Opinion
No. 2-119 / 01-1373.
Filed June 19, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, RICHARD J. VIPOND (pretrial ruling) and MICHAEL S. WALSH (trial and sentencing), Judges.
Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)(a) (1999). AFFIRMED.
Craig H. Lane of Craig H. Lane, P.C., Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen C. Odell, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and Mark Campbell, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by MAHAN, P.J., and ZIMMER and EISENHAUER, JJ.
David Meyer, Jr. appeals his conviction and sentence for vehicular homicide in violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(2)(a) (1999). He contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion for adjudication of law points because the State could not prove his driving was the proximate cause of the victim's death, and (2) his conviction for vehicular homicide is not supported by substantial evidence on the element of causation. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS.
David Meyer, Jr. drank beer after work on January 16, 2000, and then fell asleep behind the wheel as he drove home. Meyer, who had a blood alcohol level of .107, swerved down Interstate 29 at eighty-five miles per hour. He nearly rear-ended several cars and ultimately crashed into a truck being driven by sixty-four-year-old Melvin Carr. Carr was thrown from his truck and suffered extensive severe injuries, including fractured cervical vertebrae, torn spinal ligaments, and a broken pelvis.
On January 19, 2000, Dr. Ralph Reeder performed surgery on Carr, who had a history of heart disease, to fuse his vertebrae. Carr survived the surgery, but fluid began to build in his lungs. On January 20, 2000, Carr went into cardiac arrest. He died the next day after life support was withdrawn.
The State charged Meyer with Count 1, vehicular homicide in violation of section 707.6A(1) (unintentionally causing the death of another by operating while intoxicated, a class "B" felony), Count 2, vehicular homicide in violation of section 707.6A(2)(a) (unintentionally causing the death of another by driving a motor vehicle in a reckless manner with willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, a class "C" felony), and Count 3, second-offense operating while intoxicated in violation of section 321J.2. Meyer filed a motion for adjudication of law points, alleging Carr died from heart problems unrelated to the accident. The court overruled his motion, finding that the stipulated evidence set out in the minutes of testimony and depositions would tend to prove that Carr would not have died if he had not been in the accident, and that Meyer's conduct created the kind of dangerous condition which made the death more likely to occur.
After Meyer's motion was overruled, the parties entered into a disposition agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the State dismissed Count 1, Meyer waived a jury, and his case was submitted to the district court for trial on Counts 2 and 3. The parties' agreement included a stipulation as to certain facts and an agreement regarding the sentence Meyer would receive if found guilty by the district court. During his bench trial, the court overruled Meyer's motion for directed verdict. The court found him guilty of vehicular homicide as charged in Count 2 and second-offense operating while intoxicated as charged in Count 3. Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate, ten-year term of imprisonment for vehicular homicide and an indeterminate, two-year term of imprisonment for operating while intoxicated, to be served concurrently. Meyer appeals.
II. MOTION FOR ADJUDICATION OF LAW POINTS.
Meyer first contends the trial court erred in overruling his motion for adjudication of law points. Meyer's motion addresses the issue of legal causation. He contends the facts alleged in the minutes of testimony and depositions submitted to the district court, even if assumed to be true, do not support the finding that he caused Carr's death. Noting Carr's extensive history of heart problems, Meyer argues the evidence does not prove that Carr would not have died if he had not been in the accident.
A. Scope of review. We review the ruling on a motion for adjudication of law points for the correction of errors at law. State v. Friend, 630 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001).
B. Merits. We assume without deciding that Meyer's motion for adjudication of law points was properly before the district court. We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Meyer's motion. Furthermore, we determine the trial court properly applied established Iowa caselaw on legal causation. Meyer's argument to the contrary is without merit.
The principles of causation normally associated with civil tort litigation are pertinent in criminal cases. State v. Murray, 512 N.W.2d 547, 550 (Iowa 1994). In determining the legal cause of death, our supreme court has endorsed the following principle:
[A]n act is a cause of an event if two conditions are satisfied: the event would not have occurred without the act; [and] the act made the event more likely. The first condition is necessary to distinguish the attempted from the completed crime, the second to rule out cases in which, while the event in question would not have occurred but for the act, the act did not create the kind of dangerous condition that would make such events more likely to occur.Id. (quoting Brackett v. Peters, 11 F.3d 78, 79 (7th Cir. 1993)).
