Summary
In State v. Miller, 20-182 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/23/20), 308 So.3d 1246, 1258-59, writ denied, 2021-00233 (La. 4/27/21), 314 So.3d 838, the appellate court affirmed consecutive life sentences on two convictions of second degree murder where the defendant executed two individuals, took their car, and drove it around for days, as the victims’ bodies were decomposing.
Summary of this case from State v. AlexanderOpinion
NO. 20-KA-182
12-23-2020
STATE of Louisiana v. Melvin MILLER
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA, Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr., Metairie, Thomas J. Butler, Douglas W. Freese, Gretna, Lindsay L. Truhe, Matthew R. Clauss COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, MELVIN MILLER, Melvin Miller, Jane L. Beebe
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, STATE OF LOUISIANA, Honorable Paul D. Connick, Jr., Metairie, Thomas J. Butler, Douglas W. Freese, Gretna, Lindsay L. Truhe, Matthew R. Clauss
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, MELVIN MILLER, Melvin Miller, Jane L. Beebe
Panel composed of Judges Fredericka Homberg Wicker, Jude G. Gravois, and Hans J. Liljeberg
LILJEBERG, J. Defendant appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts of second degree murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. For the following reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences, and we remand for correction of the Uniform Commitment Order.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, Melvin Miller, was charged by grand jury indictment with two counts of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (counts one and two) and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (count four). On February 3, 2020, the case proceeded to trial, and on February 5, 2020, a twelve-person jury unanimously found defendant guilty as charged.
In count three of the same indictment, Joseph Alexander was indicted with obstruction of justice in violation of La. R.S. 14:130.1.
On March 5, 2020, defendant filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal, both of which were denied on that same date. Afterward, on the same date, defendant waived sentencing delays, and the trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on counts one and two to run consecutively with each other. The trial court also sentenced defendant to imprisonment at hard labor for twenty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count four, to run concurrently with the sentences on counts one and two and any other sentence he was currently serving. Also on March 5, 2020, after sentencing, defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence that was denied on that same date. Immediately following the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence, defendant filed a Motion for Appeal that was granted.
The trial judge also imposed a $1,000 fine in connection with count four, and he converted it to a civil money judgment.
FACTS
At trial, Detective Dennis Thornton of the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office (JPSO) testified that on February 14, 2013, he responded to 2209 Edenborn, Apartment Number 3, in Metairie. He explained that the patrol division had requested that the detective bureau come to the scene because they had found two unresponsive individuals who were presumed dead. The victims were later identified as Morris Williams, a transgender individual also known as "Milan" or "Mimi," and Akeem Boudreaux, who lived together in the apartment. Detective Thornton testified that Ms. Williams’ body was found on the floor in the hallway of the apartment and that a spent casing was found near her on the ground. Mr. Boudreaux's body was found on the floor in the back bedroom. Detective Thornton explained that a dog had been in that bedroom and that the dog had eaten part of Mr. Boudreaux's deceased body. He noted that the back of the bedroom door, the carpet, the floor, and the surrounding areas had been damaged by the dog, probably in an effort to get out of the bedroom. Detective Thornton testified that there was a bullet hole in the wall framing the bedroom closet and that a projectile was found in that closet.
It is noted that Morris Williams was primarily referred to as a female in the trial transcript. Morris Williams will be referred to as "Ms. Williams" or "she" throughout this opinion.
Dr. Marianna Eserman, who was accepted as an expert in forensic pathology, testified that she performed the autopsies on Ms. Williams and Mr. Boudreaux and that they were in advanced stages of decomposition. She believed that the victims died at least five to seven days and up to fifteen to twenty days before they were found. Dr. Eserman testified that the cause of death for both victims was a gunshot wound to the head and the manner of death for both victims was homicide.
