Opinion
65623-6-I
01-14-2013
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, v. GONZALO ANTONIO MORGAN, Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Grosse, J.
A trial court must hold a competency hearing if there is a reason to doubt the defendant's competence. The question of whether such a reason exists is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Here, Gonzalo Morgan fails to establish any abuse of discretion when both the presiding judge and the trial judge denied defense counsel's motions for a competency evaluation and hearing. We affirm.
FACTS
The State charged Morgan with one count of first degree rape of a child and two counts of first degree child molestation involving his girlfriend's granddaughter. Shortly before trial, defense counsel asked the presiding judge to order a mental health evaluation to address his "questions as to Mr. Morgan's competency." Counsel acknowledged that Morgan had referred to "God's will" in previous conversations, but expressed concern that in his conversation that day with Morgan regarding the State's plea bargain offer, Morgan spoke about God, counsel, and the Bible in a manner unlike "normal comments on faith." Counsel stated, "I need to be more comfortable understanding that he is intelligently evaluating this offer and this case and his possible defense or lack thereof."
The presiding judge then questioned Morgan.
THE COURT: Mr. Morgan, do you understand what you are charged with here?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.
THE COURT: And what are the charges, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Having raped a little girl.
. . .
THE COURT: Okay. And do you understand that your trial date is Monday?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
THE COURT: Do you feel that you are prepared to go to trial on Monday?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you understand, if you are found guilty of all of the charges, do you understand what that could mean in terms of a sentence or time in prison?
. . . .
THE DEFENDANT: I understand but I understand that I am innocent.
. . . .
THE COURT: That's fine, but tell me what you understand, if you were found guilty, do you understand what the possible sentence would be?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that, according to the law, I have to -- well, I have to confront the reality, but at the same time I know that when something is unjust, that I can't accept something -- when this is all unjust, I can't accept that.
THE COURT: Okay, I am not asking you to accept it, what I am asking you is if you are found guilty, do you understand that you would be sentenced to prison for 209 to 277 months? Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand.
THE COURT: Okay. Do you also understand that the prosecutor has offered a plea; in other words, he has offered that you plead guilty to some lesser charge so that your prison time would be lower? Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand. I understand clearly, but I can't plead guilty because I never committed that crime, ever.
THE COURT: Okay. And do you understand that Mr. Huffman is your lawyer for the trial?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
THE COURT: And have you told him things like you feel he is blessed by God to represent you in the case or -- do you understand that he is just a lawyer?
THE DEFENDANT: I understand that God uses people.
THE COURT: Okay, but you are convinced you do not wish to plead guilty; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: And the reason is that you believe you are innocent of these charges?
THE DEFENDANT: No, it is not only that I believe, it is that I am innocent.
[VRP 3/26/10 9-11]
Defense counsel also questioned Morgan.
MR. HUFFMAN: Mr. Morgan, when we were talking earlier today, did you tell me that I am God's messenger?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: And did you tell me that I am here to mediate on behalf of God?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: That I am God's mediator?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: And you have told me that God has illuminated my mind?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: That God has blessed me so that I will be able to defend you?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
MR. HUFFMAN: And you have told me that you are unable to plead guilty because God will curse you? -- that you will be cursed if you plead guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: No, in the Bible it says, in Deuteronomy 27:19, "Cursed is he who commits an injustice against a stranger." Precisely in my case where I am innocent -- and all of this, because of all of this I prefer to go to trial so that the all-powerful being -- that God can make the decision. God will say if I am going to prison; let him say yes or no to prison. He is here. He will be in all of that. He is here right now. He is in the middle of us right now and he is inside each one of us. It is the divine spark in each of us.
MR. HUFFMAN: And you have told me that you can't lose your trial because God is protecting you?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: And that no matter what I tell you about the witnesses, about the evidence, that has no effect on you --
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: -- because there is no way that God will allow you to lose?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: And when I try to explain to you what the offer is, you tell me that you can't accept the offer and that you won't listen to the offer because God is protecting you?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: And God will not let the trial end in a finding of guilt? It is impossible for this trial to end in guilt --
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
MR. HUFFMAN: -- because God will prevent it?
THE DEFENDANT: That's right.
The court found that Morgan had "a strongly held belief in his innocence, " "not very much different from many defendants we see, except that it is cloaked in religious belief." The court found no reason to doubt Morgan's competence, observing, "He is entitled to that belief, even though everyone in this courtroom thinks it is wrong."
