Opinion
No. 61668-4-I.
August 4, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 07-1-00187-5, Diane M. Woolard, J., entered June 27, 2007.
Affirmed in part and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rodney Moreland pleaded guilty to rape of a child in the second degree, rape of a child in the third degree, and tampering with a witness. He was sentenced to serve a minimum of 147 months imprisonment with a maximum term of life. On appeal, for the first time, Moreland seeks authority to withdraw his guilty plea, claiming that he was not informed that he would be sentenced to a life term. He also challenges several imposed sentencing conditions: that he not possess a deadly weapon, that he not possess or consume alcohol, that he take Antabuse at the direction of a community corrections officer, and that he obtain an alcohol abuse evaluation and follow related treatment. The State concedes that the sentencing court did not have authority to prohibit possession of a deadly weapon. Recognizing that the use of alcohol was not related to the crimes for which Moreland was sentenced, the State also concedes that the only alcohol-related condition that the court could properly impose was to prohibit Moreland from consuming alcohol. We accept the State's concessions.
"Antabuse" is a drug used to treat patients with alcohol dependencies.
Moreland also submitted a statement of additional grounds for review. He contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He also contends that the sentencing judge erred in denying his request for new counsel, erred in declining to recuse herself from his sentencing, and erred in considering an expert witness's evaluation, claiming that the evaluation was inaccurate. Moreland also challenges the sentencing condition prohibiting contact with his biological children. His children were not victims of his offenses.
The sentencing court erred by prohibiting Moreland from possessing deadly weapons, imposing alcohol-related conditions (other than prohibiting Moreland from consuming alcohol), and prohibiting him from having contact with his biological children. Thus, we remand to the sentencing court to modify the imposed conditions. In all other respects, we affirm.
I
At the guilty plea hearing before Clark County Superior Court Judge Diane Woolard on April 24, 2007, Moreland submitted a statement of defendant on plea of guilty that was signed both by Moreland and his attorney. The preprinted plea form stated that Moreland understood that each crime with which he was charged carried a maximum sentence, a fine, and a standard sentence range, and that the standard range of actual confinement for the charge of rape in the second degree was 111 to 147 months with a maximum term of life. As his statement of guilt to the charge of rape of a child in the second degree, Moreland read aloud his written statement attached to the plea form:
Between June 1, 2005 and November 2, 2006 I had sexual intercourse multiple times with MLA who was at least 12 years old but less than 14 years old and not married to me and I was at least 36 months older than MLA at the time in Clark County, Washington.
MLA was the son of Moreland's brother's girlfriend and the victim of all three offenses to which Moreland pleaded guilty. At the time of the offenses, Moreland was divorced and his three children did not live with him.The guilty plea form stated that Moreland understood that because the offense of rape in the second degree was committed on or after September 1, 2001,
the judge will impose a maximum term of confinement consisting of the statutory maximum sentence of the offense and a minimum term of confinement either within the standard range for the offense or outside the standard range if an exceptional sentence is appropriate. The minimum term of confinement that is imposed may be increased by the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board if the Board determines by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that I will commit sex offenses if released from custody. In addition to the period of confinement, I will be sentenced to community custody for any period of time I am released from total confinement before the expiration of the maximum sentence.
The guilty plea form specifically referenced an appendix "A" as containing the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation. Appendix "A" stated that the parties stipulated that the standard range minimum sentence for the charge of rape in the second degree was 111 to 147 months and that the maximum sentence was life imprisonment. As part of the plea agreement, the State was free to recommend that the court impose any sentence within the standard range and Moreland was free to seek authorization to participate in the special sexual offender sentencing alternative (SSOSA) program, as provided by former RCW 9.94A.670 (2006). Moreland signed the guilty plea form immediately below a paragraph reading: "My lawyer has explained to me, and we have fully discussed, all of the above paragraphs. . . . I understand them all. I have been given a copy of this 'Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty.' I have no further questions to ask the judge." Moreland's attorney also signed the plea form and indicated that he had read and discussed this statement with the defendant and that he believed that Moreland was competent and fully understood the contents of the document.
