Opinion
KENDC-CR-2023-06
09-21-2023
STATE OF MAINE, v. COLBY MICHAUD, Defendant.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
HON. BRENT DAVIS CHIEF JUDGE.
Defendant is charged with Aggravated Assault, Class A, in violation of 17-A M.R.S. §§ 208-D(1)(D), 1604(5)(B); Kidnapping, Class A, in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 301(1)(A)(3); Domestic Violence Assault, Class C, in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 207-A(1)(B)(1); Criminal Restraint, Class C, in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 302(1)(B)(1); and two counts of Obstructing Report of Crime or Injury, Class D, in violation of 17-A M.R.S. § 758(1)(A). On July 3, 2023, Defendant filed his motion to suppress, which came before the Court on August 31, 2023, for an evidentiary hearing. Defendant was represented by Attorney George Hess and Assistant District Attorney Amanda Seekins argued on behalf of the State. After consideration of the testimony, evidence, and legal argument presented, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law and issues this order denying Defendant's motion.
FACTS
The following facts were established from testimony and body camera footage introduced during the hearing. (State's Ex. 1.) On December 31, 2022, Officer James Leathers of the Waterville Police Department, previously of the Clinton Police Department, responded to a call regarding a domestic violence incident. During the initial investigation of that call, Officer Leathers developed probable cause to arrest defendant Colby Michaud. Defendant was not present at the location of the initial investigation. Officer Leathers learned that defendant was at his father's residence in Fairfield. When Officer Leathers arrived at the location, another officer, Sergeant Lacoste, was on the phone with defendant. Officer Leathers heard Sergeant Lacoste ask defendant to come out and speak and give defendant assurances that no canine would be released on him. Defendant emerged from another residence belonging to a different family member. Defendant walked freely towards Officer Leathers, who was standing about a couple hundred feet outside defendant's father's residence, on a road or driveway. Officer Leathers was with three other police officers, all in uniform and each driving a police cruiser. Defendant's parents were also outside the home with the police officers.
Defendant had his dog with him when he walked towards Officer Leathers. Defendant gave the dog to one of his relatives. Defendant then engaged in a conversation with Officer Leathers. Officer Leathers did not read defendant his Miranda rights at the start of the conversation, nor at any point during the conversation. The conversation was recorded on Officer Leathers' body camera and was entered into evidence. (State's Ex. 1.)
The time between when defendant arrived at the outdoor location where the officers were standing outside his father's home and when he was placed under arrest was about 15 minutes. Officer Leathers spoke to defendant about the events of the night before and earlier that day. Officer Leathers' tone was polite and compassionate, not aggressive. The entire conversation occurred outside defendant's father's home on a road or driveway. Defendant's parents engaged in conversation with the other three officers while Officer Leathers spoke with defendant, and defendant was never surrounded or physically restrained in any way during the conversation. At the end of the conversation, Officer Leathers asked defendant to walk with him towards his police cruiser, which defendant freely did, and Officer Leathers then placed defendant under arrest.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that statements made to law enforcement officers should be suppressed because he was placed in custody before administration of Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 478-479 (1966). The State argues the statements are admissible because defendant was not in custody and all statements were voluntary. A statement made to a law enforcement officer is not admissible as evidence if the defendant is in custody and subject to interrogation without receiving a warning of the defendant's rights against self-incrimination. See Slate v. Nadeau, 2010 ME 71, ¶¶ 52-53, 1 A.3d 455; see also Miranda at 478-479.
