State ex rel. Clark v. Hogan, 49 Wn.2d 457, 303 P.2d 290 (1956). In the instant case the defendant at no time properly challenged the sufficiency of the information upon the ground that it failed to state a crime, State v. Newson, 8 Wn. App. 534, 507 P.2d 893 (1973), or that the information was too indefinite or uncertain to enable the accused to prepare his defense, State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 403 P.2d 838 (1965), or upon any other irregularity or defect in the amended information. Nor did the defendant allege that the statutes, upon which the offenses were based, were unconstitutional.
The constitutional right violated by an inadequate information is the right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, and the state constitution, article 1, section 22. See State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 18, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985); State v. Newson, 8 Wn. App. 534, 536, 507 P.2d 893 (1973). When this issue is raised for the first time on appeal, the court should test the information's sufficiency by a stricter standard than if the question had been raised first below.
The Washington provision has the same effect as the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . . be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation". State v. Newson, 8 Wn. App. 534, 536, 507 P.2d 893 (1973). In United States v. Simmons, 96 U.S. 360, 362, 24 L.Ed. 819 (1877), the Supreme Court made clear that the use of statutory language is adequate only when it states every element of the crime:
The sole issue before this court is whether the information fails to allege all of the essential elements of the offense because the word "intent" is not included in the information. Defendant correctly states that an information must allege all the essential elements of the crime, State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 246 P.2d 1101 (1952); State v. Newson, 8 Wn. App. 534, 507 P.2d 893 (1973); and that criminal intent or scienter is a necessary element of an offense which is mala in se. Seattle v. Gordon, 54 Wn.2d 516, 342 P.2d 604 (1959); State v. Tuss, 21 Wn. App. 80, 584 P.2d 421 (1978); State v. Smith, 17 Wn. App. 231, 562 P.2d 659 (1977). Furthermore, scienter is an implied element of a mala in se statutory crime which fails to include it as an element, unless the statute expressly eliminates it. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 96 L.Ed. 288, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952); State v. Turner, 78 Wn.2d 276, 474 P.2d 91, 41 A.L.R.3d 493 (1970); State v. Smith, supra.