Our citizens may be afforded greater protections and rights under our state constitution than under the federal constitution in matters involving searches and seizures. State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992); State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 614 A.2d 1229, cert. granted, 224 Conn. 914, 915, 617 A.2d 170 (1992). Under our state constitution, a person is seized when "by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained."
We granted the state's petition for certification to appeal, limited to the following issue: "In the circumstances of this case, did the warrantless search of the defendant's car at the West Hartford police station violate article first, 7, of the Connecticut constitution?" State v. Miller, 224 Conn. 914, 617 A.2d 170 (1992). The relevant facts are reported in the decision of the Appellate Court.
The state has also enacted an intrastate exception; General Statutes 54-1f(c); that allows police officers to "pursue the offender outside of their respective precincts into any part of the state in order to effect the arrest." See State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 614 A.2d 1229, cert. granted, 224 Conn. 914, 915, 617 A.2d 170 (1992). Rhode Island General Law 12-8-3 provides that "[a]ny member of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of another state of the United States who enters this state in close pursuit, and continues within this state in such close pursuit, of a person in order to arrest him on the ground that he has committed a felony in such other state, shall have the same authority to arrest and hold in custody such person, as members of a duly organized state, county or municipal peace unit of this state have, to arrest and hold in custody a person on the ground that he has committed a felony in this state."
It is now well settled that our state constitution may provide greater rights than the federal constitution. State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn. 627, 632, 620 A.2d 746 (1993); State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635, 649, 613 A.2d 1300 (1992); State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 684, 610 A.2d 1225 (1992); State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 160, 579 A.2d 58 (1990); Cologne v. Westfarms Associates, 192 Conn. 48, 57, 469 A.2d 1201 (1984); State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 221, 614 A.2d 1229, cert. granted, 224 Conn. 914, 915, 617 A.2d 170 (1992). Because we conclude that subsection (C) does not involve protected speech and subsection (E) is void for overbreadth, we need not determine if the state constitution affords greater free speech protection than the federal constitution.
The defendant does not argue that the search of the automobile violated article first, 7, of the Connecticut constitution. See State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 614 A.2d 1229, cert. granted, 224 Conn. 914, 915, 617 A.2d 170 (1992). The trial court based its conclusion that probable cause existed on the circumstances surrounding Yukon Jack's positive alert for narcotics coupled with the corroboration of the details supplied by the informant.
Thus, the invasion of privacy occasioned by an illegal search cannot be remedied satisfactorily, even if a judge subsequently determines that the search was not supported by probable cause." State v. Miller, 29 Conn. App. 207, 220, 614 A.2d 1229, cert. granted, 224 Conn. 914, 617 A.2d 170 (1992). I disagree with the majority's statement that no search occurred and that, even if a search had occurred, subsequent to the testing the defendant's clothing "still may have been valuable to him for purposes of his own testing to counter the results of the state's examination."