JPSO Detective Rhonda Goff testified that she was the lead investigator in the instant case. She stated that when she arrived at the scene, she spoke to Ms. Williams’ friends who told her they had not heard from Ms. Williams for nine days, so they went to her apartment and discovered the victims. Detective Goff stated that the victims were last seen at a club on February 5, 2013, at 1:00 a.m.
Detective Goff testified that Ms. Williams’ laptop computer, iPhone, and Pontiac G6 vehicle were missing. She entered the missing Pontiac into the "NCIC," had the JPSO broadcast a "BOLO" (Be on the Lookout) for the vehicle, and ran the license plate through the license plate recognition system (LPRS) to see where the vehicle had been. Detective Goff testified that the LPRS indicated that on February 5, 2013, at 9:01 p.m., Ms. Williams’ vehicle passed a camera located three blocks from the victims’ residence in Metairie. She further testified that the LPRS indicated that on February 6, 2013, at 7:36 p.m., and on February 9, 2013, at 1:50 p.m., the vehicle passed cameras at two locations in Baton Rouge.
"NCIC" typically refers to the National Crime Information Center registry. See State v. Brand , 520 So.2d 114 (La. 1988) ; and State v. Harris , 03-2328 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/17/04), 887 So.2d 519.
Detective Goff testified that on February 16, 2013, she received a call from the Baton Rouge Police Department and learned that Ms. Williams’ vehicle had been located. She went to Baton Rouge where she met with defendant and Joseph Alexander, also known as "Jasmine." She learned that Ms. Williams had an internet hair business and was a prostitute who advertised her services in an online publication called "Back Page." Detective Goff testified that defendant and Ms. Williams had been in contact with each other on Facebook. A printout showing defendant and "Milan Premium Hair Boudreaux" communicating through Facebook was given to Detective Goff by Ms. Williams’ mother and was admitted into evidence.
Officer Ross Williams III of the Baton Rouge Police Department testified that on February 16, 2013, patrol officers responded to a location in Baton Rouge regarding an individual, later identified as Joseph Alexander a/k/a "Jasmine," who said she was beaten by her boyfriend, later identified as defendant, Melvin Miller. Ms. Alexander told the officers that her boyfriend had been driving the Pontiac car that was present at her residence. When the officers ran the vehicle's license plate, they discovered that it was wanted in connection with the instant case, so they notified the JPSO that they had found the vehicle. Officer Williams testified that defendant was not on the scene when he arrived but was located in Baton Rouge that night.
Joseph Alexander indicated that she prefers to be called "Jasmine" and referred to as "she."
Detective Goff testified that she interviewed defendant in Baton Rouge on February 17, 2013. In his statement, defendant stated that he bought the Pontiac for $800 at a gas station from a tall black man with "dreads" in his hair, but he did not get a bill of sale or title for the vehicle. Defendant explained that he bought the vehicle in February, after Mardi Gras, but he did not know the exact date. He knew that he had the vehicle the previous two nights. Defendant said that he did not have the vehicle when he went to New Orleans for the Super Bowl. Defendant asserted that after the Super Bowl, he bought a bus ticket in somebody else's name, took a bus to Dallas, Texas, and stayed with "Kemora Francis." He maintained that he was not in New Orleans or Jefferson Parish the week after the Super Bowl, and that he did not get the vehicle in New Orleans.
At trial, testimony was elicited that the Super Bowl was played in New Orleans on Sunday, February 3, 2013, and that Mardi Gras was on Tuesday, February 12, 2013, in New Orleans.
Detective Goff testified that she obtained the cell phone records of defendant, Ms. Williams, Mr. Boudreaux, and Paula Mosley. Through the phone records, she developed information regarding the movements of defendant's phone during the relevant time periods. Detective Goff asserted that a call was placed from defendant's phone to Ms. Williams’ phone on February 4, 2013, at 5:15 p.m. She also learned from two independent sources that defendant took a Swift bus from Baton Rouge to New Orleans on Tuesday, February 5, 2013. She asserted that the bus ran during the day and that the last ride was 6:00 p.m. in either direction.
