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State v. Miller

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Mar 14, 2001
No. 0-630 / 00-0032 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2001)

Opinion

No. 0-630 / 00-0032

Filed March 14, 2001

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Worth County, Bryan H. McKinley, Judge.

The State appeals the district court order dismissing the charges against Jesse R. Miller for a speedy trial violation. It contends the trial court erred on dismissing the case on the grounds of a speedy trial violation. AFFIRMED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Roxann M. Ryan, Assistant Attorney General, Chad Belville, County Attorney, and Brian D. Miller, Assistant County Attorney, for appellant.

Patrick B. Byrne of Winston Byrne, P.C., Mason City, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.


The district court dismissed a charge of operating while intoxicated against Defendant, Jesse R. Miller, after finding that defendant had not been brought to trial within ninety days of his indictment as required by Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2)(b). The State appeals contending the district court erred in dismissing the case. We affirm.

On November 30, 1999, over ninety days past defendant's August 23, 1999, arraignment where he demanded a speedy trial, defendant filed his motion to dismiss. In granting the motion on December 6, 1999, the district court found the State had provided no reason for the delay other than time taken by the district court in ruling on a motion to suppress filed by the defendant. The State contends in its ruling the district court incorrectly interpreted Iowa Court Rule 200 and failed to consider that the reason for the delay was the fact defendant filed pretrial motions.

Defendant was arrested on July 16, 1999, and charged by trial information on July 26, 1999. On August 10, 1999, he filed a motion to suppress contending that oral statements he made to law enforcement officers should be suppressed because he had not been advised of his constitutional right to remain silent. At defendant's arraignment on August 23 his trial date was set for September 22, 1999. Trial was not held on September 22, and no explanation appears in the record as to why it did not happen. However, no charge is made that defendant was responsible for the missed trial date.

On August 30, 1999, a hearing was set for September 20, 1999 on defendant's motion to suppress. On September 1, 1999, the defendant took the deposition of the arresting officer. On September 14, 1999, defendant amended his motion seeking suppression of evidence gathered after he took a preliminary breath test.

Hearing on the motion to suppress was held on September 20, 1999. At the end of the hearing the court stated, "This concluded the evidentiary record." On November 29, 2000, over sixty days after the evidentiary hearing was completed, the district court faxed to both attorneys a ruling denying the defendant's motions. On December 15, 1999, after the case was dismissed the district court sent a signed copy of the ruling to the clerk of the district court together with a statement that his court reporter had mailed a signed ruling to the clerk on the same day the ruling was faxed. No other explanation appears in the record for the fact that the signed ruling the judge said was sent on November 29, 2000, did not reach the clerk of court.

On November 30, 1999, defendant filed a motion to dismiss contending his speedy trial rights under rule 27(2)(b) expired on October 25, 1999. He contended trial was set for December 1, 1999, and consequently he needed an immediate ruling on his motion to dismiss. The State filed a resistance to the motion in its entirety. Meanwhile, on December 1, 1999, the district court on its own motion continued the trial and a hearing on the motion to dismiss took place on December 6, 1999.

At the hearing the defendant argued the matter should be dismissed for several reasons. He contended (1) the ruling on the suppression motion was not yet filed with the clerk of the district court; (2) that there was a forty-two day delay between the time he filed his suppression motion and the time it came on for hearing; (3) that sixty-nine days expired between the submission of the motion to suppress on September 20, 1999, and his receipt of a faxed ruling.

The State in resistance argued (1) it was unaware that the ruling on defendant's suppression motion was not in the court file until defendant called it to his attention at the time of the hearing; (2) that the motion to suppress was not submitted to the court on September 20 as defendant claimed because following the hearing attorneys for both the State and the defendant submitted written closing arguments, the State's three days following the hearing and the defendant's ten days; consequently the motion to suppress was ruled on within sixty days of submission; (3) that the issue addressed in the suppression motion was an issue of first impression: whether a nineteen-year-old was under arrest after a deputy sheriff invokes implied consent and requires the nineteen-year-old to come to the sheriff's office to submit to an intoxilyzer test.