A defendant can be relieved of criminal responsibility if an intervening act breaks the chain of causal connection between the defendant's actions and the victim's death. State v. Garcia, 616 N.W.2d 594, 597 (Iowa 2000). However, for an intervening act to relieve a defendant of criminal responsibility for homicide, the intervening act must be the sole proximate cause of death. Id.
We conclude that the accident was the legal cause of Carr's death. The evidence shows that Carr was not healthy. He suffered from artherosclerotic and hypertensive cardiovascular disease, had previously undergone heart bypass surgery, and had an automatic defibrillator implanted in his chest. However, Woodbury County Medical Examiner Dr. Thomas Carroll, who performed the autopsy, opined that the accident precipitated all the following actions and Carr's underlying disease processes were further exacerbated as a consequence of the accident. He stated,
[T]he accident set into effect a series of events that produced additional stress to his body such that he was not able to maintain normal homeostatic mechanisms to keep his life processes going and therefore the accident . . . set into effect a series of stresses on his body that he was unable to withstand.
Dr. Carroll further stated that "if [Carr] had not had an accident he would not have died of these natural disease processes." We determine that the trial court was correct in finding that (1) Carr's death would not have occurred without the accident and (2) the accident made Carr's death more likely. We affirm the trial court's ruling on Meyer's motion for adjudication of law points.
III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF LEGAL CAUSATION.
Meyer reiterates his argument under division II in support of his contention that the trial court erred in overruling his motion for directed verdict. He further contends that his conduct was not a proximate cause of Carr's death because of questionable medical decisions, including the surgery, and because Carr's family and physicians took him off life support devices. He also asserts that he never intended to harm Carr and he never intended any specific criminal act.
A. Scope and standard of review. Our scope of review is for errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. A verdict will be upheld where there is substantial evidence in the record supporting each element of the charge. State v. Tinius, 527 N.W.2d 414, 415 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). Substantial evidence means evidence which would convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
We view the record in the light most favorable to the State. State v. Bass, 349 N.W.2d 498, 500 (Iowa 1984). We draw legitimate inferences and presumptions that fairly and reasonably arise from the evidence in the record. Id. Direct and circumstantial evidence are equally probative in the examination process. State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Iowa 1981). All evidence, however, must be considered, not just evidence supporting the verdict. Bass, 349 N.W.2d at 500. In the end, the evidence must do more than raise suspicion, speculation or conjecture. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d at 479.
B. Merits. For the reasons already stated in division II of this opinion, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the State proved the required causal nexus between Meyer's criminal conduct and Carr's death.
We next turn to Meyer's contentions involving the medical decisions made in this case. In deciding whether medical treatments are superseding causes, our supreme court has stated as follows: "The intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about." Garcia, 616 N.W.2d at 597 (quotations omitted). Normal is not what is usual, customary, foreseeable, or to be expected. Murray, 512 N.W.2d at 551 (citation omitted). Instead, it means that the court in looking at the matter after the event does not regard the intervention of the new force as so extraordinary as to fall outside the class of normal events. Id. (Citation omitted.) Using this standard, we conclude that the decisions to perform surgery on Carr and to remove Carr from life support were normal consequences of the situation created by Meyer's criminal conduct.
Next, we consider Meyer's argument that he never intended to harm Carr and he never intended any specific criminal act. He asserts that an element of specific intent should be required before an accused may be criminally liable for the death of another. We do not address this issue, as Meyer raised it randomly, without elaboration or supportive authority. Soo Line R. Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 521 N.W.2d 685, 691 (Iowa 1994) (holding that a litigant's random mention of an issue, without elaboration or supportive authority, is not sufficient to raise the issue for our review). We note parenthetically that vehicular homicide is defined as an unintentional death caused by reckless driving in the statute under which Meyer was charged and convicted.
IV. CONCLUSION.
We conclude that the trial court correctly denied Meyer's motions for adjudication of law points and for directed verdict. We affirm Meyer's conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.