Detective Goff testified that defendant's phone called Ms. Williams’ phone again on February 5, 2013, at 6:54 p.m., and then at 7:39 p.m. from the Swift bus stop. Detective Goff testified that on February 5, 2013, utilizing a cell phone tower .43 miles from the victims’ residence, defendant made calls at 10:25 p.m., 10:26 p.m., 10:29 p.m., and 10:37 p.m.; however, those calls were not made to Ms. Williams. She further testified that defendant placed a call on February 5, 2013, at 11:42 p.m., in Gramercy and on February 6, 2013, at 12:09 a.m., in Baton Rouge.
Detective Goff testified that while defendant was incarcerated, she monitored his jailhouse calls. She recalled that most of them were with Ms. Alexander. She asserted that in a phone call on February 20, 2013, Ms. Alexander told defendant that she threw the bullets away, and defendant responded, "That's good." Detective Goff said she also took Ms. Alexander's statement, and defendant's explanation of how he came into possession of the vehicle was not consistent with what Ms. Alexander said.
At trial, Ms. Alexander testified that defendant was her ex-boyfriend and that they were living together in an apartment in Baton Rouge in February of 2013. Ms. Alexander testified that in February of 2013, she, defendant, and a friend went to New Orleans around the time of the Super Bowl, which was being played in New Orleans that year. She recalled that they did not stay in New Orleans through Super Bowl Sunday and that they went back home to Baton Rouge. Ms. Alexander testified that a couple of days later, defendant said he was going to his mother's house. She explained that he disappeared and was gone the rest of the evening and half of the night. Ms. Alexander testified that when defendant left, he took a brown Gucci sack with him. After defendant left, she wanted to know what defendant was doing and why he was taking a sack to go to his mother's house, so she started digging through some things and looking around the apartment. Ms. Alexander said that when she did so, she noticed that defendant had taken with him an automatic firearm that was kept in their bedroom closet and a change of clothes.
Ms. Alexander testified that defendant came back later that night "sometime after maybe 1:00 or 2:00, it was after 12:00 for sure" in different clothes and that he had a laptop computer, a white iPhone, and a gray, two-door Pontiac vehicle. She had never seen defendant with those items before. She recalled that defendant told her he had just come back from New Orleans. Ms. Alexander recalled that defendant unpacked the gun when he came home and returned it to the spot it was in before he left.
Ms. Alexander testified that she was not happy with defendant for coming home so late. She recalled that in order to calm her down, defendant presented her with the "items" and told her that he and his friend had "hit a lick," which she understood to mean that they had "pulled something off." Ms. Alexander thought that they had "jacked somebody" and defendant had gotten some stolen items. When Ms. Alexander asked him whose car he had, defendant told her it was a "rock rental," which she explained meant that it was a car given to someone to use for a period of time in exchange for drugs. She recalled that defendant told her the car owner was a friend and that the car was not stolen.
Ms. Alexander testified that eleven days later, in mid-February, she was walking to her mother's house when she saw defendant in the Pontiac with a girl. She ran over to the car and opened the door, after which she and defendant began fighting. She explained that the neighbors called the police and that defendant sped off in the car. Ms. Alexander testified that she spoke to Detective Goff that night. She further testified that she and other family members rode in the Pontiac during the time defendant had it and that she did not know the vehicle belonged to someone who was murdered. She asserted that defendant never owned a car and did not have a job. Ms. Alexander thought it was strange that he kept the car, and she kept asking him who the car belonged to.
Ms. Alexander testified that when she got home from the police station after talking to Detective Goff, the apartment was a "mess," and she was angry. She admitted that when she saw a bullet on the floor, she threw it away. She knew at that time that defendant was suspected in the murder of the car owner. Ms. Alexander stated that she was subsequently arrested for obstruction of justice and that she pleaded guilty and was sentenced to probation.
Ms. Alexander admitted that she had other prior convictions as well.
