50 Am. Jur., 224. The pertinent considerations were before the Court in S. v. Mitchell, 202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581, where Adams, J., delivering the opinion, said: "Before the adoption of our Constitution it was declared that all such parts of the common law as were theretofore in use within the State and were not destructive of, repugnant to, or inconsistent with the freedom and independence of the State and its form of government and not otherwise provided for, abrogated, repealed, or become obsolete, were in full force within the State. This statute is now in effect.

See, also, Emery v. State, 57 Tex.Crim. 423, 123 S.W. 133; Laird v. State, 79 Tex.Crim. 129, 184 S.W. 810, 3 A.L.R. 522; People v. Howland (Cal.) 44 P. 342. The case of State v. Mitchell, State Bank Examiner, et al, 202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581, is almost identical with the facts here presented. Mitchell, the chief State Bank Commissioner, with others, was appointed by the Corporation Commission.

While the General Assembly may in general modify or repeal the common law, "any parts of the common law which are incorporated in our Constitution may be modified only by proper constitutional amendment." Id. (citing State v. Mitchell , 202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581 (1932) ). Thus, while not necessarily dispositive, the common law background is highly relevant to discerning the meaning of the constitutional text when it was adopted.

Further, much of the common law that is in force by virtue of N.C.G.S. § 4-1 may be modified or repealed by the General Assembly, except that any parts of the common law which are incorporated in our Constitution may be modified only by proper constitutional amendment. State v. Mitchell, 202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581 (1932). [2] In Wilson, this Court made it clear that the lunar tides test had never been part of the English common law applied in this State before or after the Revolution.

At common law a grand jury had jurisdictional power to indict only for crimes committed within the county in which it convened. State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 321 S.E.2d 864 (1984); State v. Mitchell, 202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581 (1932). The legislature has power to extend the grand jury's power beyond the territorial limitation imposed by the common law, but when this case was heard, it had not exercised that power.

At common law a grand jury had the power to indict only for crimes allegedly committed within the county in which it sat, and an indictment which alleged an offense occurred outside the county was void for lack of jurisdiction by the grand jury. State v. Mitchell, 202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581 (1932). Supplementing this rule was the act of 1854-55 — Rev. Code ch. 35, 25 — which stated that the offense was deemed to have been committed in the county alleged in the indictment unless the defendant denied this by a plea in abatement.

As an aid in ascertaining the intent of the Legislature, we must take into account the law prior to the enactment of the statute. See: Milk Commission v. Food Stores, supra, at p. 332; State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 31 S.E.2d 858 (1944); State v. Mitchell, 202 N.C. 439, 445, 163 S.E. 581 (1932). Prior to the rewriting of G.S. 14-39 by the Session Laws of 1975, Ch. 843, this statute simply made kidnapping a felony punishable by imprisonment for life and did not define or prescribe the elements of the offense.

" In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789. The guarantees imbedded in the Constitution are not subject to modification or repeal by the legislature. State v. Mitchell, 202 N.C. 439, 163 S.E. 581. By reason of the lack of notice to Mrs. Wilson and an opportunity for her to be heard on the question of her sanity, the order of commitment under which she is now restrained violated her constitutional rights.

Messrs. Murdoch M. Johnson and Robinson Robinson, for appellant, cite: Discovery: 40 S.C. 393; 18 S.E., 929; 3 Rich. Eq., 148 2 Strob. Eq., 155; 48 S.C. 80; 26 S.E., 1; 107 S.C. 109; 91 S.E., 973; 115 S.C. 443; 106 S.E., 224; 51 Va., 1; 41 S.E., 421; 14 Cyc., 342; 292 Pac., 531; 18 C.J., 1121; 239 N.W., 541; 23 N.E., 387; 191 Wis. 586; 211 N.W., 923; 75 S.W.2d 666; 159 Pac., 737; 4 A.L.R., 619; 245 N.Y., 24; 156 N.E., 84; 52 A.L.R., 200; 161 N.E., 137; 58 A.L.R., 1256; 42 Ind., 364; 71 Pac., 602; 14 Cyc., 370. Subject-matter of discovery mustbe admissible evidence: 192 Cal., 395; 220 Pac., 422; 51 Va., 1; 41 S.E., 421; 264 U.S. 298; 32 A.L.R., 789; 44 Sup. Ct., 336; 211 U.S. 407; 53 L.Ed., 253; 29 Sup. Ct., 115. Intention of statutes: 202 N.C. 439; 153 S.E., 581; 179 S.E., 395; 25 R.C.L., 1053. Necessity of previousdemand: 40 S.C. 393; 18 S.E., 929; 48 S.C. 80; 26 S.E., 1; 107 S.C. 109; 91 S.E., 973. Messrs. Wittkowsky Wittkowsky, for respondent, cite: Discovery: 175 S.C. 464; 179 S.E., 478; 10 Fed., 529; 5 Pa., 41; 115 Wis. 31; 91 N.W., 114; 162 A., 581; 53 S.C. 519; 87 S.C. 301; 178 S.E., 838; 51 A., 1075; 18 C.J., 1121; 153 S.E., 260. As to trade secrets: 110 Pac., 547; 29 L.R.A. (N.S.), 716; 15 Fed., 716; 102 A., 373.

Therefore, the grand jury of Wayne County was without jurisdiction to indict the defendants for a breach of the criminal law averred to have been committed in Johnston County, and since the grand jury that found the bill — the grand jury of Wayne County — had no jurisdiction over an offense averred to have been committed in another county — Johnston County — the bill was void, and could confer no jurisdiction anywhere, even in the county in which the offense is averred to have been committed. S. v. Mitchell et al., 202 N.C. 439. We conclude that the Superior Court erred in disallowing the motion to dismiss the action in so far as it relates to the charge contained in the bill of indictment found in Wayne County and transferred to Johnston County; and the defendants in so far as the charge contained in this indictment is concerned are discharged.