If the court agreed to place Moreland in the SSOSA program, the parties stipulated to recommend suspending a 131-month standard range sentence contingent upon successful entry and completion of all phases of a state licensed sex offender treatment program.
The trial court informed Moreland that the standard range on the charge of rape of a child in the second degree was 111 to 147 months with a "maximum term fine of life and $50,000." The Judge also orally confirmed that Moreland understood that the court did not have to follow a recommendation that he be allowed to participate in the SSOSA program. The court also confirmed with Moreland that he was entering his plea freely and voluntarily and specifically found that the guilty plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and with a factual basis. The court indicated that, near the end of the guilty plea form, the defendant asserted that he had "previously read the entire statement above and that the defendant understood it in full." At the guilty plea hearing, Moreland's attorney indicated that the defense anticipated engaging the services of Dr. Kirk Johnson to conduct the SSOSA program evaluation.
Both parties agree that although the transcripts refer to the charge as "Count Two," this was either a speaking error by the court or a transcription error by the court reporter, and that the context of the statement demonstrates that the court was referring to the first count which was for the charge of rape of a child in the second degree.
On June 13, 2007, Moreland wrote a letter to Judge Woolard asking her to recuse herself from his sentencing hearing on June 27, 2007, because he had heard from others that she would not give him a fair sentence and that she often did not adopt Dr. Johnson's recommendations regarding SSOSA eligibility.
On June 15, 2007, Moreland wrote another letter to the superior court reiterating his request that Judge Woolard not sentence him, claiming that she was unfair, did not listen to recommendations of specialists, and was known to be a "man hater." Moreland also complained about his attorney, stating that he wanted "to know if I still have a right to request a new attorney on this matter?" Moreland asserted that his attorney had not fought for him, never talked to him about his side of the story, and was difficult to telephone from jail. Moreland further complained, without specificity, that his attorney had not disclosed to him all of the allegations against him contained in the police report and that many of those allegations were false. Moreland also averred that, although his attorney had advised Moreland to plead guilty and seek entry into the SSOSA program, he did not inform Moreland until after the plea that admittance into a SSOSA program was not guaranteed.
By June 21, 2007, when Moreland wrote a letter to his three children, he had already learned that Dr. Johnson had recommended against placing him in the SSOSA program. Dr. Johnson, noting that Moreland admitted to having sexual contact with another teenage male in 2005, reported that Moreland "appears to be a seriously disturbed individual." Dr. Johnson acknowledged that Moreland had a previous diagnosis of Asperger's disorder. He opined that the combination of Moreland's psychopathic personality trends and the Asperger's condition compromised Moreland's amenability to treatment. Dr. Johnson recommended that Moreland be placed in a secure setting where sex offender treatment is available and that the treating facility also be familiar with Asperger's disorder.
In the letter to his children, Moreland predicted that he would be going to prison and explained how the children could send letters to him. He told his children that he missed them. He also said that he was mad at his brother, claiming that his brother "obviously got what he wanted," an apparent reference to Moreland's upcoming sentencing. The next day, Moreland again wrote to Judge Woolard. This time he objected to Dr. Johnson's report, claiming that it contained numerous inaccuracies resulting from Dr. Johnson's alleged unfamiliarity with Asperger's disorder. Moreland referred to but did not provide copies of psychological evaluations done by other doctors.
At the sentencing hearing on June 27, 2007, Judge Woolard acknowledged receipt of Moreland's letter requesting that she recuse herself. She denied the request. Moreland did not mention his inquiry about obtaining new counsel and the court did not address the subject. The court considered both Dr. Johnson's report and a presentence report authored by a community corrections officer. The latter report made no mention of Moreland's children, even under the section discussing Moreland's family and marital background. The report recommended prohibiting Moreland from contacting minors and that he obtain a mental health evaluation.
