[¶ 10] We will not disturb a court's decision as to whether a seizure implicates the Fourth Amendment unless we find errors of law or clearly erroneous findings of fact. See State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 6, 704 A.2d 361, 363. We review independently a legal ruling that the historical facts found by the court constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. “An encounter between a police officer and a citizen implicates the Fourth Amendment only if the officer ‘seizes' the citizen.” State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361. “It is well-established that a police officer lawfully may stop, that is ‘seize,’ a person only when the officer has an objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal conduct has taken place, is occurring, or imminently will occur,” or that a concern for safety has arisen.

[¶ 10] An encounter between a member of law enforcement and a citizen will implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment only if the encounter constitutes a seizure of the citizen. See State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361, 363 (citing State v. Laplante, 534 A.2d 959, 962 (Me. 1987)). A seizure occurs when the citizen's liberty is restrained by a law enforcement official such that the citizen "`is not free to walk away.'"

Statev. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361.' [N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves seizures of persons.' Terry [v.State of Ohio, ] 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).

[¶ 7] An encounter between a police officer and a citizen implicates the Fourth Amendment only if the officer "seizes" the citizen. See State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361 (citing State v. Laplante, 534 A.2d 959, 962 (Me. 1987)). A seizure of the person occurs when "`the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen' such that he is not free to walk away."

We have long held that we may take judicial notice of facts on appeal. See, e.g., Nader v. Me. Democratic Party, 2013 ME 51,¶ 20 n.10, 66 A.3d 571 ("[W]e may take judicial notice."); State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 17, 704 A.2d 361 ("We may take judicial notice on appeal."); First Nat'l Bank of Bost. v. Me. Tpk. Auth., 136 A.2d 699, 714 (Me. 1957) ("We may take judicial notice of [this] fact."); Goodwin v. Small, 43 A. 507, 507 (Me. 1899), ("[W]e may take judicial notice of the fact."). The accuracy of the timeline provided by OPEGA's Information Brief cannot reasonably be questioned, and therefore we may take judicial notice of the timeline regarding OPEGA's final report and the four evaluations.

These circumstances, combined with Wilcox's slurred speech when speaking with the officer, gave rise to reasonable articulable suspicion of intoxication. See State v. Moulton, 1997 ME 228, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d 361 (listing slurred speech as one indicium of intoxication); State v. Wood, 662 A.2d 919, 921 (Me. 1995) (same).

Particularly when combined with the odor of alcohol the officer detected as coming from the van, this justified an investigatory detention of Cunneen—a conclusion that Cunneen does not challenge. SeeState v. Moulton , 1997 ME 228, ¶ 10, 704 A.2d 361. Up to that point, however, the officer's conduct and interaction with Cunneen did not rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment seizure, and the court did not err by denying Cunneen's motion to suppress.

[¶ 23] The police had probable cause to arrest Pagnani for OAS. Pagnani was wearing the jacket when she was advised that she was under arrest and throughout her interactions with the officer as she resisted arrest. SeeState v. Moulton , 1997 ME 228, ¶ 7, 704 A.2d 361 (stating that for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, "seizure of the person occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of the citizen such that he is not free to walk away"). [¶ 24] The officer continued to tell Pagnani that she was under arrest and not to walk away, but she did not cooperate.

As we discussed in State v. Moulton, although alcohol may be a “drug” by the common definition of the word, the references to “drugs” in 29–A M.R.S. § 2525 (2014) do not include alcohol. 1997 ME 228, ¶¶ 14–16, 704 A.2d 361. Accordingly, in the instant context, we use the word “drug” to refer to an intoxicating substance other than alcohol.[¶ 15] Section 2526 establishes a program to train and certify drug recognition experts, and mandates that only officers who have completed the program may conduct drug impairment assessments and testify as experts pursuant to section 2525. Section 2525(1) provides that a person must submit to a blood or urine test if and when “a drug recognition expert has probable cause to believe that a person is under the influence” of a drug, multiple drugs, or a combination of drugs and alcohol.