Opinion
2019-UP-224
06-26-2019
The State, Respondent, v. Chad Morris, Appellant. Appellate Case No. 2016-001713
Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of Sumter, all for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted May 1, 2019
Appeal From Clarendon County Roger M. Young, Sr., Circuit Court Judge.
Appellate Defender Taylor Davis Gilliam, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, both of Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest Adolphus Finney, III, of Sumter, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only."); State v. Singleton, 395 S.C. 6, 13, 716 S.E.2d 332, 335-36 (Ct. App. 2011) ("To warrant reversal based on the admission or exclusion of evidence, the appellant must prove both the error of the ruling and the resulting prejudice . . . ." (quoting Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19, 26, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005))); Rule 701, SCRE (providing a lay witness may testify "in the form of . . . opinions or inferences which (a) are rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) are helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) do not require special knowledge, skill, experience or training"); Livingston v. Oakman, 251 S.C. 611, 614, 164 S.E.2d 758, 759 (1968) (permitting a lay witness who perceived vehicle prior to a collision to testify to the speed of a moving vehicle); Lynch v. Pee Dee Express, 204 S.C. 537, 544, 30 S.E.2d 449, 450 (1944) (permitting lay witness testimony of the speed of the defendant's truck); S.C. Code Ann. § 50-21-110(B) (2008) ("Negligent operation includes, but is not limited to, operating a water device at more than idle speed in a no wake zone, failing to maintain a proper lookout for other boats or persons, operating too fast for conditions on the water, racing, or pulling a skier through a designated swimming area.").
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
HUFF, THOMAS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.