Opinion
Case No. 0504005647.
December 28, 2006.
Motions Concerning Death (Killing) in Maryland.
Peggy Marshall, Esquire, Adam Gelof, Esquire, Deputies Attorney General, Department of Justice, Georgetown, DE 19947.
Stephanie Tsantes, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Georgetown, DE 19947.
James Brendan O'Neill, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Carvel State Office Building, Wilmington, DE 19801.
Deborah L. Carey, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Sykes Building, 45 The Green, Dover, DE 19901.
Dear Counsel:
"On April 7, 2005 while in the throes of a profound psychotic episode, Mr. Norman shot and killed Jamell Weston in Laurel, Delaware. A short time later that day, Mr. Norman drove to Salisbury, Maryland. Once in Maryland, while still in a psychotic episode, Mr. Norman shot and killed DaVondale Peters. Maryland police arrested Mr. Norman in Salisbury . . ." (Defen dant's Opening Brief). It appears that the above occurred in less than an hour.
The defense concedes for the purposes of this motion that the Defendant shot and killed two people on the morning of April 7, 2005. The issue in this case is the Defendant's mental state and whether he was legally insane at the time of the shootings (See 11 Del. C. § 401).
The prosecution in Maryland ended in a nol prosse being entered days before the trial was to begin. The apparent reason for the nol prosse was the Defendant's insanity defense. Maryland and Delaware have similar insanity defense statutes, but Delaware has special rules concerning voluntary intoxication and accountability. (11 Del. C. § 422).
The present motion argues that because the events in Maryland have not resulted in a homicide conviction, Delaware is precluded from using the Maryland death as a basis to attempt to establish the two-death statutory aggravator found in the Delaware capital punishment statute at 11 Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)k which states:
k. The defendant's course of conduct resulted in the deaths of 2 or more persons where the deaths are a probable consequence of the defendant'sonduct.
While acknowledging two deaths, the defense argues that it is unprecedented to allow the State to seek the death penalty using the Maryland death.
The defense cites a number of cases involving this particular aggravator and notes in each both deaths occurred within the State of Delaware, but the defense cites no statutes or case law from Delaware or any other jurisdiction to support its position that the two or more deaths must all occur in the State where the murder trial occurs. I note that these cases are simply cases where both deaths occurred in Delaware.
I find nothing in the statute which prohibits the State from using a second death in another state. The defense argument is impractical and defies common sense. If a person walked down the Delaware side of Bi-state Boulevard in Delmar, shot someone and then crossed the street into Maryland and killed a person, by the defense theory there could be no aggravator based on the death of two persons. This result is illogical. Therefore, the State is not barred from using the second death as an aggravator because that death occurred outside of Delaware.
The defense also argues that Delaware cannot "prosecute" the Maryland offense.
In this case, the State is not attempting to use the aggravator of a previous conviction of murder, manslaughter or other violent felony as contained in 11 Del C. § 4209(e)(1)(i). The aggravator of causing the deaths of 2 or more persons does not require a conviction. 11Del. C. § 4209(e)(1)(k) requires proof that the two deaths are a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct. Obviously, the proof of the first death in Delaware requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt because that is necessary as to the guilt phase.
For sentencing purposes, the State is attempting to use the Defendant's conduct on the morning of April 7, 2005 regardless of which side of the State line it occurred. The consequence of that conduct and Mr. Norman's culpability will be judged by the laws of the State of Delaware.
If the Defendant is found guilty and the State seeks the death penalty, then the jury may consider all of the events which occurred that day including the acts occurring in Maryland. Issues of the Defendant's legal competency for his actions in Maryland will need to be addressed but these decisions will be filtered through the Delaware standards. The State of Delaware shall not be bound by Maryland's determination of criminal responsibility. Mr. Norman's conduct will be judged by law of Delaware as to his criminal responsibility. This does not mean or result in the State of Delaware exceeding its jurisdiction by "prosecuting" a homicide that occurred in Ma ryland.
As to the Defendant's final argument concerning blame-worthiness, it is appropriate and logical that in consideration of the death penalty, the Defendant's conduct, whether it occurred in Delaware or in Maryland, be judged by the same legal standard. The standard for judging the defendant's accountability or criminal responsibility will be based upon Title 11 of the Delaware Code.
For these reasons, the Defendant's Motions to bar the State from using the second death in Maryland as an aggravator is denied.