State v. Mullins

52 Citing cases

  1. State v. Polanco

    126 Conn. App. 323 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)   Cited 9 times
    In State v. Polanco, supra, 126 Conn.App. at 339 n. 8, 11 A.3d 188, noting that the remedy it provided to the defendant was based on controlling Supreme Court precedent; see State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 379, 952 A.2d 784 (2008), overruled by State v. Polanco, supra, 308 Conn. at 248, 61 A.3d 1084; this court determined that there was no need to discuss the defendant's alternative argument that his conviction on the lesser included offense should have been vacated.

    We agree that this claim warrants Golding review. See State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 377-78, 952 A.2d 784 (2008). "The federal and state constitutions prohibit multiple punishments if: (1) the charges arise out of the same act or transaction; and (2) the charged crimes are the same offense.

  2. State v. Gonzalez

    25 A.3d 648 (Conn. 2011)

    (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 361–62, 952 A.2d 784 (2008). “[W]hether a defendant was subjected to interrogation ... involves a ...

  3. State v. Demarco

    311 Conn. 510 (Conn. 2014)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that collective knowledge doctrine did not apply to impute knowledge of defendant's phone number to arresting officer for purposes of determining whether emergency exception to warrant requirement applied, but not deciding whether collective knowledge doctrine ever could be used to exonerate defendant

    This court has further explained as follows: “A finding of fact will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence and pleadings in the whole record.... As we have noted previously, however, when a question of fact is essential to the outcome of a particular legal determination that implicates a defendant's constitutional rights, and the credibility of witnesses is not the primary issue, our customary deference to the trial court's factual findings is tempered by a scrupulous examination of the record to ascertain that the trial court's factual findingsare supported by substantial evidence.... [W]here the legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our review is plenary, and] we must determine whether they are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts set out in the memorandum of decision....” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 362–63, 952 A.2d 784 (2008). “Notwithstanding our responsibility to examine the record scrupulously, it is well established that we may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court when it comes to evaluating the credibility of a witness.... It is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to weigh conflicting testimony and make determinations of credibility, crediting some, all or none of any given witness' testimony.... Questions of whether to believe or to disbelieve a competent witness are beyond our review.

  4. State v. Cipriani

    2009 Ct. Sup. 14245 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2009)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted; internal citations omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 361 952 A.2d 784 (2008). "[A]lthough the circumstances of each case must certainly influence a determination of whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of receiving Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest . . . A person is in custody only if, in view of all the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed [that] he was not free to leave . . . Further, the United States Supreme Court has adopted an objective, reasonable person test for determining whether a defendant is in custody . . . Thus, in determining whether Miranda rights are required, the only relevant inquiry is whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would believe that he or she was in police custody of the degree associated with a formal arrest."

  5. Jones v. Murphy

    694 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2012)   Cited 129 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that trial court's erroneous determination that defendant consented to removal from courtroom subject to harmless error analysis

    Connecticut law is clear that “rights of constitutional magnitude may be waived,” State v. Paige, 304 Conn. 426, 40 A.3d 279, 284 (2012), and the Connecticut Supreme Court has declined to consider similar arguments in similar procedural postures. Cf. State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 952 A.2d 784, 795–97 (2008) (declining to consider claim that confession was coerced because defendant had not objected below and record was inadequate to review the claim). We are confident that “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.”

  6. State v. Edwards

    325 Conn. 97 (Conn. 2017)   Cited 37 times
    Holding a witness who testified about the "azimuth" and "bismuth" of coverage areas acted as an expert when the witness "relied on data he obtained from Verizon to conduct his analysis, the process he used to arrive at his conclusions was beyond the ken of average juror even the trial court acknowledged that [the witness] had an expertise that allowed him to be more knowledgeable on the subject of cell phone data than the average juror"

    (Citation omitted.) State v. Mullins , 288 Conn. 345, 364, 952 A.2d 784 (2008). "Interrogation, as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself."

  7. State v. Crespo

    303 Conn. 589 (Conn. 2012)   Cited 23 times
    Describing how inconsistently these claims have been addressed

    Often, we have rejected, without further review, claims of evidentiary error under the second prong of Golding as patently failing to demonstrate constitutional error, particularly when the constitutional claim involves an alleged, generalized due process violation. See, e.g., State v. Bowman, 289 Conn. 809, 819–21, 960 A.2d 1027 (2008) (defendant's unpreserved claim of improperly admitted photographic evidence failed under second prong of Golding because claim was matter of evidentiary law and not of constitutional magnitude); see also State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 374 n. 14, 952 A.2d 784 (2008) (defendant's unpreserved claim regarding improper application of evidentiary privilege failed under second prong of Golding because “it [was] not of constitutional dimension”). In some instances, however, although we have purported to deem a defendant's unpreserved evidentiary claim unreviewable under the second prong of Golding, we reached that conclusion only after engaging in a review of the record, otherwise akin to our analysis under the third prong of Golding.

  8. State v. Canady

    297 Conn. 322 (Conn. 2010)   Cited 18 times
    Holding that the question, "are you okay," was not an interrogation

    " (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345,361-62, 952 A.2d 784 (2008). "A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation.

  9. State v. Morales

    164 Conn. App. 143 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 16 times
    In Morales, as in the present case, the defendant was convicted of strangulation in the second degree, unlawful restraint in the first degree and assault in the third degree.

    (Citation omitted.) State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 364, 952 A.2d 784 (2008), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Polanco, 308 Conn. 242, 248, 253, 61 A.3d 1084 (2013). “Interrogation, as conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent in custody itself.”

  10. State v. Johnson

    137 Conn. App. 733 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 17 times
    Applying vacatur approach pursuant to Rutledge

    We are therefore bound to follow the decision of the United States Supreme Court. Second, the Chicano approach has been endorsed by our Supreme Court and this court in cases such as State v. Mullins, 288 Conn. 345, 378, 952 A.2d 784 (2008); State v. D'Antonio, 274 Conn. 658, 715, 877 A.2d 696 (2005); State v. Padua, supra, 273 Conn. at 172, 869 A.2d 192;State v. Nelson, 118 Conn.App. 831, 856, 986 A.2d 311, cert. denied, 295 Conn. 911, 989 A.2d 1074 (2010); State v. Benjamin, 86 Conn.App. 344, 352, 861 A.2d 524 (2004); State v. Gonzalez, supra, 74 Conn.App. at 596–97, 814 A.2d 384. However, in those cases, Rutledge usually has not been distinctly raised.