Opinion
No. CR-05-0220383-A
February 16, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS I
The defendant, Steve Nelson, pro se, has filed a "Motion To Prohit (sic) Testimony." The defendant requests the court to not allow into evidence the defendant's statement to the probation officer, in preparation of the pre-sentence investigation for the prior matter of State of Connecticut v. Steve Nelson, Docket No. CR-05-0220383-T and statements to the Wethersfield Police Department detective.
Although not clearly drafted, it appears that the claim of the defendant with respect to the statement at the Wethersfield Police Department is that it was not made voluntarily, and that the Miranda warnings were not properly administered.
The court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this motion on December 1 and December 4, 2006. At the hearing, the court heard testimony from Detective Michael Patkoske and Detective James Darby of the Wethersfield Police Department, and also received documentary evidence.
The court orally ruled on this motion on December 5, 2006, denying the defendant's request. This is the written decision of that ruling.
II WAIVER OF MIRANDA WARNINGS
To demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination, the state must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional right to remain silent. State v. Santiago, 245 Conn. 301, 320 715 A.2d 1 (1998); State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 579-80, 504 A.2d 1036 (1986). The waiver must be made with full awareness of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequence of abandoning it. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). The question is whether the defendant, in fact, knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights delineated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). (Miranda)
The State of Connecticut (state) has indicated that it does not intend to offer the defendant's statement to the probation officer that is contained in the defendant's Presentence Investigation Report.
The statement that the defendant orally gave to Wethersfield Detective Michael Patkoske was given at the Wethersfield Police Department on February 10, 2005. The defendant was under arrest, and he was in custody as the term has been defined by law. The defendant was under arrest for the charges of Kidnapping First Degree With a Firearm, Robbery First Degree, Assault First Degree and Burglary First Degree, Larceny First Degree, Criminal Mischief Second Degree, and separate counts of conspiracy to commit each of these crimes. The state does not contest that the defendant was arrested and in custody at the time of the defendant's oral statement. The evidence presented at the hearing was that once Detective Patkoske placed the defendant under arrest, he proceeded to inform the defendant of his constitutional rights. Detective Patkoske indicated that he presented the defendant with a notice of rights form, State Exhibit 1(H). Detective Patkoske testified that he read to the defendant his rights in the English language. The defendant appeared to understand them and signed the form. This form was prepared in advance of any statements from the defendant.
Detective Patkoske next presented Mr. Nelson with his Miranda warnings. State Exhibit 2(H). This document was prepared prior to any statements given by the defendant. Detective Patkoske testified that he read each line of the Miranda warnings. At the conclusion of reading each warning, the defendant was asked to initial the form after the warnings. Detective Patkoske testified that the defendant read each line — he appeared to understand it. He asked no questions and did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
The defendant did not request an attorney to assist him. Following this procedure, Detective Patkoske indicated that the defendant agreed to speak to him. Detective Patkoske testified that the defendant said he was familiar with the home invasion and robbery that was the subject of the discussion. He indicated that he knew the victim in the case from that area of Hartford and a prior automobile sale experience. The detective testified that Mr. Nelson indicated that he saw the victim a few weeks prior to the incident, and he knew that the victim was Jamaican. The defendant further indicated that he heard that the person who committed the robbery was a person known as "Silky." The defendant said to Detective Patkoske that he knew the complainant, Lincoln Marshall, drove a blue BMW and that he was a truck driver. The defendant further stated to Detective Patkoske that Lincoln Marshall was a major marijuana dealer and used his trucking business to further his drug sales. The defendant also told Detective Patkoske that in the past he provided "Silky" with names of potential drug sellers so that they could rob drug dealers. However, he did not provide any information to "Silky" about this robbery. The defendant denied any involvement in this robbery. The defendant did not ask for a lawyer and did not provide a written statement.
There was nothing in the evidence at the hearing on the motion to suppress that suggests that the defendant was lacking in intelligence, suffered from a mental deficiency, was unable to read and write in English, was under the influence of drugs, alcohol or medication, or that intellectual limitations influenced his judgment when questioned by Detective Patkoske.
At the hearing, the defendant did not offer any evidence or opposition to the procedures testified to by Detective Patkoske.
The court finds that the state has sustained its burden and that the defendant was given the Miranda warnings. The state has also established by the preponderance of the evidence that, after receiving those warnings, Mr. Nelson knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights.
Voluntariness Due Process Proceeding
There was no evidence presented at this hearing that the defendant was lacking in intelligence, or suffered from a mental deficiency, or that intellectual limitations influenced his judgment when questioned by Detective Patkoske.
The evidence indicates that the defendant was able to read and write in English. There is no indication that his decision to speak with the police was influenced by a lack of understanding or comprehension of what was occurring, or what was being said. The defendant was given an opportunity to review his rights with Detective Patkoske.
Evidence at the hearing indicates that the whole discussion with Detective Patkoske lasted about twenty (20) minutes. There is no indication that the defendant was subjected to any exhausting or incessant questioning.
There is nothing in the evidence for the court to conclude that the defendant was sleep-deprived, or in need of food or bathroom relief.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the defendant was under the influence of drugs, alcohol, or medication that could have interfered with his reasoning or decision making powers.
In State v. Pinder, 250 Conn. 385, 418-19, 736 A.2d 857 (1999), our Supreme Court described the test to be used in evaluating the voluntariness of a confession: "whether an examination of all the circumstances discloses that the conduct of law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant's] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined . . . Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker?" (Citations omitted.)
Considering the totality of the circumstances, there is no evidence that the defendant's decision to waive his rights and talk to Detective Patkoske was anything other than the result of his free, considered and unconstrained choice.
The state has met its burden of demonstrating that the defendant understood his rights and knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived them, when he spoke to Detective Patkoske. The state has also met its burden of demonstrating that the defendant's will was not overborne and that his statement was voluntarily made.
Consequently, the defendant's motion to suppress statements is denied.