Opinion
No. COA12–963.
2013-02-5
STATE of North Carolina v. Maahir S. MUHAMMAD.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State. Marilyn G. Ozer of Massengale & Ozer, for defendant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 27 January 2012 by Judge Michael J. O'Foghludha in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 December 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Kathleen N. Bolton, for the State. Marilyn G. Ozer of Massengale & Ozer, for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Maahir S. Muhammad (defendant) appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury conviction of second-degree murder, sentencing him to 264–326 months imprisonment. After careful consideration, we conclude that defendant received a trial free from prejudicial error.
I. Background
On 29 October 2010, the body of Clarence “Mouse” Blossom (the victim) was discovered lying face down behind a duplex residential building. On the body, police found a wallet with some cash and a driver's license belonging to defendant. Earlier that evening, several residents of the building witnessed defendant sitting in his parked vehicle, a red BMW, near the building. The victim and one other man approached either side of defendant's car, and, according to defendant, robbed him. One witness saw the victim run behind her unit in the building and then she heard gunshots.
Defendant was later arrested and charged with second-degree murder. On 23 January 2012, his case came on for trial by jury. At the trial, one of the State's witnesses, Joshua Haley, testified that he knew the identity of the man who was with the victim the night of the murder. He further testified that he told the prosecutor and a detective the man's identity when they interviewed him on Friday, immediately before the trial. Defendant then objected, arguing that this information was discoverable under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–903, and that the State violated the discovery statute by failing to provide the information to defendant prior to trial. The trial court overruled defendant's objection, ruling that the information was not discoverable because no notes were taken during the interview.
The State also offered the testimony of two inmates who spoke with defendant while he was incarcerated and awaiting trial. One of the inmates, Cornelius Jones, testified that he saw defendant “on eight red,” which is the highest security floor. He said that defendant told him that the victim and one other man robbed him and that he went after the victim to retaliate. The other inmate, Charles Pingley, testified that defendant told him that he shot the guy who stole his wallet.
On 30 January 2012, at the close of all evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree murder. The trial court then entered judgment, sentencing defendant to 264–326 months imprisonment. Defendant now appeals.
II. Analysis
A. Discovery
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in ruling that statements made by Haley to the prosecutor and a detective prior to trial were not discoverable. We agree, but we are unable to conclude that defendant was prejudiced by this error.
“We review a trial court's ruling on discovery matters under the abuse of discretion standard. A trial court may be reversed for abuse of discretion only upon a showing that its ruling was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” In re J.B., 172 N.C.App. 1, 14, 616 S.E.2d 264, 272 (2005) (quotations and citations omitted).
The crux of the issue here is whether the State was required to take notes during the pre-trial interview with Haley. We conclude that the State was required to do so.
According to our discovery statute, the State must provide copies of all statements made by witnesses “obtained during the investigation of the offenses alleged to have been committed by the defendant.” Further, these statements must “be in written or recorded form, except that oral statements made by a witness to a prosecuting attorney outside the presence of a law enforcement officer or investigatorial assistant shall not be required to be in written or recorded form[.]” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 15A–903 (2012).
Here, Haley testified that during an interview with both the prosecutor and a detective, he stated that he knew the identity of the man who was with the victim the night of the murder. Thus, since these statements were made in the presence of a law enforcement officer, the State was required to reduce them to writing. As such, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that the State did not violate the discovery statute.
Next, we must examine whether defendant was prejudiced by this error. Defendant contends that the State's failure to turn over this information was a constitutional violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963). We disagree.
In Brady, the defendant was convicted in a Maryland trial court of first-degree murder. He then learned that his accomplice confessed to the murder, but that the prosecutor suppressed evidence of this confession. The defendant then appealed to the Maryland Court of Appeals, where that Court held that the suppression of such evidence denied the defendant due process of law. The United States Supreme Court then affirmed the decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals, holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963). In interpreting Brady, our Supreme Court has ruled that “[e]vidence is considered ‘material’ if there is a ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result had the evidence been disclosed.” State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 636, 669 S.E.2d 290, 296 (2008) (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
Here, we are unable to agree that a different result would have occurred had Haley's statements been disclosed prior to trial. The statements at issue simply revealed that Haley knew the identity of the man who was with the victim the night of his murder. Defendant has made no persuasive argument tending to show how this information would have had a substantial impact on his guilt; for example, defendant did not argue at trial that the man with the victim actually committed the murder. Further, we conclude that this information likely had little bearing on the outcome, given the substantial evidence presented against defendant by the State. This evidence includes 1) the fact that defendant's wallet and driver's license were found on the victim, 2) the testimony of two fellow inmates who each claimed defendant admitted to shooting the victim, and 3) the eyewitness testimony of several residents of the residential building behind which the victim's body was found. We further note that at trial defendant failed to object to the trial court's ruling on this matter, and he similarly declined to request any other specific relief, such as a mistrial or continuance. As such, we overrule defendant's argument.
