First, regarding possession, a defendant does not have to hold physically the narcotics to be found in possession of them; New Mexico courts allow for constructive possession to satisfy the possession requirement “when the defendant has knowledge of the presence of the drug and control over it.” State v. Brietag, 1989-NMCA-019, ¶ 11, 108 N.M. 368, 772 P.2d 898 (citing State v. Montoya, 1980-NMSC-093, ¶ 9, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893).As the Court of Appeals of New Mexico notes:

Constructive possession of a controlled substance means knowledge of its presence and control over it. Id. (citing State v. Montoya, 509 P.2d 893 (N.M. 1973)). See also People v. Bock Leung Chew, 298 P.2d 118 (Cal.Ct.App. 1956).

{27} To prove either actual or constructive possession, the State had to show Defendant had both knowledge and control of the illegal drugs in the bathroom. See State v. Montoya, 85 N.M. 126, 127, 509 P.2d 893, 894 (Ct.App. 1973). Evidence of control includes the power to produce or dispose of the narcotic.

Accordingly, the "purchase" of heroin necessarily includes the actual or constructive "possession" of heroin, and actual or constructive possession of heroin is a felony under the laws of New Mexico. Sections 30-31-6 (Schedule I(B)(10) and 30-31-23(A) and (B)(5), N.M.S.A. (1978); State v. Bowers, 87 N.M. 74, 529 P.2d 300 (Ct.App. 1974); State v. Montoya, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893 (Ct.App. 1973). See State v. Bauske, 86 N.M. 484, 525 P.2d 411 (Ct.App. 1974).

Constructive possession of a controlled substance means knowledge of its presence and control over it. State v. Montoya, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893 (1973). See also, People v. Bock Leung Chew, 142 Cal.App.2d 400, 298 P.2d 118 (1956).

"[K]nowledge of the presence of [prohibited items] may be inferred" where an individual has "exclusive possession" of an area. State v. Becerra, 1991-NMCA-090, ¶ 14,112 N.M. 604, 817 P.2d 1246; see, e.g., State v. Montoya, 1973-NMCA-060, ¶ 5, 85 N.M. 126, 506 P.2d 893 (holding that a reasonable inference can be drawn that a defendant who was in possession of a motel room for six days had knowledge of the presence of drugs in the room).

{32} Evidence of Defendant's exclusive occupancy of his single-person cell—restricted to access by only Defendant and officers—in addition to the air vent's arms-reach location and sticky substance found on the weapon, supports a reasonable inference that Defendant had knowledge of where the weapon was located and that he exercised control over it. Cf. State v. Montoya, 1973-NMCA-060, ¶¶ 4-5, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893 (holding that sufficient evidence supported constructive possession of heroin where the defendant occupied a motel room for six days even though people were seen entering and leaving the room before the search began). Considering this evidence in a light most favorable to the guilty verdict, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports Defendant's constructive possession of the weapon.

These facts are sufficient evidence upon which a jury could conclude that Defendant was knowingly in possession of the methamphetamine. See State v. Montoya, 1973-NMCA-060, ¶¶ 4-5, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893 (holding that there was sufficient evidence to show the defendant was knowingly in constructive possession of heroin when, without the defendant being present and after people were seen going inside for a few minutes before leaving, police searched the defendant's motel room and found "one cap of suspected heroin"); see also State v. Chandler, 1995-NMCA-033, ¶ 10, 119 N.M. 727, 895 P.2d 249 ("Proof of possession of illegal drugs may be established by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. Possession may be actual or constructive.

Constructive possession exists when a defendant has knowledge of and control over the drugs. Id. (citing State v. Montoya, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893 (Ct.App. 1973)). Such constructive possession need not be exclusive.

Defendant constructively possessed an object not in his physical presence if he knew what it was and exercised control over it. SCRA 1986, 14-130 (uniform jury instruction); see State v. Montoya, 85 N.M. 126, 509 P.2d 893 (Ct.App. 1973). Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he constructively possessed the marijuana, because the state failed to prove that he had exclusive possession of the room in which the marijuana was found.