Paul Mosely, who was referred to as Paula Mosely, testified that she knew Ms. Williams "[t]hrough the Trans Community" and at some point she heard that Ms. Williams had been killed. She explained that she subsequently saw a picture of defendant—the suspect—on the news, so she called her friend, "Amber," and told her that he was the same "guy" who she had been talking to on Facebook in a message app called "Kick." She testified that she and defendant were supposed to meet in New Orleans around the time of the Super Bowl and Mardi Gras, though she did not recall the exact date.
Ms. Mosely further testified that defendant was supposed to come to New Orleans from Baton Rouge on the "mega bus" and that defendant wanted her to send him money to pay for the bus but she did not. Ms. Mosely noted that a couple of hours after she spoke to defendant, he informed her that he was in New Orleans. Ms. Mosely testified that she stopped messaging defendant because she was at a party and did not want to leave. She did not see defendant or hear from him again that evening. She also testified that she gave defendant's number to the JPSO and that a police officer came to her house and interviewed her. Detective Goff testified that she obtained Ms. Mosely's phone records and determined that her phone was in New Orleans on February 5, 2013.
Ms. Mosely also testified that she was in custody at the time of trial for using stolen checks and credit cards. She also admitted that she had other prior convictions.
Joel O'Lear, who was accepted as an expert in latent-print examination, testified that he took defendant's fingerprints and compared them to the fingerprints contained in a certified conviction packet from May 22, 2012, when defendant pleaded guilty to simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.2, in case number 12-11-416 in the 19th Judicial District Court. He stated that both sets of fingerprints were created by defendant. Mr. O'Lear also testified that seventeen prints were lifted from Ms. Williams’ Pontiac vehicle and that three of those prints were left there by defendant. He stated that defendant's prints were found on the hood of the vehicle, the passenger-door window, and the passenger rear window.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant's first counseled assignment of error and his sole pro se assignment of error can be addressed together, as they both challenge the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial. In his first counseled assignment of error, defendant argues that the State failed to prove the identity of the shooter beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore, the trial court erred in denying his Motion for New Trial and Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal. He contends that no physical evidence at the scene of the crime identified him as the shooter. He also contends that the only connection he had to the victims was that his phone was in the area on the evening that they were last seen and that he had stolen their vehicle. Defendant asserts that there are many hypotheses of reasonable doubt given the facts presented and that the State bears the burden of overcoming any reasonable doubts.
In his pro se assignment of error, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of second degree murder and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He contends that his convictions were obtained solely by the State's use of circumstantial evidence and that the State failed to overcome every hypothesis of innocence. He further contends that the State also relied heavily upon self-serving testimony from his transgender partner who had reasons to testify favorably for the State. Defendant argues that there was no corroborating evidence to substantiate his convictions, noting that there was no physical evidence, no DNA evidence, and no eyewitnesses to the crimes.
The record reflects that defendant filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion for Post-Verdict Judgment of Acquittal. In those motions, defendant primarily argued that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. The question of sufficiency of the evidence is properly raised by a motion for post-verdict judgment of acquittal. La. C.Cr.P. art. 821 ; State v. Hampton , 98-331 (La. 4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867, 880, cert. denied , 528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504, 145 L.Ed.2d 390 (1999).
La. C.Cr.P. art. 851(1) provides that on motion of the defendant, the court shall grant a new trial whenever the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence. However, the denial of a motion for new trial based on the verdict being contrary to the law and the evidence fails to present an issue reviewable on appeal. State v. Condley , 04-1349 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 881, 888, writ denied , 05-1760 (La. 2/10/06), 924 So.2d 163.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must determine that the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a mixture of both, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact that all of the elements of the crime have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ; State v. Neal , 00-674 (La. 6/29/01), 796 So.2d 649, 657, cert. denied , 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1323, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002).
