State v. Mohl

9 Citing cases

  1. Pesanti v. N. Dakota Dep't of Transp.

    2013 N.D. 210 (N.D. 2013)   Cited 12 times

    “It is well settled, traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct which provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops,” Hanson v. ND Dep't of Transp., 2003 ND 175, ¶ 15, 671 N.W.2d 780, but an officer is not required to “observe a motorist violat[e] a traffic law or ... rule out every potential innocent excuse” before initiating a traffic stop to investigate. State v. Mohl, 2010 ND 120, ¶ 7, 784 N.W.2d 128. There may be circumstances when conduct, even though completely lawful, “might justify the suspicion” that criminal activity is underway. Kappel v. ND Dep't of Transp., 1999 ND 213, ¶ 10, 602 N.W.2d 718. Reasonable and articulable suspicion requires more than “a mere hunch illegal activity is taking place.

  2. STATE v. ZINK

    2010 N.D. 230 (N.D. 2010)   Cited 7 times

    We affirm the district court's decision unless we conclude there is insufficient competent evidence to support the decision, or unless the decision goes against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2010 ND 120, ¶ 5, 784 N.W.2d 128 (quoting State v. Wolfer, 2010 ND 63, ¶ 5, 780 N.W.2d 650). [¶ 6] Our review is limited to issues raised before the district court.

  3. Lies v. N.D. Dep't of Transp.

    2019 N.D. 83 (N.D. 2019)   Cited 2 times   1 Legal Analyses

    [¶7] We examine all information known to the officer at the time of the stop and consider inferences and deductions an investigating officer would make which may elude a layperson. State v. Mohl , 2010 ND 120, ¶ 7, 784 N.W.2d 128. In its decision, a hearing officer can draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented using common sense and experience.

  4. State v. James

    2016 N.D. 68 (N.D. 2016)   Cited 5 times

    Wolfer, 2010 ND 63, ¶ 7, 780 N.W.2d 650 (quoting State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86, 88 (N.D.1990)). See also State v. Mohl, 2010 ND 120, ¶ 9, 784 N.W.2d 128 (officer with six years' experience observed vehicle weaving and touching the center and fog lines an unusual number of times at about 1:27 a.m.); Hanson v. Dir., N.D. Dep't of Transp., 2003 ND 175, ¶ 16, 671 N.W.2d 780 (officer observed vehicle weaving on the roadway and crossing onto the dividing line twice). [¶ 10] At the suppression hearing in this case, the district court held reasonable suspicion existed to stop James's vehicle, explaining that:

  5. State v. Ostby

    2014 N.D. 180 (N.D. 2014)   Cited 7 times

    “It is well settled, traffic violations, even if considered common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct which provide officers with requisite suspicion for conducting investigatory stops,” Hanson v. ND Dep't of Transp., 2003 ND 175, ¶ 15, 671 N.W.2d 780, but an officer is not required to “observe a motorist violat[e] a traffic law or ... rule out every potential innocent excuse” before initiating a traffic stop to investigate. State v. Mohl, 2010 ND 120, ¶ 7, 784 N.W.2d 128. There may be circumstances when conduct, even though completely lawful, “might justify the suspicion” that criminal activity is underway. Kappel v. ND Dep't of Transp., 1999 ND 213, ¶ 10, 602 N.W.2d 718.

  6. State v. Smith

    2014 N.D. 152 (N.D. 2014)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that giving of North Dakota's implied-consent advisory informing arrestee that refusing chemical test is a crime does not render consent to test involuntary (citing Brooks, 838 N.W.2d at 570-72)

    ”State v. Zink, 2010 ND 230, ¶ 5, 791 N.W.2d 161 (quoting State v. Mohl, 2010 ND 120, ¶ 5, 784 N.W.2d 128). “Whether a finding of fact meets a legal standard is a question of law,” which is fully reviewable on appeal. State v. Mitzel, 2004 ND 157, ¶ 10, 685 N.W.2d 120. “The existence of consent is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances.”

  7. State v. Rahier

    2014 N.D. 153 (N.D. 2014)   Cited 4 times
    Noting the danger that unjustified police action will be taken "in the hopes it is later validated by tallying the knowledge of every officer and agency involved in the case"

    The determination this Court must make is whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would be “justified by some objective manifestation” to believe that the person stopped had engaged in, or was about to be, engaged in criminal activity. State v. Mohl, 2010 ND 120, ¶ 7, 784 N.W.2d 128. In assessing the reasonableness of an officer's traffic stop to investigate, this Court takes into account the inferences and deductions that an officer would make. Kappel, at ¶ 8.

  8. State v. Thompson

    2011 N.D. 11 (N.D. 2011)   Cited 3 times

    The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the North Dakota Constitution require all searches and seizures to be reasonable. State v. Mohl, 2010 ND 120, ¶ 7, 784 N.W.2d 128. A traffic stop can constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Addai 2010 ND 29, ¶ 7, 778 N.W.2d 555. "However, not all encounters between law enforcement officers and citizens constitute `seizures.

  9. State v. Dexter

    No. 1-622 / 10-1319 (Iowa Ct. App. Sep. 8, 2011)   Cited 1 times

    The officer also testified that, while it was normal for a vehicle to move within its lane and touch the lines, "this vehicle was touching the lines a lot more than a vehicle normally does."State v. Mohl, 784 N.W.2d 128, 131 (N.D. 2010). In our case we have nothing more than the videotape of Dexter's driving to supply reasonable suspicion. Without the officer's testimony to provide context, we are unable to draw inferences from the early morning hour or the other conditions present at the time of the stop.