Opinion
No. 5-747 / 04-1880
Filed March 15, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County, Jon S. Scoles, Judge.
Mary Jane Nelson appeals her conviction for violating Iowa Code section 123.47(5) (2003). AFFIRMED.
Judith O'Donohoe of Elwood, O'Donohoe, Stochl, Braun Churbuck, Charles City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, Mark L. Walk, County Attorney, and Aaron Murphy, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
Mary Nelson appeals her conviction for supplying alcohol to a minor resulting in serious injury. Iowa Code § 123.47(5) (2003). We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Iowa State Trooper Charles McNally was advised of an accident outside Osage, Iowa. At the accident site, he found an unoccupied vehicle as well as opened and unopened cans of cold "Busch Light" and "Natural Light" beer in and around the vehicle.
He also found several bottles of liquor.
McNally subsequently interviewed eighteen-year-old Joshua Nelson and his passenger, in the presence of their parents. Following that interview, he went to the Nelsons' home and had a second conversation with Joshua and his mother, Mary Nelson. This conversation was taped, without the knowledge of the Nelsons. Based on these discussions, McNally determined that Joshua's mother furnished some of the beer that was found in the vehicle.
The State charged Mary Nelson with supplying alcohol to a minor. Following trial, the district court found Nelson guilty as charged. Nelson moved for a new trial, contending the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Nelson.
On appeal, Nelson contends (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, (2) the weight of the evidence did not support her conviction, and (3) she received ineffective assistance of counsel.
II. Sufficiency-Of-The-Evidence
Nelson's primary contention is that the district court erred in overruling her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Our review of this issue is for errors of law, with fact-findings binding us if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997).
Iowa Code section 123.47(5) states:
A person who is of legal age, other than a licensee or permittee, who sells, gives, or otherwise supplies alcoholic liquor, wine, or beer to a person who is under legal age in violation of this section which results in serious injury to any person commits an aggravated misdemeanor.
Nelson first maintains that the State failed to prove she "affirmatively supplied" beer to Joshua. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude otherwise. See Thomas, 561 N.W.2d at 39 (noting evidence is reviewed in the light most favorable to the State, "including all legitimate inferences and presumptions which may be fairly and reasonably deduced from the record" (citations omitted)). Officer McNally testified that, in his first conversation with Joshua, he asked him who bought the beer. After some hesitation, Joshua looked at his mother and responded that she did. Officer McNally further stated that, during his visit to the Nelsons' home, Mary Nelson admitted she bought the Natural Light beer for her son. The tape of this interview corroborates his testimony. This amounts to substantial evidence in support of the "supplies" element.
On a related note, Nelson contends she fell within a statutory exception to the crime, which permits the dispensation of alcohol to a minor "within a private home and with the knowledge, presence, and consent of the parent or guardian." Iowa Code § 123.47(2). She argues that, to the extent she made beer available to Joshua, it was "for the purpose of consuming it at her house in her presence," and the State did not prove otherwise. Assuming without deciding that the State must prove the inapplicability of this exception, we conclude the State did so. Specifically, Mary Nelson stated her son "runs around with a good group of kids and usually when they do go out they have a designated driver." Based on this statement, a reasonable fact finder could have found that the beer was not made available solely for consumption by Joshua in Mary Nelson's presence and the exception set forth in Iowa Code section 123.47(2) did not apply.
The State argues that Nelson did not preserve error on this issue. We disagree.
Nelson next argues that the State failed to prove Joshua consumed beer purchased by her. Joshua admitted, however, that he took beer from his home to a party. He further admitted he drank seven or eight beers at the party. In addition, Officer McNally found empty Natural Light beer cans in the vehicle that Joshua was driving and he stated Mary Nelson told him she purchased that beer. A reasonable fact finder could have determined from this evidence that Joshua consumed some of the beer provided by his mother.
