Opinion
No. C7-01-1967
Filed August 20, 2002.
Appeal from the District Court, St. Louis County, File No. K199600838.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Kelly O'Neill Moller, Assistant Attorney General, and Alan L. Mitchell, St. Louis County Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Roy G. Spurbeck, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge, Halbrooks, Judge, and Stoneburner, Judge,
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Faith Noelle Nelson challenges her conviction of fourth-degree assault, arguing that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that appellant, who kicked a police officer, inflicted demonstrable bodily harm on the officer. We affirm.
DECISION
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court's review is limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the fact-finder to reach the verdict it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court must assume the fact-finder believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989). The reviewing court will not disturb the verdict if the fact-finder, acting with due regard for the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude the defendant was guilty of the charged offense. State v. Alton, 432 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Minn. 1988).
Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain appellant's conviction of fourth-degree assault because the state failed to prove that appellant inflicted "demonstrable bodily harm" on a peace officer. We disagree.
Minn. Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1, provides:
Whoever physically assaults a peace officer * * * when that officer is effecting a lawful arrest or executing any other duty imposed by law * * * [and] inflicts demonstrable bodily harm * * * is guilty of a felony[.]
The statute does not define demonstrable, but appellant contends it means "capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim." Appellant also contends that it could mean obvious or apparent. We find it unnecessary to resolve this question because even accepting appellant's proposed definitions for demonstrable harm, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction.
Both the officer appellant assaulted and the officer's partner testified that appellant kicked the officer in the groin causing the officer to buckle over. The partner's testimony establishes that the pain was capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim. Moreover, the injured officer went to the hospital after arresting appellant and testified that he spent the rest of his shift icing his swollen testicle as prescribed by his treating physician. The evidence of a kick to the groin and a swollen testicle indicate obvious, apparent harm. Thus, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to support appellant's conviction of fourth-degree assault.
Finally, we have reviewed the claims in appellant's pro se supplemental brief and conclude that they are without merit.