{¶ 21} Subsequent to Washington, the Supreme Court issued State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that “Johnson is not applicable to a RICO violation and that a RICO offense does not merge with its predicate offenses for purposes of sentencing.”

"The intent of [the statute] is ‘ "to criminalize the pattern of criminal activity, not the underlying predicate acts." ’ " State v. Miranda , 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Thomas , 3d Dist. Allen Nos. 1-11-25, 2012-Ohio-5577, 2012 WL 6017971, ¶ 61, quoting State v. Dodson , 12th Dist. Butler No. 2010-08-191, 2011-Ohio-6222, 2011 WL 6017950, ¶ 68. That pattern " ‘must include both a relationship and continuous activity, as well as proof of the existence of an enterprise.’ "

Offenses are "allied" and must be merged for sentencing if the defendant's conduct is such that a single act could lead to the commission of separately defined offenses, but those separate offenses were committed with a state of mind to commit only one act. See State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061, ¶ 48-50; State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 9-10. {¶4} Velez pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter under R.C. 2903.04(A).

’ " State v. Thomas, 3d Dist. Allen Nos. 1–11–25 and 1–11–26, 2012-Ohio-5577 , ¶ 61, quoting State v. Dodson, 12th Dist. Butler No. 2009–07–1147, 2011-Ohio-6222 , ¶ 68. State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 13. {¶ 6} In Miranda, we held that "a RICO offense does not merge with its predicate offenses for purposes of sentencing."

The focus of the statute remains on the enterprise itself, not the individuals associated with it. State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 14. {¶ 41} The part of former R.C. 2923.31(I)(2)(c) at issue defines corrupt activity as including

It is true that the conclusion in the lead Johnson opinion was accepted as the black-letter law for a period of time. State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 8 (noting the Johnson test, which applied R.C. 2941.25, was not the sole statutory codification regarding the multiplicity of sentencing in Ohio); State v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 16 (the analysis in Johnson emphasized the conduct-based inquiry was incomplete because it only accounted for R.C. 2941.25(A) and not division (B)). Subsequently, however, it has been determined that the lead opinion in Johnson did not receive the majority support of the Ohio Supreme Court, and after several subsequent decisions eroding the impact of the lead analysis, Johnson has been rendered largely obsolete.

{¶ 69} This Court in Christian further determined as follows: The requirement that the organization be separate and apart is highlighted by State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, which held that a pattern of engaging in corrupt activity “must include both a relationship and continuous activity, as well as proof of the existence of an enterprise.

As to the second element, Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.31(E) defines “[p]attern of corrupt activity” as “two or more incidents of corrupt activity, whether or not there has been a prior conviction, that are related to the affairs of the same enterprise, are not isolated, and are not so closely related to each other and connected in time and place that they constitute a single event.” Additionally, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that a “pattern must include both a relationship and continuous activity, as well as proof of the existence of an enterprise[.]” State v. Miranda, 5 N.E.3d 603, 606 (Ohio 2014) (citation omitted). Here, the complaint alleges that the Zheng DTO manufactures hundreds of types of controlled substances (Doc. No. 1 ¶ 27) and has served many customers in both the United States and Europe.

The intent of RICO is to criminalize the pattern of criminal activity, not the underlying predicate acts. State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 5 N.E.3d 603, 606–07 (2014) (internal citations omitted). Many of the terms used in the OCPA are statutorily defined.

{¶10} The "Double Jeopardy" clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions protect defendants against multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Miranda, 138 Ohio St.3d 184, 2014-Ohio-451, 5 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 6. Therefore, a defendant may be convicted only once for allied offenses of similar import.