(Italics ours.) State v. Groth, 144 Vt. 585, 590, 481 A.2d 26, 29 (1984); see also State v. Miller, 45 Or. App. 407, 608 P.2d 595, 597 (1980). The Oregon Court of Appeals stated:

As a threshold matter, it is clear that there was no search. Martin observed the rifle before any intrusion into the vehicle. See State v. Riley, 240 Or. 521, 523, 402 P.2d 741 (1965); State v. Miller, 45 Or. App. 407, 410, 608 P.2d 595 (1980). The dispositive issue in this case, however, is whether the seizure of the rifle meets state and federal constitutional requirements. If it does, the subsequent discovery of the pistol, on which the conviction was based, was proper.

Although the underlying purpose of a search of the person following a Terry-type stop is the protection of the police officers and is, therefore, generally limited to a pat-down search for what might be weapons, circumstances may permit a more extensive intrusion. We noted in State v. Miller, 45 Or. App. 407, 410-11, 608 P.2d 595, rev den 289 Or. 275 (1980), that: In Terry v. Ohio, supra, n 2, the Court said:

Page 740 E. g., United States v. Chesher, 678 F.2d 1353, 1356-1357, n. 2 (CA9 1982); United States v. Ocampo, 650 F.2d 421, 427 (CA2 1981); United States v. Pugh, 566 F.2d 626, 627, n. 2 (CA8 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1010 (1978); United States v. Coplen, 541 F.2d 211 (CA9 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1073 (1977); United States v. Lara, 517 F.2d 209 (CA5 1975); United States v. Johnson, 506 F.2d 674 (CA8 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 917 (1975); United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (CA6 1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (CA7 1971); People v. Waits, 196 Colo. 35, 580 P.2d 391 (1978); Redd v. State, 240 Ga. 753, 243 S.E.2d 16 (1978); State v. Chattley, 390 A.2d 472 (Me. 1978); State v. Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1980); Dick v. State, 596 P.2d 1265 (Okla.Cr. 1979); State v. Miller, 45 Or. App. 407, 608 P.2d 595 (1980); Albo v. State, 379 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1980). Likewise, the fact that Maples "changed [his] position" and "bent down at an angle so [he] could see what was inside" Brown's car, App. 16, is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.

See, e.g., United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding reasonable suspicion to detain where officers approached a parked vehicle in an area of criminal activity; one occupant was holding a baseball bat; and the defendant-occupant had his feet out of the vehicle, appeared very nervous, was stuffing his hands down in the back of the seat, and did not comply with officers' requests to show his hands); State v. Miller, 608 P.2d 595, 596-97 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (finding reasonable “the officer's belief that the baseball bat could be used as a weapon to harm him” where officer saw baseball bat in vehicle after it was stopped following a high-speed chase and aggressive driving, the suspects exited the vehicle without prompting and were suspected of being intoxicated, and officers testified to experiences where bats had been used as weapons). In these cases, the presence of a baseball bat was a consideration, but it was not the only consideration as it is here.

Johnson, 506 F.2d 674, 676 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 917, 95 S.Ct. 1579, 43 L.Ed. 2d 784 (1975); United States v. Booker, 461 F.2d 990, 992 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 1971); Albo v. State, 379 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 1980); Reddv. State, 243 S.E.2d 16, 18 (Ga. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 934, 99S.Ct. 2870, 61 L.Ed. 2d 304 (1979); State v. Chattley, 390 A.2d 472, 476 (Me. 1978); Livingston v. State, 564 A.2d 414, 417 (Md. 1989); State v.Vohnoutka, 292 N.W.2d 756, 757 (Minn. 1980); Dick v. State, 596 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Okla.Crim.App. 1979); State v. Miller, 608 P.2d 595, 597 (Or.Ct.App.), review denied, 289 Or. 275 (1980); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 51-52 (Utah), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1057, 102 S.Ct. 606, 70 L.Ed. 2d 595 (1981). C.

We have been directed to numerous cases which have extended the scope of Terry beyond the person to include searches of readily accessible, yet constitutionally protected, areas for the protection of interrogating police officers. Each case involved a "stop" of a defendant on a public street while driving in an automobile. See State v. Riley, supra, (gun protruding from under front seat of automobile); State v. McGregor, supra (zippered gun case underneath automobile seat); United States v. Rainone, 586 F.2d 1132 (7th Cir 1978) (protective search of readily accessible areas of automobile); State v. Miller, 45 Or. App. 407, 608 P.2d 595, rev den, 289 Or. 275 (1980) (seizure of baseball bat from automobile). We note first that the Supreme Court distinguished early between the constitutional protections afforded a dwelling or other building and those afforded an automobile in transit on a public street.

In that case after reviewing a number of California cases, that Court stated: See Latham v. Sullivan, Iowa App., 295 N.W.2d 472 (1980); Sumdum v. State, Alaska, 612 P.2d 1018 (1980); State v. Bennett, Hawaii, 610 P.2d 502 (1980); Pistro v. State, Alaska, 590 P.2d 884 (1979); State v. Miller, 45 Or. App. 407, 608 P.2d 595 (1980).Lorenzana v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 9 Cal.3d 626, 108 Cal.Rptr. 585, 511 P.2d 33 (1973); see also People v. Thomas, 112 Cal.App.3d 980, 169 Cal.Rptr. 570 (1980); But see Phelan v. Superior Court of Mariposa County, 88 Cal.App.3d 189, 151 Cal.Rptr. 599 (1979).

Rather, the test is whether his conduct was reasonable under all of the circumstances. State v. Miller, 45 Or. App. 407, 608 P.2d 595, rev den 289 Or. 275 (1980). Because Markee's concern for his own safety justified his limited search of the front passenger area for other weapons, he was in a place where he had a right to be when he found the mirror with the powdery substance on it. That discovery, therefore, was not the result of an illegal search. If Markee's lawful discovery of the mirror gave him probable cause to arrest defendants for possession of a controlled substance, he was then justified in seizing and opening the closed, opaque bottle as part of a search incident to arrest.

We have previously concluded that use of a flashlight is not ipso facto, a search. State v. Berg, 60 Or. App. 142, 147, 652 P.2d 1272 (1982); State v. Miller, 45 Or. App. 407, 410, 608 P.2d 595, rev den 289 Or. 275 (1980). However, we apparently relied on a Fourth Amendment analysis and its standard of "reasonable expectation of privacy," which may since have been rejected for purposes of an Article I, section 9, analysis.