The court denied Moreland's request to enter the SSOSA program and sentenced him to the high end of the standard sentencing range as his minimum term of imprisonment and to life imprisonment as his maximum term. The court also ordered Moreland not to have contact with any minors. Moreland asked that he be allowed to have contact with his own children. The court denied the request and said that it was basing its decision on the fact that Moreland's children were roughly the same age as the victim and because the court believed that Dr. Johnson had indicated that Moreland should have no contact with minors and obtain a mental health evaluation. The prosecutor inaccurately confirmed the court's mistaken impression that Dr. Johnson had recommended that Moreland have no contact with any minors. The prosecutor also asserted that Moreland had been writing letters to family members portraying the victim as the party deserving blame and that Moreland had thoughts of suicide. However, the only evidence of Moreland sending letters to family members is the June 21 letter to his children. That letter neither blamed the victim nor suggested that Moreland was suicidal.
Moreland told the court that his children were 14-, 12-and 8-years-old.
The court also imposed numerous conditions of community custody now challenged on appeal.
II
Moreland first challenges the court's imposition of several conditions of community custody.
Defendants can raise objections to community custody conditions for the first time on appeal. State v. Jones, 118 Wn. App. 199, 204, 76 P.3d 258 (2003). "We review a sentencing court's application of the community custody provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, de novo." State v. Motter, 139 Wn. App. 797, 801, 162 P.3d 1190 (2007), review denied, 163 Wn.2d 1025 (2008). We review findings of fact that underlie the imposition of community custody for substantial evidence. Motter, 139 Wn. App. at 801.
"A trial court may impose only a sentence which is authorized by statute." State v. Barnett, 139 Wn.2d 462, 464, 987 P.2d 626 (1999). The applicable statute is former RCW 9.94A.712 (2006). That statute required the trial court to sentence Moreland to community custody and impose those conditions provided for in former RCW 9.94A.700(4) (2003), unless a particular condition was waived. Former RCW 9.94A.712(6)(a). The sentencing court also had discretion to impose those additional conditions listed in former RCW 9.94A.700(5) (2003). Former RCW 9.94A.712(6)(a).
Any sentence imposed under the authority of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 must be in accordance with the law in effect at the time the offense was committed. RCW 9.94A.345. Moreland admitted committing rape of a child in the second degree by having sexual intercourse with the victim between June 1, 2005 and November 2, 2006. The parties do not dispute that RCW 9.94A.712 was the proper sentencing statute, but neither party indicates which version of the statute, which was amended during the time span of the offense, applies. See Laws of 2006, ch. 122, § 4. The presentence investigation report indicates that the first time Moreland touched the victim was in the summer of 2006. Thus, former RCW 9.94A.712 (2006) applies. Regardless, the relevant language at issue in the applicable statute did not change during the time span of the offense.
Former RCW 9.94A.700(4) provided for the following conditions:
(a) The offender shall report to and be available for contact with the assigned community corrections officer as directed;
(b) The offender shall work at department-approved education, employment, or community restitution, or any combination thereof;
(c) The offender shall not possess or consume controlled substances except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions;
(d) The offender shall pay supervision fees as determined by the department; and
(e) The residence location and living arrangements shall be subject to the prior approval of the department during the period of community placement.
Former RCW 9.94A.700(5) provided for the following discretionary conditions:
(a) The offender shall remain within, or outside of, a specified geographical boundary;
(b) The offender shall not have direct or indirect contact with the victim of the crime or a specified class of individuals;
(c) The offender shall participate in crime-related treatment or counseling services;
(d) The offender shall not consume alcohol; or
(e) The offender shall comply with any crime-related prohibitions.
Moreland's initial contention is that the trial court lacked the authority to prohibit him from possessing deadly weapons, as determined by a community corrections officer. The State concedes that the trial court had no authority to prohibit possession of deadly weapons, as opposed to prohibiting the possession of firearms. See RCW 9.41.045 (prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms); State v. Combs, 102 Wn. App. 949, 954, 10 P.3d 1101 (2000) (trial court has authority to prohibit felons from using or possessing a firearm and/or ammunition, but not any other type of weapon). We accept the State's concession.