In cases involving circumstantial evidence, the trial court must instruct the jury that "assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, in order to convict, it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." La. R.S. 15:438. The reviewing court is not required to determine whether another possible hypothesis of innocence suggested by the defendant offers an exculpatory explanation of events. Rather, the reviewing court must determine whether the possible alternative hypothesis is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could not have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Mitchell , 99-3342 (La. 10/17/00), 772 So.2d 78, 83 ; State v. Washington , 03-1135 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/27/04), 866 So.2d 973, 977.
Defendant was convicted of two counts of second degree murder in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1. At trial, the jury was instructed on second degree murder as a specific intent crime, defined as the killing of a human being when the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm. Specific criminal intent is defined as "that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act." La. R.S. 14:10(1). Because it is a state of mind, specific intent need not be proven as a fact, but may be inferred from the circumstances and the defendant's actions. State v. Mickelson , 12-2539 (La. 9/3/14), 149 So.3d 178, 182.
It is well established that specific intent may be inferred from the act of pointing a gun and firing at a person. State v. Hidalgo , 95-319 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/17/96), 668 So.2d 1188, 1197. Specific intent can be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon, from the circumstances of a defendant's actions, and the extent and severity of a victim's injuries. State v. Patterson , 10-415 (La. App. 5 Cir 1/11/11), 63 So.3d 140, 148, writ denied , 11-338 (La. 6/17/11), 63 So.3d 1037.
Defendant was also convicted of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. To support a conviction under La. R.S. 14:95.1, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had: (1) possession of a firearm; (2) a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; (3) absence of the ten-year statutory period of limitation; and (4) the general intent to commit the offense. State v. Youngblood , 18-445 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/19), 274 So.3d 716, 729. With respect to number three, the State must prove that ten years has not elapsed since the date of completion of the punishment for the prior felony conviction. State v. Becnel , 04-1266 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/31/05), 904 So.2d 838, 847.
Encompassed in proving the elements of the offense is the necessity of proving the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator. When the key issue in the case is identification, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof under Jackson . State v. Taylor , 99-296 (La. App. 5 Cir. 7/27/99), 740 So.2d 216, 222, writ denied , 99-2609 (La. 3/17/00), 756 So.2d 322.
In the instant case, the State presented sufficient evidence to establish that defendant committed the crimes with which he was charged. Detective Goff testified that the victims, Ms. Williams and Mr. Boudreaux, were last seen at a club on February 5, 2013, at 1:00 a.m. On February 14, 2013, Detective Thornton went to the victims’ apartment because the victims were found by their friends and presumed dead. Detective Goff determined that a laptop computer and iPhone were missing from the victims’ apartment and that Ms. Williams’ Pontiac vehicle was missing.
Detective Goff testified that she entered the license plate number of the missing vehicle into the LPRS and found that on February 5, 2013, at 9:01 p.m., the vehicle passed a camera located three blocks from the victims’ residence. She also learned that the vehicle passed two cameras in Baton Rouge on February 6 and 9, 2013. On February 16, 2013, Detective Goff went to Baton Rouge after being advised that Ms. Williams’ vehicle had been located there. Detective Goff learned that defendant and Ms. Williams had been in contact with each other on Facebook and that defendant had been driving Ms. Williams’ vehicle.
Detective Goff testified that she obtained the cell phone records of defendant and Ms. Williams. She stated that a call was placed from defendant's phone to Ms. Williams’ phone on February 4, 2013, at 5:15 p.m., and on February 5, 2013, at 6:54 p.m. She stated that defendant's phone called Ms. Williams’ phone again at 7:39 p.m. on February 5, 2013, from the Swift bus stop. She learned from two independent sources that defendant took the Swift bus from Baton Rouge to New Orleans on February 5, 2013. Detective Goff noted that on February 5, 2013, defendant's phone made four calls at approximately 10:30 p.m. to someone other than Ms. Williams utilizing a tower that was located .43 miles from the victims’ residence.