The Law Court held in State v. Holloway that "a person not subject to formal arrest may be 'in custody' if 'a reasonable person standing in the shoes of [the defendant would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave' or if there was a 'restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'" State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 23, 928 A.2d 746 (quoting Stale v. Holloway, 2000 ME 172, ¶ 14, 760 A.2d 223). In State v. Michaud, the Law Court outlined ten factors that, viewed in totality, may determine whether the defendant was in custody, including:
1. The locale where the defendant made the statements;
2. The party who initiated the contact;
3. The existence or non-existence of probable cause to arrest (to the extent communicated to the defendant);
4. Subjective views, beliefs, or intent that the police manifested to the defendant to the extent they would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
5. Subjective views or beliefs that the defendant manifested to the police, to the extent the officer's response would affect how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave;
6. The focus of the investigation (as a reasonable person in the defendant's position would perceive it);
7. Whether the suspect was questioned in familiar surroundings;
8. The number of law enforcement officers present;
9. The degree of physical restraint placed upon the suspect;
10. The duration and character of the interrogation.State v. Dion, 2007 ME 87, ¶ 23, 928 A.2d 746 (quoting State v. Michaud, 1998 ME 251, ¶ 4, 724 A.2d 1222) (citing Holloway at ¶ 19).
Applying the factors to this case, the factors that weigh in favor of a reasonable person in defendant's shoes feeling free to leave include:
- Defendant made the statements to Officer Leathers in an outdoor location, near defendant's father's house;
- Although Officer Leathers had developed probable cause to arrest defendant during his initial investigation with the alleged victim, at no point did he communicate this to defendant;
- Officer Leathers manifested to defendant that he had spoken with the alleged victim and wanted to get defendant's side of the story, which would not have an affect on a reasonable person in defendant's position;
- The focus of the conversation was on defendant and his actions earlier that day and the night before;
- The conversation between defendant and Officer Leathers occurred in familiar surroundings to defendant, as it occurred on the road or driveway outside defendant's family's homes;
- Defendant was not in handcuffs nor otherwise physically restrained in any way; and
- The conversation lasted about fifteen minutes and was nonconfrontational in character, as Officer Leathers maintained a polite and conversational tone.
The factors that weigh against a reasonable person in defendant's shoes feeling free to leave include:
- The officers initiated the conversation; see State v. Hewes, 589 A.2d 460, 461 (Me. 1991) (the court found there was "competent evidence to support a finding that the defendant did not . . . believe himself to be in custody or constrained to a degree associated with formal arrest," as he voluntarily returned to the police station to continue the conversation previously initiated by the officers); and
- Four police officers were present, standing outside their cruisers; see State v. Holloway, 2000 ME 172, ¶ 21, 760 A.2d 223 (noting a factor of custody was "whether the atmosphere was police dominated" (quoting United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1126 (8th Cir. 1995)).
The Court must view in totality all the factors and circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine whether the defendant was in custody, but "the ultimate inquiry is simply whether there [was] a "formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125). In this case, there was no formal arrest during the interrogation nor any restraint on defendant's freedom of movement.
Although there are two factors here that add weight to the interrogation being custodial, the totality of the circumstances weighs heavily in favor of the interrogation as non-custodial. First, there are many more factors pointing to an individual in defendant's shoes believing he is not in custody. Second, although the officers initiated the contact with defendant, defendant engaged in conversation voluntarily, in an area familiar to him, and in an unenclosed area. Third, although there were four police officers present, they were not engaged in the conversation with defendant but rather were off to the side and at times conversing with his family members. The presence of defendant's family members in addition to the officers, as well as the officers' placement on the scene, body postures, and actions during defendant's conversation with Officer Leathers does not lead the Court to conclude that defendant was in a police-dominated atmosphere despite the presence of four law enforcement officers.
In totality, the factors weigh in favor of a reasonable person in defendant's shoes feeling free to leave. Defendant was not physically restrained in any way, defendant walked outside to meet with Officer Leathers, and Officer Leathers met defendant with a calm, non-confrontational tone. Defendant's Miranda rights were not violated.
CONCLUSION
The Court finds defendant was not in custody during the interrogation. For the foregoing reasons, defendant's statements are admissible as evidence and the pending Motion to Suppress is hereby DENIED.
The Clerk may incorporate this order into the docket by reference in accordance with M.R.U. Crim. P. 53(a).