We determine the reasonableness based on an objective view of the known facts, not the officer's subjective belief or ability to correctly articulate his suspicion in reference to a particular crime. State v. Mitchell, 80 Wash. App. 143, 148, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995). "The detention must not exceed the duration and intensity necessary to dispel the officer's suspicions."
We determine the reasonableness based on an objective view of the known facts, not the officer's subjective belief or ability to correctly articulate his suspicion in reference to a particular crime. State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143, 148, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995). "The detention must not exceed the duration and intensity necessary to dispel the officer's suspicions."
e returning and swinging his gun in the air, threatening with a pipe, and throwing a hammer); State v. M.T. , 97 Wash. App. 1067, 1999 WL 969620, at *3 (1999) (upholding a conviction based on a seven-year old's report that a man had approached her with a closed pocketknife which he thrust in the air; she had previously seen the man "pierce his own hand with the knife"; and "a reasonable person would be intimidated by M.T.'s display of the knife, even though the knife was closed"); see also United States v. Caraang , 2018 WL 2216103, at *1–3 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Caraang where he was reported to have waved a gun in a bar parking lot in the presence of five to ten people, racked the slide, and yelled "anybody want some?"); Hill v. Ramsdell , 2016 WL 1304847 (W.D. Wash. 2016) (holding that police had probable cause to arrest Hill on § 9.41.270 charges when he attended a city council meeting wearing what appeared to be brass knuckles); State v. Mitchell , 80 Wash.App. 143, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Mitchell when he was carrying a semi-automatic weapon in an urban, residential area at night, he tucked the gun in his waistband when he saw the officer, and tossed the gun when the officer ordered him to put his hands up). The dissent argues that Mitchell cannot be squared with our reading of § 9.41.270.
"If the stop exceeds these limitations, it can be justified only by a showing of probable cause." State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn.App. 143, 145, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995). The showing necessary to meet the reasonable suspicion standard for a Terry stop is much lower than the showing necessary to meet the probable cause standard for a search warrant.
As the Court of Appeals said in State v. Mitchell, “[T]he existence of ... reasonable suspicion is determined based on an objective view of the known facts, and is not dependent upon the officer's subjective belief or upon the officer's ability to correctly articulate his or her suspicion in reference to a particular crime.”80 Wash.App. 143, 147, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995).¶ 49 Here, the State argues that the particular crimes the officers sought to investigate were assault and a minor in possession of a firearm.
See generally 1 LAFAVE, supra, § 1.4 (d) (reasoning that exclusion based on officer's mistaken grounds for arrest is "unjustified . . . because such situations are often attributable to complicated legal distinctions between offenses or an officer's failure to record all the bases or the strongest basis upon which the arrest was made."). In State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn. App. 143, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995), in response to the appellant's argument that the search was unlawful because the officer did not articulate a reasonable suspicion, the court found that the facts of the case supported a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id.
A typical Terry stop includes only a frisk for weapons and brief questioning. State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn.App. 143, 145, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995). But greater intrusion, including "handcuffing, secluding, and drawing guns" may be appropriate and necessary to accomplish investigative purposes in some circumstances.
Where officers believe that the suspect is armed, they may employ measures beyond a typical Terry stop, "such as handcuffing, secluding, and drawing guns." State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn.App. 143, 145, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995), review denied, 129 Wn.2d 1019 (1996); see e.g., State v. Smith, 67 Wn.App. 81, 88, 834 P.2d 26 (1992), aff'd, 123 Wn.2d 51 (1993).
This was error. It is well settled that “the existence of such reasonable suspicion is determined based on an objective view of the known facts, and is not dependent upon the officer's subjective belief or upon the officer's ability to correctly articulate his or her suspicion in reference to a particular crime.” State v. Mitchell, 80 Wash.App. 143, 147, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995). Whether a particular set of facts warrant a legal conclusion that reasonable grounds for suspicion or probable cause exists is a matter for the trial court to decide.
Also police may draw a gun in some circumstances. Williams, 102 Wn.2d at 740 n.2; State v. Mitchell, 80 Wn.App. 143, 146, 906 P.2d 1013 (1995). The test is whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would believe he or others were in danger.