[] State v. Molina, 8 Wash. App. 551, 552, 507 P.2d 909 (1973) (quoting State v. Van Wagner, 16 Wash.2d 54, 62-63, 132 P.2d 359 (1942) ). "[A]fter expiration of the 60-day stay of execution period, the trial court exercising its inherent discretion has been affirmed in every instance whether or not the motion to vacate had been granted or denied."
The test, in determining the question whether the trial court erred in refusing to vacate the forfeiture of a bail bond, `is not alone one of time whether prompt or otherwise; nor good faith, or the lack of it; nor compensation, or lack of it, to the bondsmen or surety; nor whether there are organized, undisclosed principals in procuring the business of furnishing bail' but `is the judicial discretion of the trial judge, who, in formulating and arriving at his judgment, may look to all such things, if in the case, and others, if there are any, with the understanding, . . . that in `the absence of evidence of flagrant abuse the appellate court will not interfere.'' State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 507 P.2d 909 (1973) (quoting State v. Van Wagner, 16 Wn.2d 54, 62-63, 132 P.2d 359 (1942) (emphasis in Molina)). That Surety Bankers played no role in Tidmore's arrest and he was apprehended only after an arrest for a new alleged offense furnished a sufficient basis for the court's exercise of discretion.
Since articulating this framework in Jackschitz, Washington courts have consistently interpreted chapter 10.19 RCW liberally and given bondsmen vacation of a judgment of forfeiture when the defendant is produced to the court within 60 days. State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 553-54, 507 P.2d 909 (1973) ("Where a defendant appears or is in custody in another state at the time the forfeiture judgment is entered, or within the 60-day stay of execution period, it has been generally held to be an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate the judgment or grant a stay or continuance until the defendant can be returned."
However, we note that in Mullen the defendant was returned to the jurisdiction of the court within the 60-day statutory period. The court in State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 553-54, 507 P.2d 909 (1973) held it to be an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate a forfeiture judgment when the defendant appears or is in custody in another state at the time the forfeiture judgment is entered or within the 60-day stay of execution period. The court further stated that "after expiration of the 60-day stay of execution period, the trial court exercising its inherent discretion has been affirmed in every instance whether or not the motion to vacate has been granted or denied."
In addition, if a defendant is found in custody outside the state of Washington within the 60-day grace period after a failure to appear, "it has been generally held to be an abuse of discretion to refuse to vacate the judgment." State v. Molina, 8 Wn.App. 551, 553-54, 507 P.2d 909 (1973). Here, Ms. Strong twice alerted the court of her incarceration in Montana during the 60-day grace period.
¶16 The decision whether to forfeit bail is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Banuelos , 91 Wash. App. 860, 861-62, 960 P.2d 952 (1998) ; In re Marriage of Bralley , 70 Wash. App. 646, 651, 855 P.2d 1174 (1993) ; State v. Molina , 8 Wash. App. 551, 552, 507 P.2d 909 (1973). "An abuse of discretion occurs only when the decision of the court is ‘manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.
Here, there is no such abuse. State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 552, 507 P.2d 909 (1973). Partial Exoneration
A trial court's decision on forfeiture of bail will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. O'Day, 36 Wn.2d 146, 159, 216 P.2d 732 (1950); State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 507 P.2d 909 (1973). A trial court abuses its discretion only when its exercise of discretion is manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons.
Where the principal is returned after the expiration of the 60-day stay of execution period, the trial court's decision has been affirmed in every instance whether the motion to vacate the forfeiture was granted or denied. State v. Van Wagner, 16 Wn.2d 54, 132 P.2d 359 (1942); State v. Jimas, supra; State v. Ohm, 145 Wn. 197, 259 P. 382 (1927); State v. Jackschitz, supra; State v. Molina, 8 Wn. App. 551, 507 P.2d 909 (1973). [4] The scope of review that can be exercised by this court was stated in State v. Van Wagner, at 62-63 (quoting State v. Jimas, supra):