Opinion
No. 111,904.
01-08-2016
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Donaldo MORALES, Appellant.
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant. Steven J. Obermeier, senior deputy district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Randall L. Hodgkinson, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.
Steven J. Obermeier, senior deputy district attorney, Stephen M. Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Opinion
PER CURIAM.
Donaldo Morales appeals his convictions of identity theft and two counts of making a false information. Morales contends that the State presented insufficient evidence of his intent to defraud to sustain those convictions. Regarding his separate conviction of identity theft, he argues that the State failed to prove he knew the identification information he used belonged to another person. Finally, he equates his convictions to State actions regulating the employment of undocumented workers which, he maintains, are preempted by the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA). Finding no merit in Morales' contentions, we affirm his convictions.
Facts
Morales was convicted of identity theft and two counts of making a false information after a bench trial. At that trial the State introduced evidence that Morales applied for a job at Jose Pepper's in October 2010. He provided the payroll manager, Sherri Ann Miller, two forms of identification to verify that he was eligible to work in the United States: a permanent resident card and a Social Security card. Copies of those documents were retained by the employer and admitted at trial. Miller testified that in her presence Morales completed a form I–9 for federal employment purposes, a form K–4 for Kansas withholding tax purposes, and a form W–4 for federal withholding tax purposes.
Jody Sight, director of human resources for Jose Pepper's, confirmed that Morales was hired by the company shortly after he applied. Jose Pepper's paid Morales under the Social Security number he gave when he applied for work. In 2012, she provided them several initial employment documents in Morales' file to authorities.
Joseph Espinosa testified that he was a special agent for the Social Security Administration. He received an assignment to investigate information received from the State of Kansas Department of Labor, Workers Compensation Division that there was an irregularity involving Morales' Social Security number. Agent Espinosa obtained Morales' employment file from Jose Pepper's. The documents verified that Morales was using a Social Security card with a number not issued to him but, rather, to another person, E.M. Agent Espinosa arrested Morales. Post-Miranda, Morales admitted to Agent Espinosa that he had purchased the Social Security card “specifically so that he could work.” Morales used that card when he applied for work at Jose Pepper's.
Morales testified in his own defense. He acknowledged that he was born in Guatemala but relocated to the United States in 1989. He wanted to work but knew he could not do so without a Social Security number, something he did not have. In 2002, some friends took him to a park where people sold “papers to work.” He purchased the Social Security card he ultimately used to obtain his employment with Jose Pepper's. Morales stated that he never used the card or the Social Security number for any purpose other than to work. Because he knew it would cause him problems, he never filed a tax return or sought a tax refund.
The district court found Morales guilty of identity theft for using E.M.'s Social Security number to obtain employment with Jose Pepper's and two counts of making a false information for using E.M.'s Social Security number on the W–4 and K–4 forms. The district court sentenced Morales to a term of 7 months in prison but granted probation for 18 months. Morales timely appealed his convictions.
Analysis
The State's Proof That Morales Acted With “Intent To Defraud” Was Not Insufficient
Morales contends that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove the element of “intent to defraud” required under both the identify theft statute and the making a false information statute. Rather, Morales contends that the State only proved he used another's Social Security number with the legally benign intent to obtain employment.
When the sufficiency of evidence is challenged in a criminal case, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. To uphold a conviction we must be convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 509, 525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). To the extent that we must interpret statutes to resolve the issues in this case, the interpretation of a statute is a question of law and our review is unlimited. State v. Eddy, 299 Kan. 29, 32, 321 P.3d 12 (2014).
Both identity theft and making a false information require proof of “intent to defraud.” Morales was charged under K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–4018(a), which defined identity theft as:
“[O]btaining, possessing, transferring, using, selling or purchasing any personal identifying information, or document containing the same, belonging to or issued to another person, with the intent to defraud that person, or anyone else, in order to receive any benefit.”
K.S.A. 21–3711 defined making a false information as:
“Making, generating, distributing or drawing, or causing to be made, generated, distributed or drawn, any written instrument, electronic data or entry in a book of account with knowledge that such information falsely states or represents some material matter or is not what it purports to be, and with intent to defraud, obstruct the detection of a theft or felony offense or induce official action.”
K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–3110(10) defined “intent to defraud” as “an intention to deceive another person, and to induce such other person, in reliance upon such deception, to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate a right, obligation or power with reference to property.” Property means “anything of value, tangible or intangible, real or personal.” K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–3110(17).
