Opinion
Cr. A. No. 1N98020028R1.
Date submitted: April 14, 1999.
Date decided: May 17, 1999. Motion Denied: February 8, 2000.
ORDER
Upon review of Keith Morris ("Defendant")'s Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record, it appears to the Court:
1) On October 22, 1998, Movant filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 on a plea to Escape Second Degree and three violations of probation.
2) On April 9, 1998, Movant pleaded guilty to Escape Second Degree and three violations of probation. On July 9, 1998, Movant filed a Motion for Modification of Order. This Court denied the motion on August 5, 1998. Defendant's Plea Agreement, dated March 19, 1998, states that Defendant will plead guilty to Escape Second Degree and three counts of violation of probation for immediate sentencing at two years Level V. The agreement also states, as part of "other conditions", that Defendant will admit habitual offender status pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a). On April 20, 1998, the Court issued and Order formally declaring Defendant to be a habitual offender pursuant to Defendant's admissions in accordance with his Plea Agreement signed on March 19, 1998 and entered on April 9, 1998.
3) In this motion, Defendant asserts that: (1) this Court failed to comply with 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) and 4215(b) when it declared Defendant to be a Habitual Offender; and (2) Defendant's attorney advised Defendant of the maximum penalty at sentencing on April 9, 1998 and not at the time Defendant signed the Plea Agreement on March 19, 1998.
5) In reviewing motions for Postconviction Relief, the Court must first determine whether a defendant's claims are barred by procedural requirements prior to addressing the merits of the underlying claims. This is Defendant's first Motion for Post Conviction Relief and the Court has determined that no procedural bars listed in Rule 61 are applicable. Therefore, the Court may consider the merits of Defendant's application.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
6) Defendant's first ground for relief is that he did not receive a separate hearing before the Court declared him to be a habitual offender. A hearing pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4215 is contemplated as being separate from the sentencing hearing. "However, even if a status hearing is not held separately from the sentencing, that fact is not a substantive basis for reversal of the declaration that the defendant is a habitual offender.
State v. Stanley, Del. Super., C.A. No. IN96-05-0966R1, 97-06-0563R1, Goldstein, J. (Oct. 15, 1998), citing Bailey v. Stale, Del. Supr., 450 A.2d 400, 404 (1982).
Stanley, supra at 2, citing Bailey, supra at 2, p. 405.
7) At the plea hearing on April 9, 1998, Defendant entered into a plea agreement pursuant to Del. Crim. R. 11(e)(1)(C). The plea agreement stipulated, as an "other condition, " that Defendant would admit habitual offender status. The Defendant signed the agreement.
8) A motion and a hearing for declaring Defendant a habitual offender were not required under the circumstances of this case. Defendant was deemed to have waive the procedural requirements of the habitual offender statute. His waiver is evidenced by his stipulation, that was set forth in the written plea agreement which was signed by Defendant, and by statements he made and/or his counsel made at the guilty plea hearing and at sentencing, that Defendant had the requisite number of felony convictions and thus qualified for sentencing as a habitual offender. Defendant is bound by his written plea agreement and by his statements and those of his counsel, that he was eligible for sentencing as a habitual offender and that he understood that he was taking a plea, including habitual offender status, and the consequences thereof.
See Marshall v. State, Del. Supr., No. 339, 1998, Veasey, C.J., Walsh, J., and Holland, J. (Nov. 20, 1998) (ORDER).
9) In addition, the Court finds that Defendant participated fully in his plea proceeding and at his sentencing hearing. During his plea colloquy, Defendant acknowledged that he would be declared a habitual offender Defendant acknowledged that he was pleading guilty to Escape Second Degree, multiple counts of violation of probation and that he was admitting to Habitual Offender Status. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant indicated that he understood that the agreed upon sentence was two years at Level V. He stated that he understood the maximum term to be two years. He affirmatively responded to the judge's question as to whether he understood that because he was admitting to being a Habitual Offender, the Court could impose a sentence up to life imprisonment. He stated that he understood that his guilty plea was made pursuant to Rule 11(e)(1)(C) and that if the Court did not follow the recommended sentence, that he could withdraw his plea and proceed. He further acknowledged that he entered into the guilty plea freely and voluntarily.
(10) In the course of the proceeding, Defendant was given the opportunity to object to the manner in which his guilty plea and sentencing took place or to request further clarification of the consequences of his plea agreement. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant had a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of his status as a habitual offender. He was also adequately advised in a timely and appropriate manner of the conditions of his plea. As a result, the Court finds that Defendant's failure to object at the time of his sentencing as a habitual offender constitutes a waiver of a separate status hearing as contemplated by 11 Del. C. § 21 4215.
Stanley, supra at 2, citing State v. Newman, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IN91-01-0367R1, Gebelein, J. (Sept. 23, 1992), aff'd Del. Supr., 622 A.2d 1096 (1993), Mem. Op. at 1.
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the grounds upon which Defendant bases his Motion are without merit. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.