Moreland next contends that the trial court erred by imposing conditions prohibiting him from consuming alcohol, requiring him to obtain an alcohol abuse evaluation and comply with related treatment, and requiring him to take Antabuse at the direction of a community corrections officer. Here again, the State concedes that because there is no evidence in the record that alcohol abuse was related to the offenses, the trial court could, at most, only prohibit Moreland's use of drugs or alcohol.
We note that former RCW 9.94A.700(4)(c) allowed the trial court to prohibit possession and consumption of illegal controlled substances. However, former RCW 9.94A.700(5)(d) allowed the trial court to prohibit only the consumption of alcohol, not its possession. The trial court had authority to prohibit Moreland from consuming alcohol regardless of whether alcohol was related to the crime. See Jones, 118 Wn. App. at 207 (holding that a trial court can order that a defendant sentenced to community custody not consume alcohol despite the lack of evidence that alcohol had contributed to his offense). We accept the State's concession that the evidence does not support the trial court's imposition of a condition requiring Moreland to obtain an evaluation for alcohol and drug abuse. See Jones, 118 Wn. App. at 208 (holding that alcohol must have contributed to the offense before a court can order alcohol counseling). Thus, except for the requirement that Moreland not consume alcohol, the alcohol-related conditions were improperly imposed. On remand, the trial court should amend the sentence accordingly.
Moreland next challenges the combined effect of the conditions requiring him both to undergo and cooperate with sexual deviancy treatment and to submit to periodic polygraph examinations in order to help determine his compliance with the community custody conditions. He does not dispute that the treatment condition was specifically allowed by former RCW 9.94A.700(5)(c) as being "crime-related treatment or counseling services" and that polygraph exams are an integral part of that treatment. See Combs, 102 Wn. App. at 952-53 (upholding community placement condition requiring the defendant to submit to polygraph testing in order to monitor his compliance with the other conditions of community placement). Moreland concedes that the polygraph condition imposed is worded so as to comply with Combs. Nevertheless, he argues that this condition must be read together with the requirement that he cooperate with sexual deviancy treatment, which is defined as requiring him to "follow all treatment directives, accurately report all sexual thoughts, feelings and behaviors in a timely manner and cease all deviant sexual activity." Thus, he asserts, the sexual deviancy treatment requires him to reveal all prior and current deviant sexual thoughts and acts, and this requirement, in combination with the polygraph condition, requires him to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
At this point, Moreland's argument is too hypothetical for us to address. The extent of the information that Moreland's treatment program will require is not set forth in our record. To date, no improper polygraph questions have been posed. "If his therapist or community corrections officer orders testing for impermissible purposes, [Moreland] may challenge the order as applied at that time." State v. Riles, 86 Wn. App. 10, 17, 936 P.2d 11 (1997), aff'd, 135 Wn.2d 326, 957 P.2d 655 (1998).
III
Moreland, in a statement of additional grounds for review, contends that the trial court improperly restricted him from having contact with his own children, who were not victims of the charged offenses.
A sentencing court has the authority to impose crime-related prohibitions, including no-contact orders. RCW 9.94A.505(8); former RCW 9.94A.030(13) (2005); State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 112-13, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). The imposition of crime-related prohibitions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d at 110. Discretion is abused when "the decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons." State v. Ancira, 107 Wn. App. 650, 653, 27 P.3d 1246 (2001).
Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children. Prevention of harm to children is a compelling state interest, and the State does have an obligation to intervene and protect a child when a parent's "actions or decisions seriously conflict with the physical or mental health of the child." [In re Welfare of Sumey, 94 Wn.2d 757, 762, 621 P.2d 108 (1980).] But limitations on fundamental rights are constitutional only if they are "reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state." [State v. Riles, 135 Wn.2d 326, 350, 957 P.2d 655 (1998).] The fundamental right to parent can be restricted by a condition of a criminal sentence if the condition is reasonably necessary to prevent harm to the children.
Ancira, 107 Wn. App. at 653-54 (citations omitted). Thus, the relevant determination is whether the record supports the proposition that prohibiting Moreland from having any contact with his children is reasonably necessary to protect those children from being harmed by their father.