We recognize that in City of Liberal v. Vargas, 28 Kan.App.2d 867, 870–71, 24 P.3d 155 (2001), rev. denied 271 Kan. 1035 (2001), a panel of this court found that using a false identity to obtain employment was insufficient to prove “intent to defraud” for identity theft. The Vargas panel indicated that this was so because the accused did not intend to defraud his employer “by stealing money or by being compensated for services not actually rendered.” 28 Kan.App.2d at 870. Not surprisingly, Morales urges us to adopt the rationale of Vargas.
However, in more recent cases, our panels have declined to apply Vargas. In State v. Oswald, 36 Kan.App.2d 144, 149, 137 P.3d 1066, rev. denied 282 Kan. 795 (2006), this court noted that the above language from Vargas was “clearly dicta.” The Oswald court held that the identity theft statute did not require “proof of actual economic loss by the victim.” 36 Kan.App.2d at 148. Then, in State v. Meza, 38 Kan.App.2d 245, 24849, 165 P.3d 298, rev. denied 285 Kan. 1176 (2007), our court held that an accused had the requisite intent to defraud her employer when she used a false Social Security number to deceive the employer into believing that she was eligible to be employed, when she in fact was not. The Meza panel quoted:
“ ‘While it is true that defendant did not actually steal money or services from her employer, she did obtain employment, compensation, and insurance benefits by misrepresenting herself as someone else. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the statute did not require her to “defraud” her employer by “stealing money” or by “being compensated for services not actually rendered” in order to be guilty of identity theft.’ “ 38 Kan.App.2d at 249.
At the times the Vargas, Oswald, and Meza offenses were committed the identity theft statute required an intent to defraud “for economic benefit.” See K.S.A.2000 Supp. 21–4018(a); K.S.A.2004 Supp. 21–4018(a). In 2005, the phrase “for economic benefit” was replaced with “for any benefit.” L.2005, ch. 131, sec. 2; see K.S.A. 21–4018(a). With the 2005 amendment, the legislature “expanded the definition of ‘identity theft’ to criminalize every conceivable motive for stealing another's identity.” State v. Capps, No. 105,653, 2012 WL 5973917, at *3 (Kan.App.2012) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 297 Kan. 1249 (2013). In Capps, the accused provided a sheriff's deputy with her sister's name, date of birth, and Social Security number during a traffic stop to avoid arrest for driving on a suspended license. The court held that the meaning of “intent to defraud for any benefit” was “very expansive” and included the accused's intent to deceive an officer to avoid arrest. 2012 WL 5973917, at *2–4; see K.S.A. 21–4018(a).
In State v. Martinez–Perez, No. 109,383, 2014 WL 2401660, at *4 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 302 Kan. –––– (June 29, 2015), another panel of this court held that an accused “intended to defraud his employer to obtain the various benefits derived from being employed” by using a false Social Security number to obtain employment. See State v. Saldana, No. 111,429, 2015 WL 4486779, at *8–9 (Kan.App.2015) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed August 5, 2015; State v. Hernandez–Carballo, No. 109,704, 2014 WL 3630348, at *5–6 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion).
Here, the applicable identity theft statute requires use of the personal identifying information of another “with the intent to defraud that person, or anyone else, in order to receive any benefit .” K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–4018(a). The applicable false information statute requires the making of a false statement on a material matter “with intent to defraud” to “create” a right to something “of value,” which would include, e.g., a job. K.S.A. 21–3711, K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–3110(10) and (17). Morales used a Social Security number he knew was not his on a card not legally issued to him intending to convince Jose Pepper's that he was eligible for employment when he in fact was not. He then received the benefits of employment he would not have received but for the use of that Social Security number. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Morales had the requisite intent to defraud for his crimes of conviction.
The State was not required to prove Morales knew the Social Security card he used had been issued to another person.
Morales contends that we must overturn his identity theft conviction because the State offered no evidence proving that he knew he used a Social Security number issued to another person. Morales relies on State v. Owen, No. 102,814, 2011 WL 2039738, at *6 (Kan.App.2011) (unpublished opinion), rev'd on other grounds by State v. Owen, No. 102,814, 2015 WL 1309978 (unpublished opinion). In Owen, 2011 WL 203978, at *5–6, a panel of this court held that the crime of identity theft required the State to prove that the accused knew the identification used belonged to another person. In Owen, 2011 WL 2039738, at *5, the court quoted and construed the 2007 version of the identity theft statute, which defined identity theft as:
“knowingly and with intent to defraud for any benefit, obtaining, possessing, transferring, using or attempting to obtain, possess, transfer or use, one or more identification documents or personal identification number of another person other than that issued lawfully for the use of the possessor.” K.S.A. 21–4018(a).