The district court made oral findings. It found that (1) the motion to suppress was very timely, having been filed two weeks before the date set for arraignment; and (2) the time for filing written arguments did not extend the sixty-day time for ruling under Court Rule 200 beyond the closing of the evidence. The district court then granted the motion to dismiss, orally stating, "I'm granting the Motion to Dismiss for the reason that no good cause has been demonstrated here as to this matter proceeding beyond the time requirements of speedy trial." The district court then filed a written ruling granting defendant's motion to dismiss for reasons stated on the record.

Review of a statutory speedy trial claim is for correction of errors at law. State v. Finn, 469 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa 1991). A district court has limited discretion in ruling on a motion to dismiss under rule 27(2)(b). We review the district court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 1999). We are not bound by the district court's determination of the law. Rouse v. State, 369 N.W.2d 811, 813 (Iowa 1985).

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 27(2)(b) provides:

If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived his or her right to a speedy trial he or she must be brought to trial within ninety days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.

The burden is on the State to demonstrate compliance with speedy trial principles. State v. Bond, 340 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Iowa 1983). Rule 27(2)(b) is more stringent than the constitutional protection delineated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1999); Bond, 340 N.W.2d at 278, State v. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d 332, 334 (Iowa 1980). Under the Iowa rule, if trial does not commence within ninety days from indictment, dismissal is compelled unless the State proves (1) defendant's waiver of speedy trial, (2) delay attributable to the defendant, or (3) "good cause" for the delay. Petersen, 288 N.W.2d at 335; accord State v. Smith, 573 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Iowa 1997); Bond, 340 N.W.2d at 279.

Defendant never waived speedy trial. Rather, he demanded it at arraignment. Therefore the question is whether the State has shown delay attributable to the defendant or good cause for the delay. The State argues that the defendant's motion to suppress provides the necessary proof.

The district court found defendant filed his motion to suppress in an extremely timely manner. The motion was quickly amended after the deputy's deposition was taken shortly after defendant was arraigned. We agree with the district court that the State has failed to show the delay was attributable to the defendant.

The next question is whether, as the State argues, the district court delay is good reason for the delay. While the State argues that the district court took an extended period of time to rule on the motion to suppress, the district court also considered the forty-two days it took the defendant to receive a hearing on his motion.

"Good cause, under our rule, focuses on only one factor: The reason for the delay." State v. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 601; Petersen, 288 N.W.2d at 335. Surrounding circumstances bear on the inquiry only to the extent they relate directly to the sufficiency of the reason itself. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 601; Bond, 340 N.W.2d at 279. Thus a short period of delay or the absence of prejudice may be legitimate considerations but "only insofar as they affect the strength of the reason for delay." Petersen, 288 N.W.2d at 335; accord Bond, 340 N.W.2d at 279. If the reason for the delay is sufficient, the other factors are not needed. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 601. If the reason for the delay is insufficient the other factors will not avail to avoid dismissal. Id.; Petersen, 288 N.W.2d at 335.

A defendant must accept the passage of time reasonably necessary for careful deliberation and ruling on dispositive motions. Nelson, 600 N.W.2d at 601. However, a defendant who files a timely motion does not thereby forfeit the right to be tried without lengthy and unexplained delay. See id. The general press of court business is insufficient to avoid dismissal under a speedy-trial rule, even for a busy judge sitting in a high-volume court. See id. at 602.

The State has failed to show that the delay in setting a hearing on the motion to dismiss coupled with the time the district court took to rule on the submission is good cause for the delay. Having so decided, we find it unnecessary to address the State's contention the district court incorrectly interpreted Iowa Court Rule 200.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

State v. Miller

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Mar 14, 2001
No. 0-630 / 00-0032 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2001)
Case details for

State v. Miller

Case Details

Full title:STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JESSE ROSS MILLER…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Mar 14, 2001

Citations

No. 0-630 / 00-0032 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2001)