On the first day of trial, defense counsel renewed his motion for a competency evaluation before the trial judge. Counsel explained that he believed Morgan was unable to assist in his defense because "no matter what I try to discuss with him in regards to potential witnesses or evidence, I can't get over the hurdle that it has been preordained by God that it will be a not guilty." The trial court questioned Morgan and then allowed defense counsel to question him. The trial court found that Morgan's statements were evidence of a "firmly-held belief that he's innocent" and "that a righteous God would never let an innocent person be condemned." The trial court stated that it was not in a position to question Morgan's belief system and denied the motion for a competency evaluation.
At trial, the State amended the rape charge to first degree child molestation. The jury found Morgan guilty on two counts of child molestation, but could not reach a verdict on the third. The trial court imposed concurrent indeterminate sentences with a minimum term of 72 months on each count.
Morgan appeals.
ANALYSIS
Morgan argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give "considerable weight" to defense counsel's opinion as to his competence.Essentially, Morgan claims that counsel's opinion alone was sufficient to constitute a reason to doubt Morgan's competence. He argues that the trial court erred by failing to order an evaluation to provide the evidence necessary to determine Morgan's competence and erred by concluding that the court was not in a position to question Morgan's religious beliefs. Without citation to Washington authority, Morgan claims, "Grandiose and delusional beliefs in a protective God or other deity may support a determination of incompetence."
State v. Hicks, 41 Wn.App. 303, 307, 704 P.2d 1206 (1985).
Appellant counsel's reference to a portion of an opinion not joined by the majority of the Utah Supreme Court in a decision involving the State's motion to compel antipsychotic medication of a defendant twice found to be incompetent and suffering from a psychotic disorder which included grandiose delusions, State v. Barzee, 177 P.3d 48 (2007), does not support his argument regarding the trial court's threshold determination of the existence of a reason to doubt Morgan's competence here and is not persuasive.
In Washington, the test for competency to stand trial is whether the defendant (1) understands the nature of the charges, and (2) is capable of assisting in his defense. RCW 10.77.060(1)(a) requires a competency hearing whenever there is "reason to doubt" a defendant's competency. "'A reason to doubt' is not definitive, but vests a large measure of discretion in the trial judge.""There are no fixed signs which invariably require a hearing, but the factors to be considered include evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor, medical opinions on competence and the opinion of defense counsel."
In re Pers. Restraint of Fleming, 142 Wn.2d 853, 862, 16 P.3d 610 (2001) (citing State v. Hahn, 106 Wn.2d 885, 894, 726 P.2d 25 (1986); State v. Ortiz, 104 Wn.2d 479, 482, 706 P.2d 1069 (1985)).
City of Seattle v. Gordon, 39 Wn.App. 437, 441, 693 P.2d 741 (1985).
State v. O'Neal, 23 Wn.App. 899, 902, 600 P.2d 570 (1979) (citations omitted)).
"We distinguish the determination of a reason to doubt competency from an actual determination of competency." The court must make the threshold determination that there is a reason to doubt competency before a hearing to determine competency is required. The fact that a motion to determine competency has been made does not by itself constitute a reason to doubt."[T]he motion must be supported by a factual basis. Only then will the court inquire to verify the facts." Although defense counsel's view of the defendant's ability to assist in his defense may suggest incompetence, a trial court may legitimately determine after inquiry that counsel's view was "unsupported by sufficient facts to cause a reason to doubt."
Gordon, 39 Wn.App. at 441.
Gordon, 39 Wn.App. at 441.
State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 901, 822 P.2d 177 (1991).
Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 901 (citing Gordon, 39 Wn.App. at 441-42).
Gordon, 39 Wn.App. at 442-43.
Here, the record reveals that both the presiding judge and the trial court judge seriously considered counsel's opinion. Each judge listened to counsel's concerns and argument, allowed counsel to repeatedly and extensively question Morgan, and conducted careful colloquies on the record. Nothing in the record indicates that the judges failed to give counsel's view considerable weight. Instead, after considering Morgan's responses and demeanor in court, both judges determined that Morgan's claim of innocence and firmly-held religious beliefs did not raise a reason to doubt his competence and require a hearing. Under the circumstances here, we cannot say that either judge abused the wide discretion vested in the trial court for that determination.
See, e.g., Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 900-904 (despite testimony that Lord told transport officer "he had a conversation with the Lord and the devil and the devil asked him to drink a cup of his own blood to prove his innocence, " as well as other evidence upon which counsel relied to request competency evaluation and hearing, trial court did not abuse discretion by finding threshold burden of reason to doubt competency was not met).
Morgan has filed a statement of additional grounds for review stating that he "thought it was strange" that he was found guilty because God knows he is innocent and "God told" the jury "that there was no proof and no witnesses." Because his statements do not inform the court of the nature and occurrence of any particular error, we cannot review them.
RAP 10.10(c).
Affirmed.