Owen is not applicable here because the 2007 version of the identity theft statute was not in effect at the time of Morales' crime. The criminal statute in effect at the time the criminal offense is committed controls. State v. Denney, 278 Kan. 643, 646, 101 P.3d 1257 (2004). In 2010, the legislature amended the identity theft statute. See L.2010, ch. 88, Sec. 2. K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–4018(a) defined identity theft as:
“[O]btaining, possessing, transferring, using, selling or purchasing any personal identifying information, or document containing the same, belonging to or issued to another person, with the intent to defraud that person, or anyone else, in order to receive any benefit.”
A new subsection (d) was added to the statute, which provided:
“It is not a defense that the person did not know that such personal identifying information belongs to another person, or that the person to whom such personal identifying information belongs or was issued is deceased.” K.S.A.2010 Supp. 214018(d).
Here, the State charged Morales with identity theft occurring on October 1, 2010. Thus, K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–4018 controls. Morales' claim that the State failed to prove that he knew the Social Security number he used belonged to another person is irrelevant. Under the plain language of K.S.A.2010 Supp. 21–4018(d), the State did not need to prove that Morales knew that the Social Security number belonged to another person. It only needed to prove that the Social Security number Morales used to obtain employment had been issued to another person. Agent Espinosa's testimony was adequate to prove that fact.
IRCA does not preempt the State's power to prosecute Morales
Morales contends that the federal Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, see specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(5) (2012), preempts Kansas identity theft and making a false information prosecutions of undocumented workers seeking employment, regardless of the form or nature of the false information such workers might provide. The State contends that IRCA preempts only prosecutions for those offenses when the information at issue is contained in a federal form I–9.
“Whether a state law is preempted by a federal law is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review.” State ex rel. Kline v. Transmasters Towing, 38 Kan.App.2d 537, Syl. ¶ 2, 168 P.3d 60, rev. denied 285 Kan. 1175 (2007).
Several panels of this court have concluded that IRCA does not preempt the prosecution of undocumented workers under the Kansas identity theft statute and/or false information statute. See Saldana, 2015 WL 4486779; State v. Dorantes, No. 111,224, 2015 WL 4366452 (Kan.App.2015) (unpublished opinion), petition for rev. filed July 23, 2015; State v. Lopez–Navarrete, No. 111,190, 2014 WL 7566851 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion); State v. Flores–Sanchez, No. 110,457, 2014 WL 7565673 (Kan.App.2014) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 302 Kan. –––– (August 20, 2015).
In Lopez–Navarrete, the court explained that Lopez–Navarrete's conviction did
“not consider her immigration status, the lawfulness of her presence within the United States, or her employment eligibility.
“Lopez–Navarrete was not convicted of an immigration offense. She was convicted of identity theft and making a false writing for using D.D.D.'s social security number to obtain employment at The Cheesecake Factory.... Here, the State was not enforcing immigration; it was enforcing the identity theft statute.” 2014 WL 7566851, at *3.
Even more recently our court issued its published opinion in State v. Ochoa–Lara, 51 Kan.App.2d ––––, 2015 WL 7566273 (No. 112,322, filed November 25, 2015), petition for rev. filed December 10, 2015. That court engaged in a comprehensive analysis, based on facts similar to those here, of the same IRCA preemption argument Morales makes to us. After that analysis the court concluded:
“The State's prosecution of Ochoa–Lara for the illegal use of another's Social Security number did not depend on his immigration status, the lawfulness of his presence in the United States, or his eligibility for employment. The other panels of our court noted in those decisions, as we do here, that the possible illegal uses of another's Social Security number are myriad. There is nothing in the IRCA that suggests that Congress intended the comprehensive preemption of the police powers of the State to prosecute all such instances of identity theft. The State's prosecution of Ochoa–Lara for violations of Kansas identity theft statutes was not preempted by the IRCA.” (Emphasis added.) 2015 WL 7566273, at *6.
We agree with the Ochoa–Lara panel's preemption analysis and its conclusion, as well as the analyses and conclusions reached in our unpublished decisions referred to above. We see no need to reiterate those analyses. Here, the State was not enforcing immigration law. Although the State initially charged Morales with making a false information regarding his form I–9, the State acknowledged that IRCA preempted that prosecution and dismissed that count. The evidence at trial showed that Morales used a Social Security number that had been issued to another person on a W–4 and K–4 form to obtain employment at Jose Pepper's he would not have otherwise obtained. His immigration status was irrelevant to the charges of identity theft and making a false information. IRCA did not preempt the State's power to prosecute him.
Affirmed.