Our supreme court has determined, however, that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Arizona Constitution affords even greater protection than the federal Constitution, barring retrial when there are instances of egregious prosecutorial misconduct that raise serious concerns regarding the integrity of our system of justice. See State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 438–39, ¶¶ 29–35, 55 P.3d 774, 781–82 (2002); State v. Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. 390, 391–93, ¶¶ 4–11, 10 P.3d 1177, 1178–80 (2000); Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108–09, 677 P.2d at 271–72. Additionally, the Arizona Supreme Court in Jorgenson cited with approval the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177, 615 A.2d 321, 322–23 (1992), in which that state's supreme court held that double jeopardy bars retrial when the prosecution deliberately fails to disclose significant impeachment and exculpatory evidence during the defendant's initial trial.
Our supreme court has determined, however, that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Arizona Constitution affords even greater protection than the federal Constitution, barring retrial when there are instances of egregious prosecutorial misconduct that raise serious concerns regarding the integrity of our system of justice. See State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 438–39, ¶¶ 29–35, 55 P.3d 774, 781–82 (2002) ; State v. Jorgenson, 198 Ariz. 390, 391–93, ¶¶ 4–11, 10 P.3d 1177, 1178–80 (2000) ; Pool, 139 Ariz. at 108–09, 677 P.2d at 271–72. Additionally, the Arizona Supreme Court in Jorgenson cited with approval the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Smith, 532 Pa. 177, 615 A.2d 321, 322–23 (1992), in which that state's supreme court held that double jeopardy bars retrial when the prosecution deliberately fails to disclose significant impeachment and exculpatory evidence during the defendant's initial trial.
¶7 The double jeopardy clauses of the state and federal constitutions protect a criminal defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same offense.See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 10; U.S. Const. amend. V; see also State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, ¶ 27, 55 P.3d 774, 780 (2002). "As a general rule, if the defendant successfully moves for or consents to a mistrial, retrial is not barred on double jeopardy grounds."
Godoy initially engaged in an untaped interview with Woods that lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes, after which police transferred Woods to a “bugged” room in order to tape his statement. State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 55 P.3d 774, 777 (2002). During the taped portion of the interview, Woods stated that McCrimmon and Minnitt had confessed to him that they had completed the El Grande murders with a third person identified as “Cha–Chi” who used to work at the market.
Godoy initially engaged in an untaped interview with Woods that lasted approximately 30 to 45 minutes, after which police transferred Woods to a "bugged" room in order to tape his statement. State v. Minnitt, 55 P.3d 774, 777 (Ariz. 2002). During the taped portion of the interview, Woods stated that McCrimmon and Minnitt had confessed to him that they had completed the El Grande murders with a third person identified as "Cha-Chi" who used to work at the market.
The facts set forth herein are derived from the Court's review of the state court record as well as the Arizona Supreme Court's opinions in Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. at 190-91, 928 P.2d at 614-15, and State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 433-34, 55 P.3d 774, 776-77 (2002). Shortly thereafter, police found an abandoned car that was parked out of place several blocks from the market.
On appeal, Shivers argues that the ruling was error, that double jeopardy barred his retrial and that his conviction and sentence must be vacated. ¶11 In general, when a defendant successfully moves for a mistrial, double jeopardy does not bar a retrial. State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 437, ¶ 28, 55 P.3d 774, 780 (2002). However, "[w]hen a prosecutor intentionally commits misconduct so as to deliberately or indifferently mistry a case for an improper purpose, double jeopardy principles can preclude a retrial."
Moody, 192 Ariz. at 509, ¶ 23, 968 P.2d at 582. Thus, Moody relies on the only case in which double jeopardy protections have been applied in the absence of a motion for a mistrial: State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 55 P.3d 774 (2002). ¶ 21 In Minnitt, we held that double jeopardy barred the retrial of a defendant whose convictions were procured by false and perjured testimony that the prosecutor placed before the jury with full knowledge of its perjurious character and of the likelihood that it would support a conviction.
Moody, 192 Ariz. at 509, ¶ 23, 968 P.2d at 582. Thus, Moody relies on the only case in which double jeopardy protections have been applied in the absence of a motion for a mistrial: State v. Minnitt, 203 Ariz. 431, 55 P.3d 774 (2002). ¶ 21 In Minnitt, we held that double jeopardy barred the retrial of a defendant whose convictions were procured by false and perjured testimony that the prosecutor placed before the jury with full knowledge of its perjurious character and of the likelihood that it would support a conviction.
In State v. Minnitt, the prosecutor, inter alia, "elicited testimony . . . that he knew was false." 203 Ariz. 431, ¶ 38, 55 P.3d 774, 782 (2002). In Milke v. Mroz, the state withheld "evidence of numerous prior acts of improper and deceitful conduct" by the investigating officer in the case.