Opinion
I.D. No. 0508014813.
Submitted: May 22, 2008.
Decided: July 10, 2008.
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief.
SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
Brian J. Robertson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Leo John Ramunno, Esquire, Ramunno Rammuno Scerba, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for Defendant
ORDER
This 10th day of July, 2008, upon consideration of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. Following a trial concluding on March 30, 2006 (where Defendant was represented by different counsel), a jury convicted Defendant of multiple offenses. On September 1, 2006, after adjudicating Defendant a habitual criminal offender (with respect to the Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony and Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited charges) under the provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), this Court sentenced Defendant to 148 years of minimum mandatory incarceration for: Trafficking in Cocaine (8 years); four counts of Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (25 years each: total 100 years); Possession with Intent to Deliver Cocaine (3 years); four counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (8 years each: total 32 years); and Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (5 years).
Defendant was also convicted of several other offenses not requiring minimum mandatory sentences. These offenses are: Possession of Drug Paraphernalia (1 year, suspended for supervision level III); Conspiracy Second Degree (1 year, suspended for supervision level III); and Maintaining a Vehicle for Keeping Controlled Substances (6 months, suspended for supervision level II.)
Defendant (represented on appeal and now by new counsel) appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court. As grounds for his appeal, Defendant asserted that:
Brooks v. State, 2007 WL 1470649 (Del.).
(a) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the charges; (b) he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial because the prosecutor made improper prejudicial statements to the jury; (c) the Superior Court erred by not ruling on his motion to suppress; (d) his trial defense counsel's assistance was rendered ineffective by a conflict of interest; and (e) the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in declaring Brooks an habitual offender.
Id. at *2.
On May 22, 2007, the Supreme Court held each ground to be without merit, and affirmed Defendant's conviction.
Id. at *5.
2. On May 22, 2008, Defendant through counsel filed this motion for postconviction relief. Defendant has asserted three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel as grounds for relief. The supporting "facts" are alleged in the motion as follows:
[(a)] Trial counsel did not object properly at trial, failed to adequately present a defense, failed to objection [sic] to the admission of evidence, failed to properly advise Defendant of his right to testify.
[(b)] In not obtaining expert testimony in regard to fingerprints and DNA and question and subpoena witnesses on behalf of Defendant.
[(c)] In not effective [sic] cross-examining the State's witness including but not limited to Rose Epps and Joseph Tomchick and his assistance was rendered ineffective by a conflict of interest.
Def. Mot. for Postconviction Relief, at 3.
These three sentences constitute the entirety of the substantive portion of Defendant's motion for postconviction relief.
3. Superior Court Rule 61(b)(2) provides in part that a "motion [for postconviction relief] . . . shall set forth in summary form the facts supporting each of the grounds thus specified." Pursuant to Rule 61(d)(4), this Court may summarily dismiss a motion for postconviction relief "if it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief." A movant must support his or her assertions with "concrete allegations of actual prejudice, or risk summary dismissal." This proposition applies to all grounds for relief, including claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
State v. Childress, 2000 WL 1610766, at *1 (Del.Super.). See also, e.g., State v. Miller 2007 WL 3287943 (Del.Super.).
See, e.g., State v. Robbins, 1996 WL 769219, at *1 (Del.Super.); State v. Miller 2007 WL 3287943 (Del.Super.); State v. Watson, 2008 WL 1952160 (Del.Super.).
It plainly appears from the motion that Defendant has not shown entitlement to relief. Defendant's motion is completely conclusory, and Defendant has failed to support his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with concrete allegations of actual prejudice. For these reasons, and even taking into account the seriousness of the charges and the length of the sentence, Defendant's motion warrants summary dismissal.
For the reasons stated, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.