to withdraw his guilty plea, it appears to the Court that:
See Docket 15.
1. Norris pleaded guilty to robbery in the second degree and wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11 §§ 831 1239. At sentencing, Norris informed the Court that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, sentencing was continued pending the outcome of this motion.
2. Norris claims he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because the victim allegedly contacted Norris' family and informed them that Norris was not the actual perpetrator of the robbery to which he entered a guilty plea. As a result of this communication, Norris now believes that he will prevail at trial. The State responds by contending that Norris should not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea because he has failed to meet his burden of showing that the plea was not voluntary or that it was entered because of a mistake as to his legal rights.
Id, ¶¶ 2-3.
See Docket 16, ¶¶ 5-6.
3. Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(d) permits the Court, in its discretion, to allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing for "any fair and just reason." The "fair and just" standard places the burden upon a defendant to establish that "the guilty plea was not voluntarily made, or that it was entered by reason of mistake of the defendant as to his legal rights." "If such circumstances be proved, the application should be readily granted; otherwise, it should be denied."
Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 504 (Del. 1969).
State v. Insley, 141 A.2d 619, 622 (Del. 1958). See also State v. French, 2004 WL 838849, at *1 (Del.Super.Ct. Apr. 16, 2004).
4. Here, Norris has not met his burden. His claim that the victim contacted his family and informed them that Norris was not the perpetrator is entirely devoid of corroboration and substantiation. A review of the transcript from the plea colloquy reveals that Norris voluntarily admitted guilt to the charges of robbery in the second degree and wearing a disguise during the commission of a felony. That admission was clear and unequivocal. Norris also confirmed during the colloquy that he carefully reviewed and signed the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form and answered the questions on that form willingly on his own, that no one, including his attorney and the State, forced or threatened him to plead guilty or promised him what his sentence would be, that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation, and that he was giving up his right to a trial and thereby waiving some of his constitutional rights including his right to be presumed innocent, his right to a speedy and public trial by jury, his right to present evidence in his defense and confront witnesses, his right to testify or remain silent, his right to vote, hold public office, or serve as a juror, his right to own or possess a deadly weapon, and his right to appeal. There being an absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Norris is bound by those representations. Therefore, the Court finds that Norris entered his plea knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and that his plea was not entered because of his mistake as to his legal rights.
See Docket 17, Plea Colloquy Tr., p. 5, 9-10.
Id., p. 5-8.
Felix v. State, 2006 WL 1971786, at *2 (Del. July 14, 2006).
5. Based on the foregoing, Norris' motion to withdraw his guilty plea is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.