Nelson next maintains that there is no evidence to prove the alcohol "resulted in" serious injury. See Iowa Code § 123.47(5). Again, we emphasize that we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. See Thomas, 591 N.W.2d at 39. Applying this standard, we find substantial evidence to support the "results in" element. Specifically, Joshua admitted he consumed seven or eight beers at the party and he admitted he stopped drinking just one hour before driving. Additionally, cans of the type of beer purchased by Mary Nelson were found in the vehicle Joshua was driving. Finally, according to Officer McNally, Mary Nelson said she and her husband "were able to drink when they were eighteen [years old], so they told their boys that when they turned eighteen they would buy them all the alcohol they wanted as long as they were safe." Mary Nelson also said her son "runs around with a good group of kids and usually when they do go out they have a designated driver."
We recognize Officer McNally did not subject Joshua to sobriety tests that might have confirmed his intoxication, and the roads were slippery on the evening Joshua lost control of the vehicle. However, the statute does not require proof of intoxication and "determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is the function of the fact finder." State v. Robinson, 288 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Iowa 1980). The cited evidence amounted to more than "suspicion, speculation, or conjecture" that the alcohol "resulted in" serious injury. State v. Randle, 555 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 1996).
Finally, Nelson claims the State failed to prove that either her son or her son's passenger sustained a "serious injury." Joshua sustained two fractures to his wrist, had difficulty writing on the night of the accident, and was wearing a cast when Officer McNally visited his home. His passenger suffered a concussion. A reasonable fact finder could have found that these injuries qualified as "serious" within the meaning of Iowa Code section 123.47(5). Cf. Iowa Code § 702.18(1)(b)(3) (defining serious injury as a bodily injury causing "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ").
III. Weight of the Evidence
Nelson moved for a new trial, contending the conviction was against the weight of the evidence. See State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d, 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). The district court denied the motion. Our review of the court's ruling is for an abuse of discretion. Id.
We discern no abuse. The court's original ruling noted that Joshua's testimony was "less than credible due to not wanting his mother to get into trouble." The court's post-trial ruling cited evidence refuting Nelson's present assertion that
the State presented no credible evidence in its case that Josh was underage, that Mary gave or supplied alcohol to Josh to drink out of the house on November 26, 2003, that Josh's consumption of alcohol from any source resulted in impaired driving which in turn caused the automobile accident or that Josh or Brett incurred serious injury.
We affirm the district court's denial of Nelson's motion for new trial.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Nelson finally contends her trial attorney was ineffective in (A) failing to file a motion to suppress the statements she made to Officer McNally at her home and (B) failing to object on hearsay grounds to McNally's testimony about statements made by Joshua.
Nelson must prove a breach of an essential duty and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d. 674, 695 (1984). Our review of these claims is de novo. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
A. Motion to Suppress.
Nelson contends her attorney should have moved to suppress statements elicited in her home. First, she maintains the questioning amounted to a custodial interrogation. On our de novo review of this issue, we determine that the encounter was not custodial. See State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 558 (Iowa 1997) (setting forth pertinent factors). The interview occurred at Nelson's home, the stated purpose was to issue citations and answer any questions, and the tape reveals that Nelson had a degree of freedom incompatible with a finding of a custodial interrogation.
Nelson next contends her statements during that interview were not voluntary. In assessing this issue, courts have applied an evidentiary test or a totality-of-the-circumstances test. See State v. McCoy, 692 N.W.2d 6, 27 (Iowa 2005); see also State v. Trigon, Inc., 657 N.W.2d 441, 445 (Iowa 2003).
Nelson cannot establish involuntariness under either test. She was not subjected to threats or sanction and she asked questions when she did not understand something. The interview occurred at a prearranged time, lasted approximately thirty minutes, and Nelson appeared to understand the questions. Trigon, Inc., 657 N.W.2d at 445.
As Nelson's answers were not the product of a custodial interrogation and were voluntary, trial counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to file a suppression motion.
B. Hearsay.
Nelson claims trial counsel should have objected "to statements ascribed to Josh concerning who bought him the beer." The State counters that Nelson "`manifested an adoption or belief in [the] truth' of Joshua's statement when she did not challenge such a damning accusation, bringing the statement within the ambit of Iowa Rule of Evidence 801( d)(2)(B)." We agree with the State's assessment and, accordingly, conclude that counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to object to these statements on hearsay grounds.
IV. Disposition
We have considered all issues presented, whether or not discussed in this opinion. We affirm Nelson's judgment and sentence from supplying alcohol to a minor.