Opinion
2 CA-CR 2024-0178-PR
09-27-2024
Matthew J. Smith, Mohave County Attorney By James M. Schoppmann, Chief Deputy County Attorney, Kingman Counsel for Respondent William Michael Meyer, Buckeye In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Mohave County No. S8015CR201400555 The Honorable Billy K. Sipe Jr., Judge Pro Tempore
Matthew J. Smith, Mohave County Attorney
By James M. Schoppmann, Chief Deputy County Attorney, Kingman
Counsel for Respondent
William Michael Meyer, Buckeye
In Propria Persona
Presiding Judge Gard authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Staring and Judge Eckerstrom concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
GARD, Presiding Judge:
¶1 William Meyer seeks review of the trial court's order summarily dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief filed under Rule 32, Ariz. R. Crim. P. We will not disturb that ruling unless the court abused its discretion. See State v. Martinez, 226 Ariz. 464, ¶ 6 (App. 2011). Meyer has not met his burden of establishing such abuse here.
¶2 After a jury trial, Meyer was convicted of twenty-three counts of sexual exploitation of a minor based on his possession of child pornography. The jury found that each conviction was a dangerous crime against children because the victims were under the age of fifteen. The trial court sentenced Meyer to consecutive ten-year prison terms totaling 230 years' imprisonment. We affirmed his convictions and sentences on appeal. State v. Meyer, No. 1 CA-CR 15-0290 (Ariz. App. July 7, 2016) (mem. decision).
¶3 Meyer has sought and been denied post-conviction relief in two prior proceedings. In his most recent petition, filed in September 2023, Meyer argued that Wright v. Gates, 243 Ariz. 118 (2017), constitutes a significant change in the law applicable to his case and that, under Wright, his sentence is improper. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c), (g). Specifically, he claimed that he had been improperly sentenced for dangerous crimes against children because the state did not sufficiently allege or present evidence that the minors in the images he possessed were actual minors rather than "fictitious" minors. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition and denied Meyer's motion for rehearing. This petition for review followed.
¶4 On review, Meyer repeats his claim. In Wright, our supreme court determined that the version of the dangerous crimes against children statute, A.R.S. § 13-705, in effect at the time of Wright's crimes did not apply "when there is no actual child victim." 253 Ariz. 118, ¶ 15. In doing so, the court overruled State v. Carlisle, 198 Ariz. 203 (App. 2000). As we understand his claim, Meyer argues that, because the version of § 13-705 applicable to his offenses contains the same provision analyzed in Wright, he was improperly sentenced for dangerous crimes against children because the state did not show "there was any actual victim."
¶5 Even assuming, without deciding, that Meyer brought this claim within a reasonable time and thus it is not subject to summary dismissal under Rule 32.2(b), he is not entitled to relief. On appeal, Meyer raised and this court rejected the argument underlying his claim: that the state did not present sufficient evidence that the children depicted in the photographs were under the age of fifteen. In fact, he admitted on appeal that the evidence shows each child was "pre-pubescent." And as we noted, a detective had testified the minors depicted were actual children under the age of fifteen and no evidence suggests they were adults posing as children or were otherwise fictitious minors. Meyer has identified no basis for this court to depart from that reasoning. Accordingly, even if Wright could constitute a significant change in the law-a question we do not decide-it would not "probably overturn [Meyer's] judgment[s] or sentence[s]." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.1(g).
¶6 We grant review but deny relief.