Ms. Alexander testified that on February 5, 2013, defendant disappeared and did not return home until approximately 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. on February 6, 2013. She stated that defendant took a sack with him when he left. Ms. Alexander explained that after defendant left, she looked around the apartment and noticed that defendant must have taken an automatic firearm that was kept in their bedroom closet and a change of clothes because those items were no longer there.
Ms. Alexander testified that when defendant returned home, he was wearing different clothes and had a laptop computer, an iPhone, and a Pontiac vehicle, which she had never seen before. She explained that defendant told her he had just come back from New Orleans, and she understood that defendant and a friend had "pulled something off." Ms. Alexander believed that the items were stolen. She recalled defendant telling her that he had taken the Swift bus to New Orleans and that the Pontiac was a "rock rental." Mr. O'Lear testified that defendant's fingerprints were found on the Pontiac.
On the other hand, defendant said in his statement that was admitted at trial that he bought the Pontiac for $800 from an unknown person at a gas station. He stated that he did not receive a bill of sale or title for it. Defendant denied being in New Orleans or Jefferson Parish at the time of the homicides.
After hearing the testimony and considering all of the evidence, the jury clearly found the evidence presented by the State was credible and rejected defendant's version of events. The credibility of witnesses is within the sound discretion of the trier of fact, who may accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony of any witness; the credibility of the witnesses will not be reweighed on appeal. State v. Rowan , 97-21 (La. App. 5 Cir. 4/29/97), 694 So.2d 1052, 1056.
Defendant contends that the State also relied heavily upon self-serving testimony from Ms. Alexander, his transgender partner, who was not credible because she had reasons to testify favorably for the State. Nevertheless, the record reflects that the jury was made aware of Ms. Alexander's criminal background and that she pleaded guilty to obstruction of justice in the instant case. After hearing Ms. Alexander's testimony, it was the jury's duty to assess her credibility.
Defendant's specific intent to kill could be inferred by his pointing the gun at the victims and shooting them. See Hidalgo , supra . It could also be inferred by his intentional use of a deadly weapon and by the extent and severity of the victims’ fatal gunshot wounds to their heads.
Defendant argues that his convictions were obtained solely by the State's use of circumstantial evidence and that the State failed to overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Although the State relied upon circumstantial evidence to support the convictions, we find that the State negated any possibility of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof under Jackson and that a rational jury could have found the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's convictions for second degree murder.
We note that this Court has previously upheld a second degree murder conviction based on circumstantial evidence. In State v. Cochran , 09-85 (La. App. 5 Cir. 6/23/09), 19 So.3d 497, 505, writ denied , 09-1742 (La. 3/26/10), 29 So.3d 1249, this Court found that the lack of direct, physical evidence notwithstanding, the State presented circumstantial evidence that was sufficient to prove the defendant was the person who killed the victim, noting that the defendant was seen in close proximity with items belonging to the victim after the homicide.
We also find that the evidence was sufficient under the Jackson standard to support defendant's conviction of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The State's evidence established that defendant must have possessed a firearm when he shot the victims. Also, Ms. Alexander testified that defendant must have taken their gun because it was in the apartment before he left, but it was missing afterward. Further, Mr. O'Lear, the expert latent print examiner, testified that he took defendant's fingerprints and compared them to the fingerprints contained in the certified conviction packet from defendant's 2012 conviction for simple burglary of an inhabited dwelling in violation of La. R.S. 14:62.2, in the 19th Judicial District Court. Mr. O'Lear determined that both sets of fingerprints were created by defendant. Additionally, the State proved that ten years had not elapsed since the date of completion of the punishment for the prior felony conviction. Lastly, the State established that defendant had the general intent to commit the offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Accordingly, defendant's first counseled assignment of error and his pro se assignment of error are without merit.
The certified conviction packet indicates that defendant committed the prior offense on July 25, 2011, and was sentenced to four years at hard labor, suspended, and three years of active probation. The instant offense was committed on or about February 5, 2013.