B. State's closing argument
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State's closing argument when the prosecutor stated “this defendant is no longer entitled to any presumption of innocence.” We disagree.
The standard of review for assessing alleged improper closing arguments that fail to provoke timely objection from opposing counsel is whether the remarks were so grossly improper that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to intervene ex mero motu. Under this standard, [o]nly an extreme impropriety on the part of the prosecutor will compel this Court to hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero motu an argument that defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when originally spoken. To establish such an abuse, defendant must show that the prosecutor's comments so infected the trial with unfairness that they rendered the conviction fundamentally unfair.
State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443, 499–500, 701 S.E.2d 615, 650 (2010) (quotations and citations omitted).
Here, when read in context, we are unable to agree that the prosecutor's remarks rise to such level of abuse. The prosecutor said “this defendant is no longer entitled to any presumption of innocence” because “he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, using your reason and our common sense as you all indicated that you would .” We conclude that these statements were simply the prosecutor implying that the State had met its burden. Further, the record shows that after closing arguments were made, the trial court instructed the jury, in part, that “[t]he defendant is presumed to be innocent.” This Court has held that “the trial court's correct jury instructions on the law cured any mistakes made in the prosecutor's closing argument.” State v. Campbell, 177 N.C.App. 520, 530, 629 S.E.2d 345, 351 (2006). As such, we are unable to agree that the trial court erred with regards to this issue.
C. Jury Instructions
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on confession, because he never made a confession. We disagree.
Confession is defined as: [a] voluntary statement made by a person charged with the commission of a crime or misdemeanor, communicated to another person, wherein he acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged, and discloses the circumstances of the act or the share and participation which he had in it.
State v. Bray, 37 N.C.App. 43, 46, 245 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1978) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court has held that
[t]he pattern jury instruction concerning confessions ... should not be given in cases in which the defendant has made a statement which is only of a generally inculpatory nature. When evidence is introduced which would support a finding that the defendant in fact has made a statement admitting his guilt of the crime charged, however, the instruction is properly given.
State v. Young, 324 N.C. 489, 498, 380 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1989).
At trial, the State presented evidence that defendant told two fellow inmates that he shot the victim. Jones testified that defendant told him “he had went back to get his wallet and money, whatever he took from him, and he shot the guy.” Pingley testified that defendant told him that “he had runned and caught Mousey behind the house and shot him, but he didn't say how many times.” We conclude that these statements are sufficient evidence of a confession, and the trial court did not err in so instructing the jury.
D. Prejudicial testimony
Lastly, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit testimony from Jones, revealing that defendant was imprisoned on the highest security floor at the jail. According to defendant, this evidence violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. We disagree.
Defendant likens the admittance of this evidence to those cases where the United States Supreme Court has held that “where a defendant is forced to wear prison clothes when appearing before the jury, the constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire may affect a juror's judgment.” Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568, 89 L.Ed.2d 525, 534 (1986) (quotations and citations omitted). However, this Court has previously rejected a similar comparison in State v. Fowler, 157 N.C.App. 564, 579 S.E.2d 499 (2003).
In Fowler, the trial court told the jury that the trial was being delayed because defendant was currently in the custody of the sheriff's department. The defendant did not object, but he argued on appeal that the statement violated his constitutional rights. This Court disagreed, and held that “the statements by the trial court do not create the same prejudice to the defendant as that raised when a defendant appears in court in shackles or prison garb.” State v. Fowler, 157 N.C.App. 564, 566, 579 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2003). As such, we overrule defendant's argument.
III. Conclusion
In sum, we conclude that defendant received a trial free from prejudicial error.
No prejudicial error. Judges McGEE and HUNTER, ROBERT, C. concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).