Opinion
I.D. No. 90007317DI
Submitted: April 6, 2001
Decided: April 25, 2001
UPON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF. SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
ORDER
This 25th day of April, 2001, upon consideration of the Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 and the record in I case, it appears that:
(1) On September 26, 1995, Defendant, Ricardo Moreno, pleaded guilty but mentally ill to Murder, Second Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony. On December 1, 1995, the Court sentenced Moreno to a total of twenty years level 5 incarceration.
(2) Moreno has now filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. Under established procedure, the Court must first determine whether Moreno has met the procedural requirements of Rule 61(i) before the Court may consider the merits of the postconviction relief claims. Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990). The Court has determined that Moreno's motion is procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(1).
(3) Moreno lists multiple grounds for relief in his motion, including newly discovered evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and "structural errors.". All of these grounds assert basically the same claim, that Moreno was "not informed of his right to consular notification and access, in violation of customary international law and treaties of the United States," specifically, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Moreno claims that, as a result of this failure, he made incriminating statements to police which prejudiced him in the proceedings against him.
(4) All of the claims contained in Moreno's motion are procedurally barred under Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1). Moreno's motion, filed on March 21, 2001, falls outside the statutory three-year time limitation set forth in Rule 61(i)( 1), as his conviction became final more than five years ago. In addition, the Court previously considered and rejected Moreno's argument, set forth again in this motion, that this time bar is inapplicable under Rule (i)(5). See State v. Moreno, Cr. A. No. IN90-08-0361, Goldstein, 1. (Jan. 30, 2001), Order at 2-3.
In addition, Moreno's claim of "newly discovered evidence" is procedurally barred under Rule (i)(4) as having been previously adjudicated. His remaining claims are procedurally under Rule (i)(2) because they were not asserted in his prior motion for postconviction relief.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, Moreno's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.