In his second counseled assignment of error, defendant argues that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive life sentences for his two second degree murder convictions. He contends that the trial court failed to justify why the sentences were made consecutive, deviating from the law's preference for concurrent sentences. He further contends there was nothing in the facts of the instant case that justifies consecutive sentences. Defendant asserts that for these reasons, the imposition of consecutive life sentences in the instant case was excessive.
At the sentencing hearing on March 5, 2020, Mr. Boudreaux's mother gave a victim impact statement and the State a read victim impact statement from Ms. Williams’ mother. Following the victim impact statements, the trial judge sentenced defendant to life imprisonment without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on counts one and two to run consecutively and imprisonment at hard labor for twenty years without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence on count four, to run concurrently with any and all other sentences. The trial judge stated in pertinent part, "Mr. Miller, you executed two individuals and were callous enough to take their car and drive around in it for days and your behavior and violent outburst the last time I saw you shows that you have no remorse for these gruesome murders."
The record contains the transcript from a sentencing hearing on February 20, 2020, during which the prosecutor asked for a continuance of the sentencing hearing because the mother of one of the victims had been hospitalized and was unable to be present that day. Defense counsel objected, but the trial judge replied that victims’ families were entitled to be present and give victim impact statements. Defendant then apparently had an outburst in which he stated multiple expletives, and the trial court told a deputy to remove defendant from the courtroom. The trial court also stated that defendant would have a contempt hearing on his next scheduled hearing date.
After sentencing, defense counsel stated in pertinent part, "Your Honor, concerning the sentence you just imposed on Mr. Miller, in fact they were consecutive life sentences, Your Honor, we will file a Motion to Reconsider those sentences." She said that she had the motion prepared and was going to approach the bench. The trial judge denied the motion, stating, "Each person, Mr. Miller, that you executed has worth and value, and you will receive a life sentence for each one of those murders."
The record reflects that defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentences pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. art. 881.1. In his motion, defendant argued that a reconsideration of sentences was necessary and appropriate as the sentences were constitutionally excessive. Although defense counsel did not challenge the consecutive nature of the sentences, her oral objection to the consecutive sentences after sentencing constituted such a challenge. As such, the consecutive nature of the sentences on counts one and two is properly before this Court on appeal.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive punishment. Although a sentence is within statutory limits, it can be reviewed for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Smith , 01-2574 (La. 1/14/03), 839 So.2d 1, 4. A sentence is considered excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the offense or imposes needless and purposeless pain and suffering. Id. A sentence is grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Lawson , 04-334 (La. App. 5 Cir. 9/28/04), 885 So.2d 618, 622.
It is noted that a life sentence for second degree murder is mandatory; however, whether the sentences run consecutively is discretionary. When two or more convictions arise from the same act or transaction, or constitute parts of a common scheme or plan, the terms of imprisonment shall be served concurrently unless the court expressly directs that some or all be served consecutively. La. C.Cr.P. art. 883 ; State v. Yelverton , 12-745 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/21/13), 156 So.3d 53, 66-67, writ denied , 13-629 (La. 10/11/13), 123 So.3d 1217. A trial judge retains discretion to impose consecutive sentences on the basis of factors such as the offender's past criminal acts, the violent nature of the charged offenses, or the risk that the defendant may pose to the safety of the community. State v. Williams , 08-556 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/13/09), 8 So.3d 3, 9, writ denied , 09-330 (La. 11/6/09), 21 So.3d 298.
If the trial court elects to impose consecutive sentences for crimes arising out of the single course of conduct, it must articulate the reasons it feels consecutive sentences are necessary. State v. Cornejo-Garcia , 11-619 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1/24/12), 90 So.3d 458, 465. Although the imposition of consecutive sentences requires particular justification when the crimes arise from a single course of conduct, consecutive sentences are not necessarily excessive. State v. Bradley , 02-1130 (La. App. 5 Cir. 3/11/03), 844 So.2d 115, 118.
