Opinion
No. COA12–1039.
2013-04-2
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Oliver G. Wheeler, IV, for the State. Glenn Gerding for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 March 2012 by Judge Edgar B. Gregory in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 25 March 2013. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Oliver G. Wheeler, IV, for the State. Glenn Gerding for defendant-appellant.
BRYANT, Judge.
Where the record supported the witness' qualifications, the trial court did not err in permitting the witness to testify as an expert in forensic chemistry.
Facts and Procedural History
In July 2010, defendant Julio Cesar Navarrete–Garcia agreed to sell cocaine to a police informant and provided the informant with a “sample” of the cocaine. Chemical analysis revealed that the sample was 0.8 grams of cocaine. At trial, the State sought to tender Lori Knops of the Iredell County Sheriff's Office, who conducted the chemical analysis of the sample while working for the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI), as an expert in forensic chemistry specializing in chemical analysis of controlled substances. Defendant objected.
Prior to the objection, Ms. Knops testified about her education and professional experience. Ms. Knops has a Bachelor of Science degree in chemistry from the University of North Carolina at Asheville. From 2002 to 2005, Ms. Knops worked in the State Patrol Crime Laboratory in Washington State, where she received most of her professional training in identification of controlled substances. In Washington, Ms. Knops conducted chemical analysis in drug cases and studied emerging methods of manufacturing methamphetamine. Ms. Knops then worked as an SBI forensic chemist and toxicologist from 2005 to 2011. At the time of the trial, Ms. Knops worked for the Iredell County Sheriff's Department Crime Laboratory. Ms. Knops had previously testified as an expert approximately sixty times.
The trial court overruled defendant's objection and permitted Ms. Knops to testify as an expert in forensic chemistry. Ms. Knops described the testing she did on the substance received from defendant and stated her opinion that it was cocaine. The State also submitted Ms. Knops' laboratory report into evidence.
The jury found defendant guilty of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, delivery of cocaine, and conspiracy to traffic in more than 400 grams of cocaine. The trial court consolidated the convictions for judgment and imposed 175 to 219 months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
_________________________
In his sole argument on appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by permitting Ms. Knops to testify as an expert in forensic chemistry. This argument is without merit.
We review a trial court's decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Crandell, 208 N.C.App. 227, 233, 702 S.E.2d 352, 357 (2010) (citation omitted), disc. rev. denied,365 N.C. 194, 710 S.E.2d 34 (2011).
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence permit expert testimony if the witness “may be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. North Carolina case law requires only that the expert be better qualified than the jury as to the subject at hand, with the testimony being helpful to the jury .” State v. Green, 209 N.C.App. 669, 672–73, 707 S.E.2d 715, 718 (2011) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Our Supreme Court has established a three-prong inquiry to determine the admissibility of expert testimony: “(1) Is the expert's proffered method of proof sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that area of testimony? (3) Is the expert's testimony relevant?” Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 458, 597 S.E.2d 674, 686 (2004) (citations omitted).
In the present case, defendant challenges the second prong of the Howerton test—whether Ms. Knops was qualified to testify as an expert in forensic chemistry. The record indicates that Ms. Knops testified she had a degree in chemistry, had performed forensic chemical analysis and identification of controlled substances since 2002, had received additional training as part of her professional experience, and had testified as an expert in forensic chemistry approximately sixty times. Given Ms. Knops' extensive relevant training, experience, knowledge, and education, Ms. Knops was better informed than the jury about the subject of forensic chemistry. Accordingly, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Ms. Knops to testify as an expert in forensic chemistry. See Green, 209 N.C.App. at 673, 707 S.E.2d at 719 (an expert with academic credentials, professional experience, and prior testimony as an expert in a relevant field properly qualified as an expert witness).
No error. Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).