[¶ 10] An encounter between a member of law enforcement and a citizen will implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment only if the encounter constitutes a seizure of the citizen. See State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361, 363 (citing State v. Laplante, 534 A.2d 959, 962 (Me. 1987)). A seizure occurs when the citizen's liberty is restrained by a law enforcement official such that the citizen "`is not free to walk away.'"

[¶ 7] An encounter between a police officer and a citizen implicates the Fourth Amendment only if the officer "seizes" the citizen. See State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361 (citing State v. Laplante, 534 A.2d 959, 962 (Me. 1987)). A seizure of the person occurs when "`the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen' such that he is not free to walk away."

The police may make brief, investigatory stops of people on the basis of "`specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.'" State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d 361, 364 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). Although the State raised the reasonable suspicion standard at the motion hearing, its brief to this Court does not argue that this encounter qualifies as a Terry stop. Issues not briefed to this Court are not preserved. Holland v. Sebunya, 2000 ME 160, ¶ 9 n. 6, 759 A.2d 205, 209.

See, e.g., Bard v. Lord, 2010 ME 48, ¶ 7, 997 A.2d 101;Wrenn v. Lewis, 2003 ME 29, ¶ 23 n. 4, 818 A.2d 1005. See, e.g., State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 17, 704 A.2d 361;State v. Taylor, 1997 ME 81, ¶ 10, 694 A.2d 907. [¶ 16] Here, Deutsche Bank's ownership of the mortgage is not a fact susceptible to proof by judicial notice pursuant to Rule 201(b)(2).

[¶ 17] A similar threat of loss or destruction of evidence did not arise with respect to Alley's clothing until Alley refused to give his clothing to the police and told the police that he wanted to leave the police station. Only then did it become necessary to seize the bloodstained clothing so that it would not be lost or destroyed. Although Alley was not under arrest at that time, his subsequent detention without a warrant for approximately fifty minutes was necessary so that Detective Lopez could obtain a change of clothes for Alley. See State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d 361, 364 (finding that an investigatory detention of a person, short of an arrest, is valid if the law enforcement officers act on the basis of specific and articulable facts). This temporary detention was reasonable because the police had an articulable suspicion that a crime had been committed; observed, in plain view, that Alley was in possession of clothing that was evidence of the crime; and faced the exigency of needing to take immediate possession of Alley's clothing so that it would not be lost or destroyed as evidence, while also needing to obtain replacement clothes for Alley to wear.

Further, "[p]olice officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another public place." State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 8, 704 A.2d 361, 363. [¶ 4] In this case, the officer, in protecting defendant's children, was engaged in a community caretaking function that did not end until he determined that they had a safe ride home.

As we discussed in State v. Moulton, although alcohol may be a “drug” by the common definition of the word, the references to “drugs” in 29–A M.R.S. § 2525 (2014) do not include alcohol. 1997 ME 228, ¶¶ 14–16, 704 A.2d 361. Accordingly, in the instant context, we use the word “drug” to refer to an intoxicating substance other than alcohol.[¶ 15] Section 2526 establishes a program to train and certify drug recognition experts, and mandates that only officers who have completed the program may conduct drug impairment assessments and testify as experts pursuant to section 2525. Section 2525(1) provides that a person must submit to a blood or urine test if and when “a drug recognition expert has probable cause to believe that a person is under the influence” of a drug, multiple drugs, or a combination of drugs and alcohol.

matter of law, in the absence of some such physical force or show of authority, there was no intrusion on Collier's liberty or privacy that required any reasonable articulable suspicion, and any belief Collier may have had that he was not free to leave the encounter was objectively unreasonable. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554–55, 100 S.Ct. 1870 (stating that no seizure occurred when police approached a woman in a public concourse at the airport, identified themselves, requested—but did not demand—that she produce some identification and her flight ticket, and asked her a series of questions); United States v. Klinginsmith, 25 F.3d 1507, 1509–10 (10th Cir.1994) (finding no seizure when a state trooper followed the defendant's vehicle into a gas station); State v. Cilley, 1998 ME 34, ¶¶ 1–4, 707 A.2d 79 (vacating the grant of a suppression motion when game wardens pulled over to the side of a rural road and the approaching vehicle stopped without any signal to do so from the wardens); State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶¶ 1–3, 704 A.2d 361 (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress when a police officer observed a car stopped on the side of the road, pulled his cruiser alongside the car without activating his blue lights, looked through the windows into the stopped car, and spoke to the driver); cf. State v. Chapman, 495 A.2d 314, 315, 318 (Me.1985) (finding that a seizure occurred when the police officer parked behind the defendant, “blocking any movement”). We therefore vacate that portion of the court's decision granting Collier's motion to suppress for lack of reasonable articulable suspicion.

[¶ 10] We will not disturb a court's decision as to whether a seizure implicates the Fourth Amendment unless we find errors of law or clearly erroneous findings of fact. See State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 6, 704 A.2d 361, 363. We review independently a legal ruling that the historical facts found by the court constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

[¶ 23] The police had probable cause to arrest Pagnani for OAS. Pagnani was wearing the jacket when she was advised that she was under arrest and throughout her interactions with the officer as she resisted arrest. SeeState v. Moulton , 1997 ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361 (stating that for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, "seizure of the person occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of the citizen such that he is not free to walk away"). [¶ 24] The officer continued to tell Pagnani that she was under arrest and not to walk away, but she did not cooperate.