In the instant case, the evidence presented at trial indicates that defendant's convictions arose from a common scheme that occurred over the span of one night. La. C.Cr.P. art. 883 requires that concurrent sentences must be imposed under these circumstances, unless the trial court expressly directs that the sentences are to be served consecutively. Here, the trial judge ordered defendant's two second degree murder sentences to be served consecutively, and he articulated his reasons for the sentences. The trial judge stated that defendant had executed two individuals and was callous enough to take their car and drive around in it for days. He also stated that defendant's behavior and violent outburst at a prior court hearing showed that defendant had no remorse for these "gruesome" murders. When he ruled on the Motion to Reconsider Sentence, the trial judge explained that each person defendant executed had worth and value, and therefore, he would receive a life sentence for each one of those murders.
Courts in this state have upheld consecutive life sentences for second degree murder convictions. See State v. Pilcher , 27,085 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95), 655 So.2d 636, writ denied , 95-1481 (La. 11/13/95), 62 So.2d 466, where the court affirmed the imposition of two consecutive life-without-benefits sentences for a fifteen-year-old defendant convicted of two counts of second degree murder; State v. Coleman , 32,906 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/5/00), 756 So.2d 1218, 1248, writ denied , 00-1572 (La. 3/23/01), 787 So.2d 1010, where the court upheld the defendant's consecutive life sentences for two counts of second degree murder after noting the trial court considered the defendant's crime to be especially heinous in that he murdered two elderly victims during the commission or attempted commission of some type of robbery or aggravated burglary at the time the murders were committed causing a risk of death or bodily harm to more than one person; and State v. Wood , 08-1511 (La. App. 3 Cir. 6/3/09), 11 So.3d 701, where the court upheld consecutive life sentences for three counts of second degree murder.
Even if defendant's sentences were excessive because of their consecutive nature, a remand for resentencing would be "an academic exercise which has no practical benefit to anyone." See State v. Funes , 11-120 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/28/11), 88 So.3d 490, 510, writ denied , 12-290 (La. 5/25/12), 90 So.3d 408. Because defendant received a life sentence without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence for his conviction of second degree murder, an additional life sentence has "no practical effect as defendant will be in jail for the rest of his life unless he is pardoned." See Funes , supra .
After review, we find that the record supports the consecutive sentences for defendant's second degree murder convictions. The record reflects that defendant shot each victim in the head, after which he stole Ms. Williams’ vehicle. He also stole the victims’ laptop computer and iPhone. Defendant took Ms. Williams’ vehicle back to Baton Rouge where he drove around in it for days. The victims were not found for approximately nine days after the murders. As a result, the victims’ bodies were found in an advanced stage of decomposition by their friends. The victims’ dog, which was trapped in the room with Mr. Boudreaux, ate part of Mr. Boudreaux's deceased body. Defendant showed no remorse for his actions, and he engaged in a profanity-filled outburst in court at a hearing when he could not be sentenced that day.
In light of the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences. Accordingly, defendant's second counseled assignment of error is without merit.
ERRORS PATENT
The record was reviewed for errors patent, according to La. C.Cr.P. art. 920 ; State v. Oliveaux , 312 So.2d 337 (La. 1975) ; and State v. Weiland , 556 So.2d 175 (La. App. 5 Cir. 1990). One error requiring corrective action was noted.
There is an inconsistency between the transcript and the uniform commitment order (UCO). The UCO reflects that the adjudication date for each crime was March 5, 2020; however, the transcript reflects that it was February 5, 2020. The transcript prevails. State v. Lynch , 441 So.2d 732, 734 (La. 1983). Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to correct the UCO to conform to the transcript. We also order the Clerk of Court for the 24th Judicial District Court to transmit the corrected UCO to the appropriate authorities in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 892(B)(2) and to the Department of Corrections’ legal department. See State v. Long , 12-184 (La. App. 5 Cir. 12/11/12), 106 So.3d 1136, 1142.
DECREE
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictions and sentences for two counts of second degree murder and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We also remand to the trial court for correction of the UCO.