Opinion
I.D. No. 9611000380
Submitted: March 13, 2001
Decided: June 29, 2001
ORDER
Preliminarily, the court denied Nelson's motion for postconviction relief under Rule 61. The court, however, appointed counsel for Nelson. After Nelson's Rule 61 counsel declined to pursue postconviction relief, Nelson refiled his own Rule 61 motion. In response, the court ordered the State to reply to Nelson's final submission.
Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(e)(1).
Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(e)(2).
Id.
Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(f).
Having allowed Nelson to pursue his motion, having appointed counsel and having required the State's response, the Court now is prepared to summarily dismiss Defendant's March 13, 2001 pro se motion for postconviction relief.
Super. Ct. Crim. Rule 61(h)(3).
Nelson originally filed a motion for postconviction relief in August 1998. On October 19, 1999 the Court issued an Order denying Nelson's 1998 motion for postconviction relief without prejudice and allowed him to file a new motion through court-appointed counsel.
Nelson's court-appointed attorney reported on October 10, 2000, that he was unable to substantiate Nelson's claims. That was not surprising because Nelson's trial attorney showed no signs of impairment during Nelson's trial. Although Nelson's claims against his trial attorney justified further consideration, including appointment of counsel, that is as far as they went. Nelson's claims have not panned out. Rule 61 counsel specifically concluded that the record was not "in any way demonstrative that [trial counsel] subverted the due process of Mr. Nelson as a result of [trial counsel's] addiction.
As mentioned, after his Rule 61 counsel declined to pursue a claim for postconviction relief, on November 30, 2000, Nelson filed another pro se motion. On December 18, 2000, the Court issued an order refusing to dismiss Nelson's motion summarily, ordering the State's response, and allowing Nelson to reply within 30 days of the State's response. The State responded on February 9, 2001 and Nelson replied on March 13, 2001.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(f)(1).
For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a defendant must meet the two-prong Strickland test. As stated in Albury v. State, the Defendant must show that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that there was "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Moreover, Albury states that, "[w]hen an appellate court examines the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland test, that review is subject to a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable."
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53 (1988). See also Somerville v. State, Del. Supr., 703 A.2d 629, 631 (1997) (To prevail on an ineffective counsel claim, defendant must meet Strickland's test.)
Id. at 58 (quoting Strickland at 688, 694).
Id. (Citing Strickland at 689). See also Dawson v. State, Del. Supr., 673 A.2d 1186, 1190, cert. denied, Dawson v. Delaware, 519 U.S. 844 (1996) (Counsel's efforts . . . enjoy a strong presumption of reasonableness. (citing Flamer v. State, Del. Supr., 585 A.2d 736, 753-754 (1990))).
Nelson's motion is not couched in Strickland's terms, rather it is his effort to obtain yet another appeal. Under the guise of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Nelson has gleaned from the record every error he sees in the proceedings leading to his conviction, no matter how trivial or far-fetched. For example, Nelson complains that his trial attorney "failed to challenge the prosecution's failure and or refusal to have produced the lab analysis prior or at the time the Indictment was returned." Nelson makes no attempt, however, to explain how that fell below an objective standard, much less how he was prejudiced by the alleged failure. In fact, no competent defense attorney would have filed such a frivolous challenge.
To the extent that Nelson's claim actually touches on potential issues related to his trial counsel's effectiveness, especially trial counsel's post-trial problems, Nelson's contentions are wild and unsubstantiated. For example, he alleges that "counsel was high on drugs," and that "trial counsel was wholly unprepared and incompetent due to being under the influence of marijuana and or alcohol abuse." Nelson incorrectly alleges that his attorney had a long criminal history. Nelson wildly and baselessly alleges that trial counsel "show[ed] his appreciation to the courts for continuing to allow him to practice law." Also, Nelson states in conclusory fashion that "[trial counsel's] representation of him [sic] was a pretense, a sham and a mockery of justice."
Despite the Court's admonition that he present specifics, Nelson has not pointed to any instance where counsel's representation actually appears impaired. At this point there is innuendo and rhetoric. Sadly, after Nelson's conviction, Nelson's trial counsel also got into trouble over drugs. By itself, however, that does not justify postconviction relief. There is no evidence that trial counsel was under the influence when he represented Nelson. And, the notion that trial counsel sabotaged Nelson's case to curry favor is fanciful, at best. To the contrary, the record shows that trial counsel, who was an experienced criminal defense lawyer, actively challenged the State's case at trial, and his efforts were partially successful.
To the extent Nelson was convicted, the State had a substantial case against him. Where the evidence came up short, Nelson's supposedly impaired trial attorney obtained an acquittal. While Nelson's trial attorney's eventual fate is lamentable, it does not form a basis for giving Nelson a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's November 30, 2000 Motion for Postconviction Relief is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.