Opinion
Def. ID No. 0205019125.
Decided: December 17, 2003.
Anthony E. Morris.
Memorandum Opinion — Motion for Postconviction Relief
Dear Mr. Morris:
This is my decision on your motion for postconviction relief. You were charged by indictment on July 2, 2002 with Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine, Possession of Drug Paraphernalia and Resisting Arrest. You were found guilty of these offenses after a three-day jury trial on October 18, 2002. I sentenced you on December 6, 2002 to 32 years at supervision level V, suspended after serving 15 years at supervision level V for 17 years of declining levels of probation. You filed an appeal with the Supreme Court on December 13, 2002. The Supreme Court affirmed your convictions on September 8, 2003. Morris v. State, Del. Supr., No. 687, 2002, Berger. J. (Sept. 8, 2003). You filed your motion for postconviction relief on October 14, 2003. This is your first motion for postconviction relief and it was filed in a timely manner. Therefore, your motion, which sets forth three claims for relief, is not barred by Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(2).
1. Violation of Due Process
You allege that your due process rights were violated. Specifically, you allege "substantial abridgement of due process rights by precipitous disavowal of initial motion to suppress evidence." Def.'s Mot. at para. 12. This claim is barred by Rule 61(i)(4) because you raised this claim on appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court where the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Morris, Del. Supr., No. 687, 2002, Berger, J. (Sept. 8, 2003). Rule 61(i)(4) precludes consideration of this claim unless such consideration is warranted in the interest of justice. Rule 61(i)(4) provides the following:
Former adjudication. Any ground for relief that was formerly adjudicated, whether in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, in an appeal, in a postconviction proceeding, or in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, is thereafter barred, unless reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice.
SUPER. CT. CR. R. 61(i)(4). Delaware Courts have defined the "interest of justice" exception narrowly `to require the movant to show that the trial Court lacked the authority to convict or punish [the movant].' State v. Denston, 2003 WL 22293651, at *3 (Del.Super.Ct.), citing State v. Wright, 653 A.2d 288, 298 (Del.Super.Ct. 1994) (citing Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 746 (Del. 1990)). Since this claim was already raised on appeal, it is barred and I will not consider it now.
2. 6th and 14th Amendment Violations
You allege that your 6th and 14th Amendment rights were violated. However, you have failed to present any facts supporting your position. Rather, you simply state that there were "clear violations of said amendments . . . [and] [t]hree distinctly identifiable points in procedure @ [sic] trial." Def.'s Mot. at para. 12. Consequently, you have failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 61(b)(2), which require that you "set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified." SUPER. CT. CR. R. 61(b)(2).
Moreover, your appeal to the Supreme Court did, at least to some extent, raise these same allegations. Due to the vagueness of the allegations in your motion for postconviction relief it is unclear whether or not these allegations were raised on appeal. The only ground raised on appeal was an alleged violation of due process. The basis of that was my decision not to consider your untimely motion to suppress, which in turn was based on your belief that the police lacked probable cause to arrest you. To the extent that the allegations raised in your motion for postconviction relief are related to my denial of your motion to suppress before trial, they were raised before, and rejected by, the Supreme Court. Therefore, this claim is procedurally barred. SUPER. CT. CR. R. 61(i)(4). To the extent that you did not raise these allegations on appeal, you certainly could have and the failure to do so then bars them now. SUPER CT. CR. R. 61(i)(3). Therefore, either way, this claim is also procedurally barred and I will not consider it now.
3. Improper Evaluation of Movant by Court
You allege "improper evaluation of movant by court." You specifically state "egregious error on the part of the Trial Judge in permitting movant to serve as his own attorney. Movant will present conclusive evidence to bolster said claim!" Def.'s Mot. at para. 12. However, you concede that this ground was not previously raised. Your excuse for not raising this ground is basically ignorance of law. You claim that you "was [sic] unable to raise ground three due to lack of comprehension of laws governing said procedure." Id. Ignorance of the law, however, is no defense. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) sets forth the terms for a procedural default. The Rule specifically provides "[a]ny ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows (A) Cause for relief from the procedural default and (B) Prejudice from violation of the movant's rights." SUPER. CT. CR. R. 61(i)(3). You have not shown cause for relief from the default and prejudice from any violation of your rights. Therefore, since you failed to raise this claim it is barred and I will not consider it.
However, Rule 61(i)(5) enables a movant to overcome the procedural bars of Rule 61(i)(1), (2), and (3), which bar your second and third claims, if you present "a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermines the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the conviction." SUPER. CT. CR. R. 61(i)(5). However, "[t]his `fundamental fairness' exception contained in Rule 61(i)(5) is a `narrow one and has been applied only in limited circumstances, such as when the right relied upon has been recognized for the first time after a direct appeal.'" Denston, 2003 WL at *3, quoting Younger, 580 A.2d at 555. Rule 61(i)(5) is not applicable in this case since you did not assert a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice in your motion for postconviction relief.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, your Motion for Postconviction Relief is denied.