In this way, it is like the attempt statute. See State v. Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 147, 949 A.2d 155 (2008) ; see also RSA 629:1, I (2007) (providing that "[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, with a purpose that a crime be committed, he does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the crime"). Also, like attempt, solicitation is an inchoate crime.
“We have not, however, adopted the Crawford analysis as applicable in this State.” State v. Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 148, 949 A.2d 155 (2008). The defendant's assertion that the New Hampshire Constitution's Confrontation Clause protection is more expansive than the Crawford rule relies entirely upon our observation in State v. Peters, 133 N.H. 791, 794, 587 A.2d 587 (1991), that “[t]he language of the New Hampshire Constitution['s Confrontation Clause] is the more precise of the two, in that it explicitly provides what the Federal Constitution has been interpreted to mean.”
"We have not, however, adopted the Crawford analysis as applicable in this State." State v. Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 148, 949 A.2d 155 (2008). The defendant's assertion that the New Hampshire Constitution's Confrontation Clause protection is more expansive than the Crawford rule relies entirely upon our observation in State v. Peters, 133 N.H. 791, 794, 587 A.2d 587 (1991), that "[t]he language of the New Hampshire Constitution['s Confrontation Clause] is the more precise of the two, in that it explicitly provides what the Federal Constitution has been interpreted to mean."
Here, although the defendant invokes the Confrontation Clause protections of both the State and Federal Constitutions, his argument relies upon his rights as interpreted under the Federal Constitution: He contends that admitting the breathalyzer certificate into evidence, without providing him with the opportunity to cross-examine the state crime laboratory employee who prepared and signed the certificate, is contrary to Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Melendez–Diaz. We have not adopted the Crawford analysis under the State Constitution, and the defendant does not argue that we should do so now. SeeState v. Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 148, 949 A.2d 155 (2008). Nor does he address the applicability of the Confrontation Clause test that we have adopted—namely, that of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980).
Juries must be unanimous only as to each element of an offense. See RSA 625:10 (2007); see also State v. Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 147, 949 A.2d 155 (2008). Here, the defendant was charged with and convicted of attempted AFSA. Attempt is an inchoate crime that is considered a substantive offense in and of itself.
To preserve an issue for appellate review, the party must raise it in the trial court in the first instance. See State v. Munoz, 949 A.2d 155, 161 (N.H. 2008) ("[W]e will not entertain objections that were not raised during the proceedings below because they are not preserved for our review." (citing State v. Wong, 635 A.2d 470 (N.H. 1993))).
It could have proven that the defendant himself took a substantial step toward the commission of the burglary, i.e., that the defendant himself removed the screen. See State v Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 147 (2008) (explaining that an indictment charging an attempt must allege an intent to commit a crime and an overt act in furtherance of the crime). However, the State also had the option of proving accomplice liability.
See Thiel, 160 N.H. at 465. "Since an attempted crime is by definition a crime not completed, the State could not plead, factually identify, and prove the elements of the intended offense as if it had been carried out" State v. Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 147 (2008) (quotation omitted). In charging an attempt crime, the attempt statute is generally paired with another criminal statute, such as burglary, because the defendant has failed to complete the underlying crime.
Instead, we have applied the analysis in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). See State v. Munoz, 157 N.H. 143, 148 (2008); State v. Ayer, 154 N.H. 500, 511 (2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 63 (2007). As neither party argues for the imposition of a different standard, we confine our analysis to the Roberts standard.