A similar issue arose in State v. Letourneau, 100 Wn. App. 424, 997 P.2d 436 (2000). Letourneau was convicted of two counts of rape of a child in the second degree. The victim was not one of her children. We held that the sentencing court could not restrict Letourneau's contact with her own children unless there was "an affirmative showing that the offender is a pedophile or that the offender otherwise poses the danger of sexual molestation of his or her own biological children to justify such State intervention." Letourneau, 100 Wn. App. at 442. The record herein does not support such a finding.
At sentencing, the only evidence presented to support the request to prohibit Moreland's contact with his children was the June 21 letter. The court articulated two reasons for prohibiting contact with Moreland's own children: (1) because they are roughly the same age as the victim; and (2) because Dr. Johnson recommended that Moreland have no contact with minors and that he obtain a mental health evaluation. In fact, Dr. Johnson did not recommend restricting Moreland's contact with his children. Instead, this recommendation originated with the community correction officer. However, that report did not in any way discuss Moreland's own children. Moreover, there was no evidence that Moreland met the definition of a pedophile or that he otherwise posed a risk of molesting his own children. Thus, this condition was improperly imposed. Letourneau, 100 Wn. App. at 442.
IV
Moreland next contends that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he was not informed prior to sentencing that he would be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment. He also contends, in his statement of additional grounds for review, that his guilty plea should be withdrawn because his counsel provided ineffective assistance.
Although Moreland never moved to withdraw his plea, we may consider an argument raised for the first time on appeal where the appellant raises a claim of "manifest error affecting a constitutional right." RAP 2.5(a)(3). Moreland has raised such a claim of error. See State v. Taylor, 83 Wn.2d 594, 597-98, 521 P.2d 699 (1974) (a denial of effective assistance of counsel establishes manifest injustice); In re Pers. Restraint of Murillo, 134 Wn. App. 521, 530, 142 P.3d 615 (2006) (a plea entered without knowledge of the direct sentencing consequences is a manifest injustice).
We first address Moreland's claim that he was not informed that he would be sentenced to a maximum term of life imprisonment.
To satisfy due process requirements, courts, before accepting a guilty plea, must inform the defendant of the direct consequences of such a plea. These include both the applicable standard range and the maximum sentence for the charged offense as determined by the legislature. State v. Kennar, 135 Wn. App. 68, 74-75, 143 P.3d 326 (2006), review denied, 161 Wn.2d 1013 (2007).
"Knowledge of the direct consequences of the plea can be satisfied by the plea documents." State v. Codiga, 162 Wn.2d 912, 923, 175 P.3d 1082 (2008) (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Stoudmire, 145 Wn.2d 258, 266, 36 P.3d 1005 (2001)). Due process does not require that the court "orally question the defendant to ascertain whether he or she understands the consequences of the plea and the nature of the offense." Codiga, 162 Wn.2d at 923 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Keene, 95 Wn.2d 203, 207, 622 P.2d 360 (1980)). A trial court is not required to orally confirm a defendant's understanding of the various elements of the plea if the court relies on the defendant's plea form, its attached documents, and the defendant's assurances that he reviewed the form with his attorney and understood it. Codiga, 162 Wn.2d at 924.
A plea is strongly presumed to have been properly entered where the defendant admits to reading, understanding, and signing a proper plea statement. State v. Smith, 134 Wn.2d 849, 852, 953 P.2d 810 (1998). "We have expressed a strong preference for the enforcement of plea agreements, and the burden of showing manifest injustice sufficient to warrant withdrawal of a plea agreement rests with the defendant." Codiga, 162 Wn.2d at 929.
Moreland claims that the trial court did not inform him during the guilty plea colloquy that he would be sentenced to life in prison on the charge of rape of a child in the second degree. Moreland also contends, without citing any supporting authority, that the use of the term "standard range" multiple times in the statement of defendant on plea of guilty misled him to believe that his guilty plea subjected him to a determinate sentence of no less than 111 months and no more than 147 months. These arguments are unavailing.
