Opinion
No. A-12-488
12-04-2012
IN RE INTEREST OF MICHAELA A., A CHILD UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE. STATE OF NEBRASKA, APPELLEE, v. MICHAELA A., APPELLANT.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and Rachael A. Smith for appellant. Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Paulette Merrell for appellee.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
NOTICE: THIS OPINION IS NOT DESIGNATED FOR PERMANENT PUBLICATION
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY NEB. CT. R. APP. P. § 2-102(E).
Appeal from the Separate Juvenile Court of Douglas County: ELIZABETH CRNKOVICH, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Thomas C. Riley, Douglas County Public Defender, and Rachael A. Smith for appellant.
Donald W. Kleine, Douglas County Attorney, and Paulette Merrell for appellee.
IRWIN, PIRTLE, and RIEDMANN, Judges.
IRWIN, Judge.
INTRODUCTION
Michaela A. appeals from an order of the separate juvenile court of Douglas County which adjudicated her to be a juvenile within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(1) (Reissue 2008), on the basis that she had committed acts which would constitute a misdemeanor, and committed her to the Office of Juvenile Services (OJS). For the reasons explained below, we reverse the decision of the juvenile court committing Michaela to the OJS and remand the matter for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In an amended petition, the State alleged that on April 25, 2012, Michaela had committed the offense of knowingly giving false information to a police officer, in violation of the Omaha Municipal Code. The alleged offense occurred 2 days before Michaela's 18th birthday. The record suggests that there was a concurrent neglect case filed with regard to Michaela, and the court granted a motion for her detention, citing evidence that she was a flight risk, had stayed with a 30-year-old man, had used marijuana and alcohol, and was a danger to herself and others. Counsel was appointed for Michaela, and an arraignment hearing was scheduled for May 9.
At the hearing, Michaela admitted to the allegations in the petition and was adjudicated under § 43-247(1). Thereafter, a discussion ensued regarding Michaela's disposition and, specifically, whether Michaela had undergone a recent psychological evaluation. Andrea Hansen of the Nebraska Family Collaborative stated that an updated evaluation was needed as to Michaela's mental status to see what kind of treatment was needed. Under the court's questioning, neither Hansen nor the county attorney could say with certainty that Michaela had undergone a psychological evaluation in the previous 12 months. The attorney for the Department of Health and Human Services agreed that such an evaluation was necessary but stated that she did not know whether one had yet been completed. Michaela's guardian ad litem noted that Michaela had been hospitalized in January 2012 but was unsure whether an evaluation had been conducted at that time.
The juvenile court declined to order a full-scale evaluation, stating that "[t]his child is 18 years old." Nonetheless, the court found that "a psychological evaluation was done within the last 12 months, which is the only requirement by law." The court ordered Michaela committed to the OJS at the Youth Rehabilitation and Treatment Center (YRTC) at Geneva, Nebraska. Michaela has timely appealed from this order.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Michaela asserts that the juvenile court erred in committing her to the YRTC, because the commitment was not in her best interests.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews juvenile cases de novo on the record and reaches its conclusions independently of the juvenile court's findings. In re Interest of Jorge O., 280 Neb. 411, 786 N.W.2d 343 (2010); In re Interest of Dakota M., 279 Neb. 802, 781 N.W.2d 612 (2010). To the extent an appeal calls for statutory interpretation or presents questions of law, an appellate court must reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. In re Interest of Jorge O., supra; In re Interest of Dakota M., supra.
ANALYSIS
Michaela argues that the juvenile court improperly committed her to the YRTC because there was no showing that an evaluation had been completed, as required by statute, and because the court's disposition was not in her best interests. Section 43-247(1) gives juvenile courts original jurisdiction over "[a]ny juvenile who has committed an act other than a traffic offense which would constitute a misdemeanor or an infraction under the laws of this state, or violation of a city or village ordinance." As a statutorily created court of limited and special jurisdiction, a juvenile court has only such authority as has been conferred on it by statute. In re Interest of Katrina R., 281 Neb. 907, 799 N.W.2d 673 (2011). Absent any provision affirmatively stating otherwise, it is within the juvenile court's discretion to issue whatever combination of statutorily authorized dispositions as the court deems necessary to protect the juvenile's best interests. Id.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-286(1)(a) (Supp. 2011) permits several dispositions with respect to a juvenile adjudicated under § 43-247(1), including restitution, community service, probation, or placement of the juvenile in a suitable family home or institution. Under § 43-286(1)(b), the court may commit such juvenile to the OJS. However, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-413(3) (Reissue 2008) provides in part that "[a]ll juveniles shall be evaluated prior to commitment to the [OJS]."
The record in the instant case shows that the juvenile court committed Michaela to the OJS, apparently believing that the required evaluation had been performed. However, the record does not support such a finding. In its brief, the State conceded that no evaluation was entered into evidence and that the parties present at the May 9, 2012, hearing did not know whether any evaluation had been completed. The State argues that the court was nonetheless correct in finding that Michaela's commitment to the YRTC was in her best interests. We disagree. Strictly construing the applicable statutes, we find that the juvenile code simply does not permit the court to commit a juvenile to the OJS without a prior evaluation. The court's order committing Michaela to the OJS is in error and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The juvenile court's apparent belief that an evaluation had been completed is not supported by the record. The court's order committing Michaela to the OJS is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.