Furthermore, if we look beyond the theoretical concept of a court trial and consider the unique Connecticut philosophy, it appears that the court of common pleas might refuse to consider any constitutional challenge. In State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323, 326, 176 A. 401, 403 (1935), the Connecticut Supreme Court stated: "In the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, any court has power to pass on the constitutionality of a statute and it may be its duty to declare it invalid, but a proper regard for the great co-ordinate branch of our government, the legislative, and for the preservation of the respect of our citizens, who are apt to look askance upon a decision of a court so limited in its jurisdiction as the city court of New Haven holding invalid the considered legislative judgment, dictates that such a court should take such action only upon the clearest ground or where the rights of litigants make it imperative that it should do so. Otherwise it is better for such a court to leave the decision to our higher courts, to which the matter may be brought by appeal or otherwise."
The title of the act, "An Act concerning Areas Not Served with, Electric Current," while not conclusive, is in this instance, when taken with the wording of the act itself, significant. Baker v. Baningoso, 134 Conn. 382, 387, 58 A.2d 5; State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323, 330, 176 A. 401. This claim has no merit. P.U.C. Docket No. 8925, Finding and Order, p. 9.
' "In State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323 ( 176 A 401), in passing upon an issue like that in the instant case, the court said: "`For one otherwise (than in lawful use of the highway) to maintain a place of private business in the highway in front of another's property is to commit a wrong against the owner of the fee.
" In State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323 ( 176 A 401), in passing upon an issue like that in the instant case, the court said: "For one otherwise (than in lawful use of the highway) to maintain a place of private business in the highway in front of another's property is to commit a wrong against the owner of the fee.
He may use the surface of the street temporarily for purposes necessarily incident to the abutting land. Thus he may place building materials or articles for household use thereon for a reasonable length of time. Under the surface of the highway he may build a mill race, tunnel or basement, or he may mine coal therefrom. It is clear that, when the authorities take part of an owner's lot or land for highway purposes, his rights in the residuum of fee are not entirely swept away. The parking of cars for purposes other than social or business may be at once a public nuisance, a violation of police regulations, and a private nuisance or trespass to the abutting owner: Birmingham v. Hood McPherson Realty Co., 233 Ala. 352, 172 So. 114; State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323, 176 A. 401; In re Opinion of the Justices, 8 N.E.2d 179 (Mass.); Decker v. Goddard, 233 App. Div. 139, 251 N.Y. Supp. 440; Lowell v. Pendleton Auto Co., 123 Or. 383, 261 P. 415. See also Hopkins v. Mfg. Co., 180 Pa. 199.
The defendants have demurred and thereby challenge the constitutionality of the statute. In State vs. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323 at pages 325 and 326 ( 176 A. 401, 403) the court said: "It is incumbent upon any court, in the consideration of an attack upon the constitutionality of a legislative act, to approach the question with great caution, examine it with infinite care, make every presumption and intendment in its favor, and sustain the act unless its invalidity is clear. Beach vs. Bradstreet, 85 Conn. 344, 349, 82 A. 1030; State ex rel. Brush vs. Sixth Taxing District, 104 Conn. 192, 205, 132 A. 561.
In construing state statutes they apply the rule that the legislature intended to enact a constitutional statute. Cedar Island Improvement Ass'n v. Clinton Electric Light Power Co., 142 Conn. 359, 372, 114 A.2d 535 (1955); State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323, 330, 176 A. 401 (1935); See State ex rel. Rourke v. Barbieri, 139 Conn. 203, 209, 91 A.2d 773 (1952). If there is any reasonable ground on which a statute can be sustained, the Connecticut courts will presume that to have been intended by the legislature. State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Comm., 139 Conn. 102, 90 A.2d 862 (1952).
Moreover, the Connecticut Supreme Court has in the past construed statutes so as to avoid doubts as to their constitutionality. See, e.g., Cedar Island Improvement Ass'n v. Clinton Elec. Light Power Co., 142 Conn. 359, 372, 114 A.2d 535 (1955); State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323, 330, 176 A. 401 (1935). See also, Lynch v. Overholser, supra, 369 U.S. at 710, 711, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211.
In construing state statutes they apply the rule that the legislature intended to enact a constitutional statute. Cedar Island Improvement Ass'n v. Clinton Electric Light Power Co., 142, Conn. 359, 372, 114 A.2d 535 (1955); State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323, 330, 176 A. 401 (1935); See State ex rel. Rourke v. Barbieri, 139 Conn. 203, 209, 91 A.2d 773 (1952). If there is any reasonable ground on which a statute can be sustained, the Connecticut courts will presume that to have been intended by the legislature. State ex rel. Higgins v. Civil Service Comm., 139 Conn. 102, 90 A.2d 862 (1952).
It is difficult to fathom why Justice Borden, in reaching this conclusion, does not impute to the legislature the same knowledge of the potential unconstitutionality of the statute and assume that the legislature, too, would have rejected that interpretation in light of the well established principle that "[w]e cannot impute to the Legislature an intent to pass an unconstitutional statute and a law should be construed, if it can reasonably be done, so as to make it valid." State v. Muolo, 119 Conn. 323, 330, 176 A. 401 (1935); accord State v. Doe, 149 Conn. 216, 229, 178 A.2d 271 (1962). The defendant requested that the trial court give the following charge: "The jury does not have to unanimously agree on the same statutory bar.