Moreland signed and submitted a statement of defendant on guilty plea prepared by his attorney. This form stated, more than once, that the standard range for the charge of rape of a child in the second degree was 111 to 147 months and that the maximum term was life. The preprinted plea form also stated that "the judge will impose a maximum term of confinement consisting of the statutory maximum sentence of the offense and a minimum term of confinement either within the standard range for the offense or outside the standard range if an exceptional sentence is appropriate." The plea form also stated that "[t]he minimum term of confinement that is imposed may be increased by the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board if the Board determines by a preponderance of the evidence that it is more likely than not that I will commit sex offenses if released from custody."
The trial court orally told Moreland that the standard range on the charge of rape of a child in the second degree was 111 to 147 months with a "maximum term fine of life and $50,000." The court also confirmed that Moreland had read the entire guilty plea statement, understood it in full, and signed it. Under these circumstances, Moreland has not met his burden of demonstrating that he was not informed of the direct consequences of his guilty plea.
We next turn to Moreland's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
To show ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient, and that such deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). And to show prejudice, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 883-84, 822 P.2d 177 (1991) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697) (alteration in original). Moreover, because the defendant must prove both ineffective assistance and resulting prejudice, a lack of prejudice will resolve the issue without requiring an evaluation of counsel's performance. Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 884.
State v. Aaron, 95 Wn. App. 298, 305, 974 P.2d 1284 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of guilty pleas, the defendant must show that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have entered the plea. State v. Jamison, 105 Wn. App. 572, 590, 20 P.3d 1010 (2001).
Moreland has not established prejudice. More than one and a half months after entering his guilty plea and only 12 days before sentencing, Moreland wrote to the court asking if he still had a right to request a new attorney. Moreland explained that his attorney had not "fought" for him. He complained of the difficulty of reaching his attorney from jail. Moreland also claimed, without specificity, that his attorney had not told him about all of the allegations in the police report, many of which Moreland believed to be false. Moreland also suggested that his attorney only told him, after he pleaded guilty, that placement in the SOSSA program was not guaranteed.
We first note that the trial court informed Moreland prior to the entry of his guilty plea that even if he qualified for the SOSSA program, the court was not bound to impose a sentence placing him in the program. Even if we were to interpret Moreland's inquiry as a request for new counsel, the inquiry was made in the context of desiring an attorney who would more strongly advocate for him at sentencing. Moreland has not established that, but for his attorney's performance, he would not have entered the guilty plea. Thus, he has not shown prejudice warranting appellate relief.
Moreland also contends that the sentencing judge erred by not granting his request for new counsel prior to sentencing. Even if we were to interpret Moreland's written inquiry as a request for new counsel, Moreland did not renew this request at sentencing and made no mention of the previous written inquiry. Thus, Moreland did not preserve this issue for appellate review.
V
Moreland next contends that Judge Woolard erred by declining to recuse herself from his sentencing. We disagree.
Due process, the appearance of fairness doctrine, and Canon 3(D)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct require a judge to recuse herself if she is biased against a party or if her impartiality may be reasonably questioned. State v. Dominguez, 81 Wn. App. 325, 328, 914 P.2d 141 (1996). But the party claiming bias must present evidence of the judge's actual or potential bias. State v. Bilal, 77 Wn. App. 720, 722, 893 P.2d 674 (1995). We review a decision on recusal for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Farr, 87 Wn. App. 177, 188, 940 P.2d 679 (1997). Moreland asked the judge to recuse herself from sentencing him because he had heard from others that her rulings were unfair, that she did not listen to recommendations by specialists, and that she was a "man hater." This does not constitute evidence of the judge's actual or potential bias. There was no error.
CJC 3(D)(1)(a) states that judges should disqualify themselves in a proceeding in which their impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances in which the judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.
VI
We remand for imposition of modified sentencing conditions. In all other respects, we affirm.
In his final additional ground for review, Moreland reiterates his objection to the sentencing court considering Dr. Johnson's report, claiming that the evaluation was inaccurate. No evidence supports Moreland's claim. It is without merit.