Applying the "voluntariness" standard, the Supreme Court has held that a suspect who initiates an attempt to "cut a deal" with police or prosecutors by bartering his confession for a favor gives his confession voluntarily. In State v. Morris, 248 Or. 480, 435 P.2d 1018 (1967), the defendant was in custody following an arrest for armed robbery. When he asked police officers if he could speak with the district attorney about the possibility of joining the Foreign Legion, the officers agreed to contact the district attorney.

The same view of the record was adopted on appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court. State v. Morris, Or., 435 P.2d 1018 (1967). It would be an outrageous misuse of space to quote, at length, from petitioner's testimony showing his aggressiveness in willfully giving a confession without the advice or presence of his attorney.

See, e.g., State v. Cortman, 251 Or. 566, 573, 446 P.2d 681 (1968); State v. Townsend, 237 Or. 527, 530, 392 P.2d 459 (1964). See also State v. Morris, 248 Or. 480, 483, 435 P.2d 1018 (1967) (surplusage language which does not mislead the jury in view of other instructions is not reversible error); Waterway Terminals Company v. P.S. Lord Mechanical Contractors, 256 Or. 361, 370, 474 P.2d 309 (1970) ("* * * cases should not be reversed upon instructions, despite technical imperfections, unless the appellate court can fairly say that the instruction probably created an erroneous impression of the law in the minds of the jurors which affected the outcome of the case"). The challenged instruction did not create an erroneous impression of the law in the minds of the jurors.

For one, we have generally held that assurances by police that they will report a defendant’s cooperation to the prosecutor are permissible, as opposed to promises of immunity or leniency, which render confessions involuntary. Compare State v. Williams , 64 Or. App. 448, 455, 668 P.2d 1236, rev den , 296 Or. 120, 672 P.2d 1193 (1983) ("[T]he officers agreed only to forward [the] defendant’s request to the officials with authority to ‘deal’ with him. * * * [W]hile [the] defendant may have felt impelled by his desire not to disappoint his brother, the only ‘promise’ made to [the] defendant by the police was a promise to convey a request—a promise made without any effort by the officers to make that conveyance contingent on anything."), and State v. Morris , 248 Or. 480, 482-83, 435 P.2d 1018 (1967) ("[N]o promises of benefit or hope of benefit were held out to the defendant to obtain his confession. The officers merely agreed to make known his desires to the district attorney, and this was done."), with State v. Aguilar , 133 Or. App. 304, 307-09, 891 P.2d 668 (1995) (police promises of leniency or immunity for the crime to which a defendant confesses are involuntary "as a matter of law" because "[i]t is assumed that when a person confesses in response to a promise that the person will not be charged with the crime for which the confession is made, the person’s confession is not the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice").